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ABSTRACT 
 
WORKING WITH THE DRIVE:  A LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH TO 
THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTIONS 
 
 
 
By 
Cristina R. Laurita, M.A. 
August 2010 
 
Dissertation supervised by Bruce Fink 
This dissertation examines the clinical utility of applying Lacanian 
psychoanalytic interventions to the treatment of addictions.  By combining theoretical 
exegesis with clinical case studies of psychotherapy with patients who struggled with 
addictions, this project seeks to:  1) contribute to the improvement of the clinical 
treatment of addictions; and 2) contribute to the advancement of Lacanian clinical 
scholarship in the U.S.  Although the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan is 
well‐known in Europe and South America, Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S. is 
disappointingly sparse.  As a result, most American clinicians are not aware of the 
clinical usefulness of Lacanian theory.  This dissertation focuses on how addictions 
relate to the psychoanalytic concept of the drive, which is closely linked to the repetition 
 v
compulsion and what Lacan refers to as jouissance—a kind of painful enjoyment beyond 
the pleasure principle.  Since addictions involve drive‐related circuits of repetition and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis aims to facilitate transformations on the level of the drive, this 
dissertation proposes that Lacanian interventions may be particularly relevant to clinical 
work with addictions, which are notoriously difficult to treat.  This project explores how 
addictions are highly particular.  They manifest themselves and function in very 
different ways depending on where the individual is situated within the Lacanian 
diagnostic categories—psychosis, perversion, hysteria or obsessional neurosis—as well 
as how the individual’s experience of the drive is shaped by the particularity of his or 
her history and events of development.  This dissertation demonstrates how to go 
beyond surface behavior and transform addictions on the level of the drive.  While the 
techniques and interventions discussed within this project can be used within a wide 
range of clinical approaches, this project is the first of its kind, in that a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic approach to the clinical treatment of addictions has not yet been written. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Introduction to the Problem 
 
 Most clinical practitioners, regardless of their theoretical or clinical 
orientation, agree that addiction is one of the most difficult problems to treat.  It 
logically follows that a problem as remarkably tenacious as an addiction would 
seem to require a treatment approach that is designed to target and transform 
that which keeps an addiction so deeply entrenched and stuck in repetition.  This 
is precisely what Lacanian psychoanalytic practice aims to do:  to create shifts 
within cycles of repetition, to transform on the level of the drive.  In this light, it 
is perhaps ironic that although mainstream addiction treatment approaches 
(which largely focus on surface behavior) abound, a Lacanian clinical approach 
to the treatment of addictions has not yet been formulated.   
Accordingly, in the chapters to follow I will attempt to articulate the 
clinical utility of applying Lacanian analytic interventions to the treatment of 
addictions, by combining theoretical exposition with clinical case studies of my 
work with former patients who struggled with addictions.  My hope is that this 
project will accomplish two primary tasks:  1) to contribute to the improvement 
of the clinical treatment of addictions; and 2) to contribute to the advancement of 
Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S. 
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 Although Lacanian clinical praxis receives very little attention in the U.S., 
Lacan’s work is quite prominent in much of Europe and South America.  For 
instance, just a few years after his death, nineteen of the twenty psychoanalytic 
organizations in France were grounded in Lacan’s teachings (Nobus, 2000, p. 
213).  And yet in spite of his significant popularity in other parts of the world, 
Lacan is by no means as well known in the U.S. today.  Somewhat strangely, in 
the U.S. Lacan, a psychoanalyst who maintained a clinical focus throughout his 
life’s teachings, is more likely to be taught in literature, film, or cultural studies 
departments than in psychology departments.  In spite of the tremendous impact 
his work has had for psychoanalysts and clinical practitioners in other parts of 
the world, in the U.S. today Lacan is largely absent from the clinical dialogue.1 
As evidence of the effects of this absence from clinical dialogues, the 
majority of Lacanian scholarship in English is not clinically oriented.  Instead, we 
usually encounter a motley assortment of non-clinical “applications” of Lacan.  
For instance, Yannis Stavrakakis’s (1999) Lacan and the Political applies Lacanian 
theory to various political issues, such as Green ideology and the hegemony of 
advertising in popular culture.  Joan Copjec’s (1994) Read My Desire: Lacan 
Against the Historicists addresses everything from detective fiction to vampires, 
but nothing about desire as it relates to the psychoanalytic process itself.  Those 
                                                 
1
 The scarcity of Lacanian scholarship in the US is also partly due to the fact that much of the existing 
Lacanian literature is published in French or Spanish and is also difficult to obtain. 
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who are interested in the application of Lacan to art or literature can refer to such 
texts as Steven Levine’s (2008) Lacan Reframed: A Guide for the Arts Student, Ben 
Stolzfus’s (1996) Lacan and Literature: Purloined Pretexts, or Karen Coats’s (2007) 
Looking Glasses and Neverlands: Lacan, Desire, and Subjectivity in Children’s 
Literature.  The dubious value of too hastily “applying” Lacan to something else 
(other than clinical practice) is perhaps best exemplified by one chapter from 
Coats’s text that explicates the supposedly perverse psychic structure of Curious 
George.  Without engaging in a critique of the generally questionable scholarly 
merit of such an endeavor, let me just note that attempting to analyze a cartoon 
character such as Curious George seems to be a far cry from analyzing a real 
person!  Overall, scholarship that attempts to apply Lacan to things like film or 
literary characters, precisely because such scholarship focuses on fictional 
characters, fails to elucidate the realities of clinical work with real people.  Lacan’s 
work is about relief of suffering for real people. 
Finally, no discussion of the myriad attempts to “apply” Lacan to 
something else would be complete without giving a nod to the king of all 
Lacanian applicationists:  Slavoj Žižek.  Considering the fact that he is one of the 
best-known Lacan scholars today, it is perhaps surprising that in spite of his 
having produced over forty books (and innumerable articles), not one of them is 
directly clinical.  This highlights the extent to which Lacan studies have lacked a 
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focus on clinical work.  A consequence of this neglect of the clinic is that the rigor 
of Lacan’s work gets lost.   
In Žižek’s writing, the sheer abundance of references to literature, film, 
and so on, often creates more of a diffusion of examples than a consolidation of 
ideas.  For instance, in Žižek’s Interrogating the Real he touches on the difference 
between desire and drive by shimmying from Rear Window to Who Framed Roger 
Rabbit? to Dreamscape to Limelight and then finally to Hitchcock’s The Birds within 
the space of just one page (Žižek, 2005, p. 177).  This metonymic style seems to 
occlude more than it illuminates, and in any case it is difficult to see how readers 
who are unfamiliar with his cultural references can find such examples at all 
helpful.  Moreover, while he elaborates on the difference between desire and 
drive in those films, any relation to actual clinical work remains completely 
unexplored and thus opaque in Žižek’s text.  While two of Žižek’s most popular 
books are Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture 
and Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lacan (But Were Afraid to Ask 
Hitchcock), given what I perceive to be a significant lack of connection between 
that style of scholarship and actual clinical reality, I would suggest that readers 
stop looking awry and when they want to know something about Lacan, just ask 
Lacan himself!  A re-centering of focus on the clinical Lacan is what I believe is 
called for.   
 5
 
Lacanian Clinical Studies 
Thankfully, a few Lacanian analysts and scholars have indeed contributed 
to the project of focusing on the clinical import of Lacan’s teachings.  For 
instance, Lacanian psychoanalyst Dany Nobus’s Jacques Lacan and the Freudian 
Practice of Psychoanalysis addresses such concepts as desire, transference, and 
interpretation as they relate to clinical work.  Stuart Schneiderman’s How Lacan’s 
Ideas are Used in Clinical Practice is an interesting edited collection that includes a 
few case studies by Lacanian analysts and even a transcription of one of Lacan’s 
interviews with a psychotic patient.  Two of Bruce Fink’s books, A Clinical 
Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis and his more recent Fundamentals of 
Psychoanalytic Technique, are exemplary for their weaving together of theoretical 
points with clinical examples to demonstrate how the theory actually relates to 
clinical work.  Fink’s text traces components of the analytic process such as 
engaging the analysand in the work and making use of interpretation so as to 
open up a space of desire for the analysand.  It also elucidates Lacanian 
structural diagnoses through theoretical expositions paired with case vignettes.  
The latter text does a similar job of weaving together theory and clinical 
examples but focuses in more detail on particular technical elements of Lacanian 
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analysis, such as punctuating, scanding (the variable-length session), and ways 
of working with dreams, daydreams, and fantasies.   
In spite of these precious few scholarly contributions that successfully tie 
together theory and clinical practice, the general climate of Lacanian studies in 
the U.S. is decidedly not clinical.  For those who want to learn about what 
actually happens in Lacanian psychoanalysis, there are few scholarly sources to 
turn to.  Indeed, as Fink observes, "few if any books on Lacan available today 
talk about how one goes about doing Lacanian psychoanalysis, what it really 
involves, and what thus distinguishes it from other forms of therapy, whether 
psychoanalytically oriented or not" (Fink, 1997, p. xi).  Considering the mere 
handful of Lacanian clinical texts, as opposed to the profusion of “applications” 
of Lacan, it’s no wonder that so few people have any real sense of Lacanian 
clinical praxis.   
I think this situation often leads to unfortunate consequences.  First, 
because of the sheer abundance of works that apply Lacan to something else 
(film, art, and so on), the momentum is on the side of more and more work being 
produced that attempts to paste Lacan’s ideas onto something else (something 
other than clinical work), since those are the arenas in which scholarly dialogue 
about Lacan is primarily taking place.  I think this lack of grounding in the clinic 
sometimes leads to the production of less than rigorous scholarship and, more 
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often than not, misunderstandings or misrepresentations of many of Lacan’s 
ideas.   
Another consequence of the neglect of the clinic in Lacan studies in the 
U.S. is a drift away from what Lacan himself said was the aim of his work:  “The 
goal of my teaching has always been, and remains, to train analysts” (Lacan, 
1964/1981, p. 209).  Unfortunately, Lacan is rarely taught in psychology 
departments and, to the best of my knowledge, he is not taught at any of the 
psychoanalytic institutes in the U.S. that are affiliated with the American 
Psychoanalytic Association (at least not in any kind of systematic or thorough 
way).  Unless further contributions to the field are made that bring Lacan’s work 
back to its clinical roots, the future of clinical Lacanian work in the U.S. would 
seem to be pretty bleak. 
 
A Call for Lacanian Clinical Literature on Specific Clinical Problems 
 Of the handful of explicitly clinical books on Lacan mentioned in the 
previous section, many of them are somewhat general or broad in scope.  For 
instance, Nobus (2000) explores a very wide range of concepts as they relate to 
Lacanian clinical psychoanalysis.  As interesting and clinically relevant as 
Nobus’s book is, it still remains quite broad in its focus, spanning, for instance, 
topics as diverse as handling transference and the organization of analytic 
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training in different parts of the world.  Schneiderman’s (1980) edited collection, 
while a classic in the field, is similarly broad in scope.  It contains, for instance, a 
case study of an obsessional patient, a chapter on the onset of psychosis, and a 
chapter that discusses transexualism.  Fink’s A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis is similar in scope to Nobus’s text, but Fink’s is more tightly 
focused on different facets of the course of analysis and includes more sustained 
case vignettes.  Fink’s Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique is exemplary in its 
directly clinical relevance.  Fink successfully weaves together theory and clinical 
examples in order to explicate various aspects of Lacanian analytic techniques 
(including particular ways of listening, punctuating, and scanding), and the book 
is thus a major contribution to Lacanian clinical studies in the U.S., articulating, 
as it does, how to actually do Lacanian analytic work.   
Additionally, two recent graduates of Duquesne University have written 
dissertations that examine clinical work from a Lacanian perspective.  Yael 
Goldman’s (2004) Neurosis and Fantasy: Lacanian Theory and Case Conceptualization 
Through Three Case Studies offers Lacanian case formulations of some of her 
hysterical and obsessional clients.  Through three case studies, Michael Miller’s 
(2006) Following the Letter:  Case Studies in the Application of Lacanian Theory to 
Psychotherapy explores the clinical impact of his Lacanian interventions designed 
to follow the patient’s speech “to the letter.”   
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 In spite of the strong merits of all of these clinical contributions, because 
they are fairly wide-ranging in scope, they do not rigorously delve into the many 
facets of any one particular issue.  To the best of my knowledge, no Lacanian 
scholar has yet produced a book that weaves together the theoretical and clinical 
with a specific and rigorous emphasis on one particular clinical problem or issue.2  
The general groundwork has already been laid by the existing scholarship, and 
perhaps new clinical contributions of more specificity are called for in order to 
continue advancing the field while deepening its areas of focus. 
 For these reasons, my dissertation is designed with the aim of continuing 
to develop clinical Lacan studies in the U.S. by focusing on one particular clinical 
problem:  addictions.  In the next two sections, I will introduce why I am looking 
at the problem of addictions and why I think Lacan might actually be ideally 
suited to address issues of clinical work with addictions. 
 
Addiction as a Major Problem in the U.S. 
 Addictions (or substance use disorders) are among the most common of 
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) diagnoses today.  Indeed, a modest estimate is that 
substance use disorders affect about 1 in 10 Americans per year (Kessler et al., 
                                                 
2
 Although Rik Loose’s (2002) The Subject of Addiction is a Lacanian exploration of one problem—
addiction—it is theoretical and not clinical. 
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1994).  This is not a problem that we as clinicians can ignore in that each year, 
about 1 million Americans enter formal treatment for substance abuse (National 
Institute of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, 1993).  Of course, that estimate 
doesn’t even include the number of people who do not seek treatment for 
substance abuse.  Given the high percentage of people being affected by 
addiction and the high number of people who are actually seeking formal 
treatment for it, odds are that any clinician in the mental health field, regardless 
of theoretical orientation or institutional affiliation, will encounter many clients 
who are struggling with addictions.   
 In the DSM-IV-TR, mainstream psychological definitions of addictions are 
represented within the diagnostic categories of Substance-Related Disorders.  
Substance-Related Disorders are broken down into two categories:  Substance 
Abuse and Substance Dependence.  The DSM-IV-TR defines Substance Abuse as 
“a maladaptive pattern of substance use manifested by recurrent and significant 
adverse consequences related to the repeated use of substances” (2000, p. 198).  
In order to receive a diagnosis of Substance Dependence, an individual must 
meet the criteria for Substance Abuse and also criteria for tolerance, withdrawal 
symptoms, and a pattern of compulsive use.   
While the DSM-IV-TR defines “substances” of addiction as drugs, 
medications, or toxins, I believe this limits our ability to understand how people 
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can become addicted to other things that don’t fall within those categories, such 
as sex and gambling.  I will argue that in contrast to the mainstream 
psychological way of defining addiction, a more useful framework would be a 
Lacanian understanding of addictions as problems of the drive (which I will 
explain in a later section of this chapter) and as problems that are not necessarily 
about a particular object (substance) or specific quantity of a substance.  I thus 
believe that greater clinical efficacy in the treatment of addictions would result 
from clinicians making use of something like a Lacanian formulation of addiction 
rather than a mainstream definition of addiction. As the latter doesn’t help us to 
understand how and why people become addicted or how their addiction 
functions for them, treatment approaches based on this definition seem to lack 
the very foundational understanding upon which proper treatment should be 
built. 
 Currently, the two major mainstream treatment approaches to addictions 
in the U.S. are Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and 12-Step programs based 
on Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA).  The vast 
majority of people seeking treatment for addictions find themselves in 12-step 
programs, with approximately 3.5 million participating in AA or other 12-step 
self-help meetings (Room, 1993).  Indeed, most addiction treatment programs in 
the United States follow the 12-step intervention model (Wallace, 1996), and the 
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second most predominant treatment model is CBT.  These treatment modalities 
have become so prevalent that they are often taken to be the only treatment 
approaches that “work” or that “should” be utilized for addiction treatment.  
Nevertheless, I would argue that they are taken up in this way primarily because 
not enough substantive research has been done yet on other clinical approaches 
to the treatment of addictions.   
For a number of reasons, further research is called for.  Firstly, even 
though the American National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) devotes 
approximately $600,000,000 per year to scientific research on drug abuse (Loose, 
2002, p. xv), no one has yet been able to formulate a sound scientific explanation 
of addiction.  And yet, in spite of all of this money devoted to researching the 
problem, millions of Americans are still struggling with addictions, as evidenced 
by the statistics above.  This lack of sufficient research (assuming that more 
adequate research could have more of an impact on the high rates of addiction 
and its deleterious effects) thus affects not only the addicted individuals, but also 
society as a whole, in that the financial cost to society owing to substance use 
disorders amounts to over $100 billion per year (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1990).  What is more, relapse rates for chemical addictions 
(which include, for instance, heroin, cocaine, nicotine, and alcohol) and across all 
addiction treatment modalities are astonishingly and depressingly high:  over 
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75% (Armor, Polich, & Stambul, 1978; Hunt, Barnett, & Branch, 1971; Svanum & 
McAdoo, 1989).  These data may suggest not only that addiction is remarkably 
tenacious, but perhaps also that these predominant treatment modalities leave 
something to be desired. 
 
Lacanian Clinical Work and Addictions 
 The primary hypothesis underlying my project is that Lacanian theory 
and clinical technique may have a lot to offer with regard to the clinical 
treatment of addictions.  I will argue that addictions are problems of the drive 
and that Lacan is particularly relevant to the topic of the addictions precisely 
because Lacanian psychoanalysis has an impact at the level of the drive.  Indeed, 
as Fink states, “the drives themselves undergo a kind of transformation in the 
course of analysis” (Fink, 1997, p. 209).  It therefore logically follows that a 
clinical approach that has as one of its primary goals a transformation of the 
drives might be particularly relevant to clinical work with addictions. 
Drives are very closely linked with repetition compulsion and jouissance 
(a sort of “kick” or enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle, for Lacan).  It is 
easy to see how the addict’s tendency to get caught up in repetitive cycles of 
pursuing some kind of enjoyment (e.g., getting high) over and over again is an 
extreme example of “the circuit of the drive” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 178).  As such, 
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considering how to work with addictions through the techniques of Lacanian 
analysis should be productive.   
I will now offer an overview of the existing Lacanian literature on 
addictions, because it is vis-à-vis the arguments posited in that scholarship that I 
will situate my own ideas. 
 
 
What Lacanian Literature on Addiction is Already Extant and What are its 
Limitations (Why Do We Need More)? 
 
 The existing Lacanian literature on addiction is disappointingly sparse.  
There is but one book to date that offers a Lacanian perspective on addiction!  
This contribution is Irish Lacanian psychoanalyst Rik Loose’s book, The Subject of 
Addiction (2002).  Although Loose’s book is a major contribution towards 
bringing together Lacanian studies and the field of addictions, I believe that 
certain elements of his argument are flawed.  The fact that his book is primarily 
theoretical and not grounded in the clinical realm is another limitation, at least 
from the perspective of Lacanian clinical studies.  Consequently, more work is 
called for—work that is specifically grounded in the clinical realm and addresses 
how theory and practice can come together in formulating and putting into effect 
a Lacanian approach to the treatment of addictions.  
Without engaging in an exhaustive review of Loose’s book, I will give a 
general overview of his central argument here.  In The Subject of Addiction, Loose 
 15
presents his specific way of understanding addiction as an “actual neurosis” and 
as a symptom that is not symbolically structured.  Loose suggests that addiction 
is related to “Freud’s (often forgotten) clinical category of the actual neuroses . . . 
[which] would make addiction a clinical entity which is separate from the other 
clinical structures and their symptoms” (Loose, 2002, p. 218).  Loose’s way of 
formulating addiction (similar to Paul Verhaeghe’s [2004] rehabilitation of the 
notion of the actual neuroses in On Being Normal and Other Disorders) is grounded 
in his sense that actual neuroses involve a confrontation with the real: 
The actual neuroses are an anxiety reaction to the direct confrontation 
with the real, because psychic processing is lacking in essential points.  
The psychoneuroses are a continuous processing of this traumatic real 
with signifiers and symptoms (i.e., symbolically structured formations of 
the unconscious).  The psychoneuroses are an attempt to cure the original 
real trauma.  The actual neuroses lack this type of cure because there is no 
pacifying symptom. (Loose, 2002, p. 219) 
What this boils down to is an argument that actual neuroses (including 
addictions) are “not symbolically structured” (Loose, 2002, p. 146).  Indeed, 
Loose claims that in the actual neuroses there is a failure to symbolize, regulate, 
process, and delimit an anxiety-inducing confrontation with the real (e.g., that 
which is unsymbolized, traumatic, beyond the pleasure principle, etc.).  Loose 
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posits that because “The actual neuroses are characterized by an anxiety against 
which the subject cannot defend himself” (Loose, 2002, p. 219) addicts, here 
conceived as “actual neurotics,” turn to drugs precisely because “One way out of 
the actual neurotic impasse is by regulating the organism with drugs and 
alcohol” (Loose, 2002, p. 219).   
Although Loose’s book is a noteworthy piece of scholarship, I believe it 
has a number of limitations.  For instance, I disagree with his argument that 
addiction is based in actual neurosis, and is not a symbolically structured 
symptom.  In the chapters to come, I will give case examples that support my 
claim that it is erroneous to assume that addictions are always actual neuroses.  
In addition to disagreeing with Loose’s particular alignment of addictions with 
actual neuroses, I also think he makes the mistake of turning addiction into a 
separate diagnostic category (seemingly distinguishing it from neurosis, 
psychosis, and perversion, which is a mistake also made in the DSM-IV-TR).  
What is interesting is that Loose’s characterization of addiction as a form of 
actual neurosis might actually repeat the same kind of mistake made in 
mainstream approaches such as CBT and AA.  Just as CBT and AA assume that 
addiction is a general and monolithic whole, so too does Loose’s understanding 
of addiction reduce it to one supposedly consistent and univocal category by 
proposing a sort of general nomination:  a claim that addiction is actual neurosis, 
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a general and separate diagnostic category, and so on.  In the chapters that follow 
I will present several clinical case studies that demonstrate how addiction is 
extremely complex and variable and that it can indeed be seen to be operative 
within the traditional Lacanian diagnostic categories.  I will explore, for instance, 
how addiction in a psychotic subject is qualitatively different from addiction in 
an obsessional neurotic subject, and that those diagnoses do not in any way 
depend on assuming that addiction is actual neurosis.   
Another limitation of Loose’s book is that it is highly theoretical and not 
clinical.  Unfortunately, Loose does not offer concrete clinical examples or cases 
to illustrate what his ideas look like in the clinical realm, and so his claims 
remain abstract.  Further, his presentation makes it difficult to evaluate the 
efficacy of his theoretical ideas.  Finally, the book does not offer a way to work, 
analytically/clinically, with addicted patients.  As such, his book remains just as 
limited as the “applications” of Lacan detailed earlier, at least in terms of the lack 
of connection with the clinical realm. 
I believe the primary strength of Loose’s work is the way he argues that 
we can only know about the cause and nature of someone’s addiction by 
listening to the subject: 
The cause of addiction cannot be known a priori and . . . this cause can 
only be articulated by the subject.  One is only able to get to know 
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something about how the effects of drugs and alcohol cause addiction by 
listening to how the subjects speak about their drug taking and how these 
drugs affect them. (Loose, 2002, p. 110) 
Unfortunately, since Loose does not include case studies that might present just 
that—how the subjects speak about their drug taking—his argument goes 
unsubstantiated.  My primary hope for this dissertation is that the case studies 
that I present here will return our focus to the clinic and, fundamentally, to the 
subjects’ speech.  Lacanian work is indeed nothing but that. 
In addition to Loose’s book, there are a few other sources of Lacanian 
literature on addictions, though they are mainly shorter article-length works that 
do not set out to build the same kind of theoretical edifice that Loose’s does.  For 
instance, a number of particularly interesting ideas related to a Lacanian 
perspective on addictions are offered by French psychoanalyst Eric Laurent 
(1996) in his essay “From Saying to Doing in the Clinic of Addiction and 
Alcoholism.”  Unlike Loose, who aligns addiction with actual neurosis, thus 
making it into something of a general category, separate from the other Lacanian 
diagnostic categories, Laurent begins to suggest ways in which addictions might 
be understood in terms of the pre-existing Lacanian diagnostic categories.   
Nevertheless, Laurent’s speculation on this issue is limited, and does not 
go far enough.  Falling short of offering a full exploration of the ways in which 
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addiction might show itself in each of the diagnostic categories, Laurent simply 
suggests that “The drug incarnates a function connected either to desire or to 
delusion, according to the subject’s structure” (Laurent, 1996, p. 132).  Laurent’s 
comment is rather compelling, but he offers neither more of a theoretical 
exposition nor case material that might further illuminate his ideas.  In addition 
to offering this quick suggestion that addiction might fruitfully be understood in 
terms of the diagnostic structures, Laurent also indicates that the analytic 
treatment of addictions can operate within any of the three Lacanian orders—
imaginary, symbolic, or real.  Still, he does not say what those different treatment 
situations would look like, why the treatment would wind up operating in any of 
those orders, or why the analyst perhaps should try to situate the treatment there 
and to what effect.  And so, overall, while Laurent certainly offers a few very 
compelling ideas, they do not get unpacked or built out into a full exploration of 
how this would get played out in a Lacanian treatment, which limits the value of 
his contribution.   
 Charles Melman (1980), in his “Essay in Clinical Psychoanalysis: The 
Alcoholic,” also takes up the question of how addictions can function within the 
logic of each Lacanian diagnostic structure.  Indeed, his article discusses how to 
locate alcoholism within the diagnostic structures, as he considers whether it 
makes sense as neurotic, psychotic, or perverse.  By the end of the article, 
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Melman suggests that alcoholism is a perversion because it involves a relation to 
an object that is not sexual.  While I appreciate his effort to try to think about 
how addictions relate to diagnostic structures, I nevertheless feel he errs in 
attempting to rigidly link alcoholism to just one diagnostic structure.  The notion 
that alcoholics are always perverts is suspiciously reductive, and from what I 
have seen in several of my patients who are alcoholic but not perverse, his claim 
simply doesn’t hold up to the clinical reality I have encountered.  I believe that 
Melman’s article makes theoretical errors in linking alcoholism and perversion, 
and I hope to demonstrate through the case studies in this dissertation that 
alcoholism (or addictions to a variety of substances) can potentially show itself in 
any of the diagnostic categories.  That is, one of my fundamental arguments in 
this dissertation is that there is no one-to-one link between particular substances 
and psychoanalytic diagnoses. 
 I believe a more sophisticated attempt to understand the relation between 
an addiction and a psychic structure is made by Gabriela van den Hoven (2002) 
in her essay “Toxicomania in Context.”  In this essay, she includes a very brief 
case vignette of a psychotic patient who was a recovering drug addict.  She 
discusses how the patient used drugs in order to deal with his sense that he was 
not a part of the human race, which is one form of the psychotic’s sense of being 
outside the social fabric.  She also discusses how the patient used drugs in an 
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attempt to detach from his body.  In addressing how he turned to drugs to deal 
with the feeling that his body was overtaken by an overwhelming anxiety that 
left him feeling invaded, van den Hoven successfully begins to draw links 
between addiction and the patient’s experience of psychosis.  The primary 
weakness of her essay is that this case vignette comprises a mere two pages!  This 
description of a case of a psychotic patient in drug withdrawal offers 
illuminating initial thoughts, but doesn’t go far enough.  She doesn’t offer many 
case details, nor does she address what the analytic process was actually like.  
Accordingly, we’re left wondering how the initial, valuable link that van den 
Hoven builds between addiction and diagnostic structure actually impacts the 
course of the treatment.   
 Thus, there are some interesting initial contributions to the potentially 
fertile field of Lacan and addictions.  Nevertheless, their limitations are that they 
remain on the level of abstract theory, put forth flawed hypotheses, or make 
interesting clinical or theoretical contributions that simply aren’t taken far 
enough.  More in-depth work tying together theory and detailed case studies is 
needed. 
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Introduction to the Method 
 In an attempt to contribute both to the advancement of Lacanian clinical 
work and to the fields of addictions and Lacanian studies, I will bring together 
the theoretical and the clinical.  For this reason I have chosen to ground my 
theoretical expositions in concrete data:  clinical case studies.  I believe the 
qualitative methodology of the case study is a research method that is ideally 
suited to an exploration of clinical phenomena.  I believe case study research is a 
good medium through which to explore the complexity and multiple meanings 
of what our patients talk about in therapy.  Robert Yin, an authority on 
qualitative research, echoes this idea when he states that “the distinctive need for 
case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.  In 
brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003, p. 2).  Case studies, by 
allowing the researcher to tell a story about what happens in psychotherapy, 
allow us to study real life events in a way that preserves their richness and 
inherent complexity.  Since the therapeutic process is fundamentally an 
interpersonal interaction grounded in speech, the narrative approach of the case 
study allows us to focus on what is actually said between patient and clinician in 
the therapeutic process.  The case study methodology allows us to tell a story 
about therapeutic interactions that most closely matches the phenomena.  This is 
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particularly appropriate given Lacan’s notion that fundamentally, 
“psychoanalysis has but one medium: the patient’s speech” (Lacan, 1956a/2006, 
p. 206). 
 By exploring in detail what actually happened in each of my cases, I will 
highlight how certain therapeutic interventions may have contributed to shifting 
the structure of each patient’s addiction.  I believe this approach (trying to 
understand and articulate the elements of clinical work that actually facilitate 
change) is an essential component not only of improving the treatment of 
addictions but also of furthering the growth and development of the field of 
psychoanalysis itself.  As Lacan attests, “If psychoanalysis can become a science 
(for it is not yet one) and if it is not to degenerate in its technique (and perhaps 
this has already happened), we must rediscover the meaning of its experience” 
(Lacan, 1956a/2006, p. 221).   
In other words, in order to avoid what Russell Walsh (2004) describes as 
the “widely acknowledged gap between research and clinical practice” we need 
more research that has a direct bearing on clinical work and focuses on the why 
and wherefore of how therapy is conducted (Walsh, 2004, p. 3).  Unfortunately, 
there is precious little scholarship that does just that.  Indeed, as British analyst 
Ernesto Spinelli (1997) states, "what takes place between the therapist and the 
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client once the door to the consulting room has been shut continues to remain 
something of an enigma."   
 Including case studies in my dissertation should contribute to bridging 
the gap between research and clinical practice, but it is important to recall that 
this gap was much smaller during the early days of psychoanalysis when case 
studies were by no means a rarity.  Josef Breuer’s famous case study of “Anna 
O.” marks the beginning of the psychoanalytic case study tradition.  The case 
illustrates how the “talking cure,” as “Anna O.” named it, proceeds by way of 
the unraveling and working through of symbolically structured symptoms, 
allowing “strangulated affect to find a way out through speech” (Freud & 
Breuer, 1895/1974, p. 68).  Of course, Freud was also a proponent of case studies.  
In fact, Freud’s (1895) Studies on Hysteria, in which he offers four case studies of 
his work with hysterical women—“Frau Emmy von N.,” “Miss Lucy R.,” 
“Katharina,” and “Elisabeth von R.”—has been called the “starting point of 
psycho-analysis” (see Strachey, SE II, p.xvi).  His most famous cases—Dora, the 
Rat Man, Little Hans, and the Wolf Man—also offer careful and detailed 
accounts of both the process of analysis and the theoretical concepts 
underpinning it.  I hope to follow in this tradition of combining rigorous clinical 
and theoretical exposition in the case studies in my dissertation. 
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Overview of the Chapters 
 The case studies in the chapters that follow will situate each patient within 
Lacanian structural diagnostic categories (hysteria, obsessional neurosis, 
perversion, or psychosis) as opposed to Loose’s approach of reducing addictions 
to the category of the actual neuroses.  Theoretical issues related to how certain 
features of each diagnostic category (psychic structure/character structure) might 
show themselves in addictions will be expounded upon in the theoretical 
chapters and highlighted through the case studies.  I will emphasize, for 
instance, how an addiction in an obsessional neurotic is very different from an 
addiction in a psychotic.   
Throughout the chapters I will place particular emphasis on the drive, 
jouissance, repetition compulsion, and desire—concepts closely associated with 
Lacanian analysis and well suited to thinking about and working with 
addictions.  To make those ideas clearer and to indicate how they show 
themselves clinically, I will focus heavily on clinical examples—detailed case 
studies—from my own past work with patients.3  Fundamentally, I will take up 
these clinical examples to show how a Lacanian approach to clinical work might 
have a transformative impact on addictions.   
                                                 
3
 My data will come from therapy notes written during or immediately after sessions and also from my own 
memory of what happened in sessions. 
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Chapter 2, simply titled “The Drive,” is a detailed theoretical chapter on 
the drive which lays much of the theoretical groundwork upon which many of 
the ideas that I explore in more detail throughout the other chapters is built.  
Although this chapter addresses how both Freud and Lacan conceptualize the 
drive, I place greater emphasis on the latter, insofar as Lacan’s ideas about the 
drive are the primary focus of this project.  I explain how Lacan’s theorization of 
the drive includes ideas about the partial drives—oral, anal, scopic, and 
invocatory—though he in many ways generalizes the concept of the drive.  That 
is, later in his career Lacan focuses less on partial drives and more on “the drive” 
or “jouissance” itself.  Nevertheless, I will suggest that Lacan’s later work on 
jouissance can be reconciled with his earlier work on the drive—his ideas from 
the 1950s and 60s about the drive’s connection to the subject taking a position in 
relation to the Other’s demand.  I will highlight ways in which the subject can try 
to either satisfy or refuse to satisfy the Other’s demand and that the subject’s 
drive-related activity can take shape in relation to how he or she takes a position 
in relation to the Other’s demand or remains “stuck” or fixated on it, so to speak.   
My most central argument in this project is that addictions are 
experienced in very different ways depending not only on the subject’s structural 
diagnosis but also on the particular ways in which the subject goes through 
castration or Oedipalization.   
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As for the way in which addictions differ with regard to diagnostic 
structures, I will argue that in neurosis, castration or Oedipalization (or the 
imposition of the paternal metaphor, as Lacan also puts it) symbolically installs a 
kind of loss.  That is, by way of primal repression through the operation of the 
paternal function, the subject imagines that a kind of supreme jouissance has 
been lost to him or her.  That generates a drive to recover some jouissance.  
Moreover, the way in which that loss occurs is particular to each subject, and 
results in the subject’s particular attempt to recover some of that lost jouissance.  
That is precisely what I will explore through the case studies. 
Whereas neurotics undergo castration and emerge as lacking subjects who 
then experience a drive to recover some jouissance they imagine has been lost, 
psychotics do not undergo castration.  While neurotics experience the drive as 
attempts to recover some jouissance—which they often seek to do through 
addictions—psychotics do not experience that loss of jouissance by way of 
castration and therefore, I will argue, their drive manifests itself in a completely 
different way.  That is, psychotics do not experience a loss of jouissance, and so 
the drive for psychotics often takes the form of something closer to a kind of 
overwhelming experience of unregulated drives, impulses, and sensations—not 
reigned in by the castration process.  Psychotics then seek not to recover some 
lost jouissance but rather seek ways of defending against and forming limits, 
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barriers, or forms of protection against the drive.  These are complicated ideas 
that will be explained in much more detail throughout the theoretical chapters 
that follow and then illustrated by way of clinical examples. 
In sum, the most overarching argument in this project is that the subject’s 
relation to the drive is established, on a structural level, by how the subject 
proceeds through the castration complex or becomes Oedipalized (or doesn’t, as 
is the case with psychotics) and how the subject takes a position in relation to the 
demand of the Other.  Desire and drive get structured by those events or logical 
processes within the subject’s development.  Since the way in which castration 
operates for each subject is very particular, the subject’s relation to the drive is 
also very particular.  By extension, that also means that each subject’s addiction 
is particular.  In this chapter I focus on the drive as it relates to neurosis and then 
take up psychosis in more detail starting with Chapter 5. 
My examination, from a clinical perspective, of the relation between 
neurosis and addiction begins in Chapter 3, in which I present a case study of 
Buck—an obsessional neurotic patient who abused multiple substances.  I focus 
on how Buck’s drive to recover some jouissance associated with his mother—a 
jouissance that he imagined as having been lost—manifested through some of his 
more “oral” addictions.  That chapter includes a discussion of those many 
manifestations of Buck’s self-described attempts to find satisfaction by putting a 
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whole host of objects in his mouth—from soda to paperclips—which 
fundamentally had to do with his experience of himself as lacking and his 
attempts to overcome that lack, by filling it with some object.  I also discuss how 
Buck’s more “anal” manifestations of the drive took shape in relation to what he 
interpreted as the Other’s (his father’s) demand that he succeed in college and 
make good use of his educational experiences.  That is, Buck derived a great deal 
of jouissance, or drive satisfaction, from his refusal to satisfy his father’s demand.  
This strategy included pushing his father to yell at him.  In discussing the role of 
the obsessional’s relation to the drive as it was manifested through Buck’s 
addictions, I also highlight how he maintained his desire as impossible, which is 
a key feature of obsessional neurosis according to Lacan. 
Chapter 4, “The Color of Emptiness: Re-enacting the Paternal Metaphor—
From Darkness to Light—In an Attempt to Transform ‘Mamajuana’ into 
Ordinary Marijuana,” contains a case study of a different obsessional neurotic 
patient:  Phil.  In that chapter I describe how Phil’s addiction to marijuana took 
two forms.  One experience of smoking marijuana was pleasurable and limited 
(within the bounds of the pleasure principle) while at other times he experienced 
smoking marijuana as incredibly anxiety-inducing and painful (beyond the 
pleasure principle).  The latter was what led him to seek treatment, and I relate 
this painful addiction to the way in which his addiction manifested as a drive-
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related activity associated with recovering or reexperiencing some jouissance 
associated with a kind of primal fusion with the mother.  He achieved an almost 
lethal immersion in the mother by his suffocation and aphanisis through 
smoking.  I describe his interpretation of his mOther’s demand as being 
something like “fuse with me and die.”  I also detail the precedents within the 
family narrative that led him to form that interpretation of the Other’s demand 
and I describe how he lived out that demand to suffocate himself and lethally 
fuse with his mother through the cycles of his addiction.  Within that chapter I 
also call attention to technical interventions that were focused less on meaning 
than nonmeaning—that is, interventions that involved attending to the letter of 
the patient’s speech and working between meaning and nonmeaning to modify 
jouissance.   
Chapter 6, “Psychosis and the Drive,” is a presentation of my own 
theoretical conceptualization of a Lacanian way of understanding psychosis and 
the drive.  This chapter thus also establishes the groundwork for my 
conceptualization of the relation between psychosis and addiction.  This is not 
something that was theorized by Lacan, and so what I present in this chapter and 
the two cases of psychosis which follow it is my own attempt to make use of 
some of Lacan’s ideas.  As those are not brought together by Lacan, I thus draw 
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my own conclusions and put forward my own formulations that involve a 
Lacanian way of understanding the psychotic’s relation to the drive.   
In Chapter 7, “A (W)hole Feeling:  Filling in and Creating Holes to Modify 
the Drive,” I present a detailed case study of Nadia—a psychotic patient whose 
addictions included drive-related behaviors involving cutting, bulimia, and 
drinking and writing.  I will discuss how her relation to the drive involved her 
turning to her various addictions as attempts to form defenses against 
experiences of invasions or jouissance.  That is, Nadia’s addictions were attempts 
to regulate the drive—which, because of her psychotic structure was not 
regulated or limited—by either filling in or creating holes.  Through her cutting 
and her bulimia she tried to create holes or lack, primarily in jouissance itself in 
an attempt to delimit it.  Through her drinking and writing she tried to plug up 
various kinds of anxiety-inducing holes (such as a question for which she could 
find no answer) by which she felt overwhelmed and consumed.  These will be 
explained in greater detail through the presentation of the case.  
In Chapter 8, “Working Within and Reorganizing a Delusional Structure:  
The Case of the Woman who Believed she was Jesus Christ,” I present the case of 
Janice—a psychotic woman who had a full-blown delusional structure in which 
she believed she was Jesus Christ.  I discuss her alcohol addiction and writing as 
being wrapped up in her delusional structure and as attempts to regulate and 
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defend against her experience of the drive.  I center my discussion of Janice’s 
experience of the drive around her having felt invaded by command auditory 
hallucinations which told her to hurt or kill her daughter.  Since she did not feel 
very capable of resisting those commands (which I also describe as a psychotic 
form of the demand of the Other), she turned to drinking and writing as ways of 
trying to defend against that manifestation of the drive through the voices and 
their commands to commit acts of violence.   
Throughout Chapters 7 and 8, I present further thoughts about how the 
drive as the subject’s position in relation to the Other’s demand might still be 
operative within psychosis, even though the psychotic’s relation to the Other is 
very different from the neurotic’s.  Also, in both of the cases of psychosis, I 
emphasize that the addictions Nadia and Janice struggled with were symptoms, 
loosely speaking, of a much more all-encompassing problem—their difficulties in 
regulating and forming defenses against the drive.  I thus call attention to the fact 
that the modification of the patients’ addictions—and thus the modification of 
their relations to the drive—followed from work being done not so much directly 
on the addictions but rather on a much more structural level.  That is, it involved 
modifying, within their psychotic structures, what was causing the addictions, 
just as my work with Buck and Phil involved modifying the drive-related aspects 
of their addictions as they had to do with their neurotic structures.   
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In Chapter 9, the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I discuss the 
results of my findings, limitations of my project, and implications for future 
research. 
Overall, I believe an approach that weaves together the theoretical and the 
clinical while also offering an in-depth exploration of a particular clinical 
problem is important for a few reasons.  First, as I indicated, there is precious 
little scholarship in English on Lacan from a clinical perspective.  Indeed, we 
need more clinical contributions.  As Stephen Friedlander (2000), in his essay 
“Lacan and the Clinic,” argues: 
The reason that American analysts and other clinicians have little 
familiarity with Lacan and little appreciation for its relevance to 
their work is that the bulk of the writing in English on Lacan is 
devoted to theory. Clinical case studies in English are in decidedly 
short supply. Relatively few clinicians present their own work and 
show how the theory applies to phenomena that other clinicians 
encounter in the framework of their own practices. (Friedlander, 
2000, p.137)  
 Work that can begin to bridge the gap between theory and practice is thus 
very important for the development of Lacanian scholarship and clinical work.  
So too will it be important to the development of the study and treatment of 
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addictions.  My hope is that this approach will begin to deepen that field and 
shed further light on some important features of addictions, while perhaps also 
illuminating particular elements of Lacanian theory that have not yet been 
explored.  For instance, although Lacan placed a strong emphasis on the role of 
the drive (and jouissance), no one has yet produced any scholarship on the 
important role of (and how to work with) the drive in Lacanian clinical work.  In 
offering a theoretical formulation and pairing it with vignettes of case material, 
my work lays the foundation for further work on addictions from a Lacanian 
clinical perspective. 
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Chapter 2 
THE DRIVE 
A subject, through his relations with the signifier, is a subject-with-holes (sujet troué).  
These holes came from somewhere  
(Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 184).  
 
In the previous chapter I noted that in this project I would examine 
addiction through the lens of Lacan’s concept of the drive.  There I provided a 
brief gloss that the drive was closely related to jouissance—a kind of painful 
enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle—and the repetition compulsion.  Lacan 
even defines jouissance as “the satisfaction of a drive” (Lacan, 1959-1960, p. 209).  
Jacques-Alain Miller further clarifies that the drive is “an activity related to the 
lost object which produces jouissance” (Miller, 1996, p. 425).  In this chapter I will 
take up and unpack these ideas by offering a careful exposition of Lacan’s 
conceptualization of the drive.   
Most generally, “the drive” and jouissance are practically synonymous, 
the latter being the satisfaction that characterizes the former.  Moreover, the 
subject’s position in relation to jouissance (and thus the drive) is very particular.  
That is, the subject can either seek to recover some lost jouissance (more 
characteristic of neurosis) or seek to defend against or attempt to limit jouissance 
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(more characteristic of perversion and psychosis).  The way in which some 
enjoyment comes to be retroactively determined to have been lost (or comes to be 
something the subject seeks to defend against or limit) is thus very particular for 
each subject, which means that the subject’s experience of the drive is very 
particular.  This will have consequences with regard to how subjects can 
experience addictions in very unique ways, depending both on their psychic 
structure (within Lacanian structural model of diagnosis—neurosis, perversion, 
psychosis) and the particular events that come to constitute castration, or how 
they enter language and experience some loss of jouissance.  I am briefly 
introducing these ideas here in order to set the stage for what is to come, but 
these ideas will be explained in more detail throughout this chapter (as they 
relate to neurosis) and in Chapter 5 (as they relate to psychosis).   
As I will explain, the drive can alight on various objects and can involve, 
even if by way of their logical structure, different erogenous zones.  Freud 
suggests that there are partial drives (which correspond to a source/erogenous 
zone and an object), such as the anal drive (anus, feces) and the oral drive 
(mouth, breast).  Lacan adds to that list the scopic drive (eyes, gaze) and the 
invocatory drive (ears, voice).  Later in this chapter I will emphasize the 
importance of not getting bogged down in theorizing the drive according to any 
strict connection to erogenous zones.   
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Overall, it is important to note that Lacan often generalizes his concept of 
the drive—and therefore refers more broadly to “the drive” rather than 
individual “drives”—in order to refer to the subject’s structural relation to 
jouissance.1  Moreover, while in the 1950s Lacan theorizes the drive in terms of 
its connection with the demand of the Other (the drive being precisely an 
articulation of the subject’s relation to the Other’s demand, which I will discuss a 
bit further on in this chapter), later in his career his emphasis shifts slightly and 
he begins to accentuate the concept of “jouissance” itself.  Nevertheless, I believe 
jouissance and the subject’s position in relation to the demand of the Other are 
closely connected in important ways.   
For these reasons, throughout this project I will refer most often to “the 
drive” and only sometimes discuss more specific partial drives.  Overall, I will 
emphasize the grammar of the drive and how each drive relates to the subject’s 
response to the Other’s demand.  That is, I find it more useful, as will be reflected 
in my approach to this project, to focus on how the structure of the drive operates 
for each subject—referring to its logical, formal, and grammatical structure as 
that which governs how the neurotic subject attempts to recover some lost 
enjoyment, or how the perverse or psychotic subject tries to get limits set on or to 
                                                 
1
 Lacan often refers to “jouissance” in general without always restricting his theorization by specifying a 
particular kind of jouissance (e.g., Other or phallic).  Similarly, he also often refers to “the signifier” in 
general, which indicates his focus on the signifier’s role, structure, and function.   
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defend against some experience of jouissance.  That is, I will examine the 
structure of the drive and thus the structure of jouissance itself.   
Before examining, through detailed case studies in the chapters to come, 
the relationship between the drive and addictions, and how to work with drives 
clinically to have an impact on addictions, it is first necessary to take a theoretical 
detour through Lacan’s work on the drive.  This is by no means a simple task, in 
that the drive is one of the most notoriously complex of Lacan’s concepts and one 
would be hard pressed to find any clear and sustained exposition of it within 
existing Lacanian scholarship (clinical or theoretical).  Nevertheless, I will 
highlight some of what I understand to be the main features of Lacan’s theory of 
the drive.2  I will do this with the case studies in mind, by thus highlighting not 
only general elements of Lacan’s work on the drive but also by paying particular 
heed to the elements that will feature most heavily in the cases that I present in 
the chapters to come.  What follows is, of course, my own reading of Lacan’s 
ideas, and no doubt other readings would be possible.  In this chapter I will focus 
on the drive in general and as it operates within neurosis.  My thoughts on the 
specificity of the drive in perversion and psychosis will come later in this project.   
                                                 
2
 Some of my readers may find my exposition to be overly complex, and some may find it to be a reduction 
or oversimplification of what are certainly very complicated and multivalent theoretical constructs.  My 
intention in this chapter is not to say it all—Lacan certainly emphasizes the impossibility of that!—but to 
highlight the aspects of Lacan’s work on the drive that I find to be most relevant to my own theorization 
about addictions.  Furthermore, I am making an effort in this chapter to explain, as clearly as possible, a 
number of Lacan’s symbols and mathemes because these will come up again in the subsequent chapters.  
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The difficulty that comes with attempting to make sense of Lacan’s 
concept of the drive is not simply due to Lacan being abstruse or supposedly 
elliptical in his theorizing (though those can certainly play a role at times!) but 
rather has to do with the nature of the concept of the drive itself.3  Freud himself 
even acknowledged how difficult it is to not only think about drives on a 
theoretical level but also to recognize, grapple with, and work with drives in the 
clinic:  “In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never 
sure that we are seeing them clearly” (Freud, 1932/1964, p. 95).   
Another way to frame the difficulty inherent in getting a handle on the 
concept of the drive is to highlight the fact that the drive cannot be thought 
outside of its psychical representatives.  On that point, Lacan agrees with Freud:   
I am indeed of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and 
unconscious does not hold for drives. A drive can never be an object of 
consciousness—only the idea that represents the drive. Even in the 
unconscious, moreover, it can only be represented by the idea. If the drive 
                                                 
3
 One of the difficulties inherent in reading Lacan’s work—any of it—is that it is a work-in-progress, an 
ever-changing open system in which he constantly revises his thinking and builds upon and reworks 
previous ideas.  This is certainly true of his work on the drive.  Sometimes his terms seem to mean one 
thing at one stage of his career and then take on a different meaning at a later stage of his career.  
Nevertheless, I believe there is a thread that can be followed which connects Lacan’s thoughts about the 
drive across their various reworkings throughout his teachings.  Furthermore, it is not surprising that it is 
hard to get a handle on and grasp the drive, since the structure of the drive is in and of itself elliptical!  Just 
as attempts to formulate the drive seem to circle around something only to give the impression of never 
fully capturing something, this is indeed the very structure of the drive, as I will explain a few pages further 
on.  
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did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we 
could know nothing about it. (Freud, 1915/1991, p. 126) 
Lacan extends Freud’s concepts and takes up the idea that the drive can only be 
known through language.  Lacan is in many ways agreeing with Freud but 
pointing out that Freud didn’t take seriously enough his own claim that drives 
can only be represented by ideas or by psychical representatives.  Lacan’s 
position is that Freud didn’t formulate that connection between the drive and the 
symbolic well enough and that this is partly owing to his flawed 
metapsychology.   
Lacan focuses on the fact that the unconscious is not composed of 
repressed affects but rather repressed drive representatives.  This means that one 
cannot understand the drive without the symbolic, the signifier, as I will 
elaborate a bit further on.  In a way, Freud already knew this as he described the 
fact that there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas (Freud, 
1915/1991, p. 127).  However, as Lacan seems to imply, Freud does not 
adequately formulate the relation between language and the drive.  Instead, 
Freud relies on a metapsychology that is fundamentally ill-suited for the concept 
of the drive.   
This is the case precisely because the idea of a build-up and release of 
tension which Freud presents through his hydraulics model—beginning with his 
 41
1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology—focuses on an unclear and imprecise 
notion of libido/energy/affect which lacks grounding and according to Lacan 
does not put the emphasis where it should be:  on the role of the signifier and the 
structure of language.  That is, Freud’s hydraulic model and motif of energetics 
only obfuscate the reality of the unconscious (as a linguistic unconscious, 
governed and structured by the logic of the signifier and instated by way of the 
subject’s entry into language, as I will touch on a bit further on).  For Lacan, the 
primary focus of psychoanalysis is the unconscious.  Affects do not form the 
structure of the unconscious.  Affects are not repressed; ideas (signifiers) are 
repressed.  Lacan questions the utility of a focus on energy, as in Freud’s 
hydraulic model, and dryly dismisses it, saying that “Libido, in Freud’s work, is 
an energy that can be subjected to a kind of quantification which is all the easier 
to introduce in theory as it is useless” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722).   
Instead, Lacan wishes to save Freud from the entanglements of his flawed 
metapsychology by re-reading Freud through his own lens.  Lacan’s famous 
“return to Freud” is a linguistic one.  It was his attempt at illuminating that 
which Freud himself did not see in his own work—that which was perhaps 
implicit but not fully theorized:  the importance of speech and language.  Freud’s 
hydraulic model and efforts to formulate “energy” and “libido” rely on motifs 
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from nineteenth-century physics.  Lacan strives to use models more appropriate 
to psychoanalysis, more in keeping with the true nature of the unconscious.   
Lacan steers things away from a science of hydraulics and instead towards 
a science of the unconscious:  “If psychoanalysis is to be constituted as the 
science of the unconscious, one must set out from the notion that the unconscious 
is structured like a language” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 203).  This notion of the 
unconscious being structured like a language will become clearer a bit further on.  
For now it is important to keep in mind that Lacan tries to create a model that is 
different from Freud’s, more in keeping with the true nature of the unconscious, 
and that means using the model of linguistics.  For Lacan, the drive needs to be 
formulated within the context of his theory of the signifier.   
In order to begin examining Lacan’s ideas about the drive by way of his 
theory of the signifier, it must first be noted that it is precisely because Lacan 
emphasizes the role of language in the construction of the drive that he separates 
psychoanalytic notions of the drive from biology or instinct.  Lacan implores his 
audience that psychoanalysis is, of course, not biology:  “Freud is not a biologist . 
. . we analysts have contributed nothing to anything whatsoever that resembles 
biology” (Lacan, 1962-1963, Class of December 12, 1962).  Lacan emphasizes what 
he believes Freud already knew:  that for the human subject the pressure of the 
drive is constant and thus differs from, for instance, biologically-driven mating 
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patterns in the animal kingdom, in which there are distinct patterns, identical for 
each member of a species, and biologically-caused mating seasons in which 
animals are in heat.  Lacan notes that the drive’s constancy “forbids any 
assimilation of the drive to a biological function, which always has a rhythm.  
The first thing Freud says about the drive is . . . that it has no day or night, no 
spring or autumn, no rise and fall.  It is a constant force” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 
165).   
Lacan takes pains to clarify that the drive “has nothing to do with 
instinct” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722).  It is generally accepted that James Strachey, 
the translator of Freud’s Standard Edition, mistranslates Trieb as “instinct.”  
Whenever one encounters the word “instinct” in Strachey’s translation, it should 
be read as “drive.”4  Laplanche and Pontalis provide a helpful clarification of the 
difference between instinct and drive.  They note that instinct (“Instinkt”) is “a 
hereditary behavior pattern peculiar to an animal species, varying little from one 
member of this species to another and unfolding in accordance with a temporal 
scheme which is generally resistant to change and apparently geared to a 
purpose” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 214).  By contrast, drive (“Trieb”) 
“retains overtones suggestive of pressure (Trieben=to push); the use of ‘Trieb’ 
accentuates not so much a precise goal as a general orientation, and draws 
                                                 
4
 For this reason, I have replaced any instances of the word “instinct” with the word “drive” in all citations 
of Freud’s work in this project.   
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attention to the irresistible nature of the pressure rather than to the stability of its 
aim and object” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 214).   
If Lacan is rejecting the notion of biological cause, the next question is:  
Where does the drive’s “pressure” or “constant force” come from?  How and 
why is that generated?  That takes us to Lacan’s theory of the signifier.  And, like 
most psychoanalytic stories, that begins with the mother.   
For both Lacan and Freud, the mother is the first object of the drive.  In his 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud notes that the aims of the drive stem 
from the individual’s early experiences (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 184).  We can 
extend this primarily to early experiences with the mother.  In the beginning the 
child is helpless and dependent upon its mother or caretaker.  Note also that 
when Lacan refers to the mother he is essentially talking about the maternal 
function, insofar as the primary object for the child could be anyone who 
provides this kind of care and attention (any caregiver who fills this role in 
relation to the child, and not necessarily just the biological mother).  The young 
child who is dependent upon the mother is fed, washed, embraced, touched, and 
held by her, and this is not a neutral experience for the child.   
Lacan describes the child as a kind of brute subject at this point, a subject 
without lack (which can be represented by a symbol:  “S” to designate an 
unbarred, uncastrated subject).  Lacan designates the castrated, lacking subject 
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with the symbol “S/  ” (to be read as “the barred subject”), but this will be 
addressed in more detail a bit further on.  The infant’s body at this stage (as a 
brute subject prior to castration) is full of jouissance.  It could be argued that at 
this point the child experiences drives in the real.   
Early in his career, Lacan describes the real, at its most basic, as “what 
resists symbolization absolutely” (Lacan, 1953-1954/1988, p. 66).  We can think of 
this experience of drives in the real in terms of the child’s body being a jumble of 
disparate sensations and impulses that lack symbolic representation at this stage 
(thus they are drives in the real, outside the symbolic/symbolization).  These 
impulses and sensations are attended to by the mother, and the child thus 
experiences these drives in relation to an Other (the mOther).  For the baby who 
lacks the ability to distinguish boundaries between self and other, self and world 
(such that, for instance, there is no distinction between the baby and the mother’s 
breast), we might say that it cannot ascertain whether these impulses and 
sensations—these drives in the real—are coming from itself or the mother.  As 
for the latter, that would indicate that the mother’s desire and jouissance get read 
through her touches, her various forms of contact with the child, and her ways of 
regulating the child’s needs and impulses.  What is problematic is that Lacan, to 
the best of my knowledge, does not clearly formulate what kind of drive might 
be associated with the stage prior to castration.  What I am presenting here is my 
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own attempt to grapple with that problem and suggest possible ways of thinking 
about that, though some of the terminology is problematic.    
Nevertheless, I think an argument can be made for referring to the 
experience of drives prior to castration as a form of jouissance of the Other (la 
jouissance de l’Autre). 5  Lacan sometimes also refers to the jouissance of the Other 
as the Other jouissance.  This is so in several senses.  In the French grammatical 
form in which la jouissance de l’Autre is framed, the subjective and objective 
genitive, la jouissance de l’Autre can refer to the Other’s jouissance or the 
jouissance of the Other (loosely put:  jouissance of—as in enjoying the Other—or 
as in belonging to/coming from the Other, with the Other doing the enjoying).  
Following this logic, the experience of real drives considered from the 
perspective of the jouissance of the Other could indicate the mOther’s enjoyment 
and/or the child’s enjoyment of the mOther.   
That is jouissance in the real—real drives—because those drives lack 
symbolic representation; they are not yet attached to representations (“psychical 
representatives,” for Freud).  This point will become important in Chapter 5, 6, 
and 7, in which the status of jouissance in the real will be explored as it featured 
in two cases of psychosis.  The drives lack symbolic representation at the pre-
                                                 
5
 To refer to them as forms of Other jouissance is problematic.  In Seminar XX Lacan suggests that 
although men experience only phallic jouissance, women experience Other jouissance as well as phallic 
jouissance.  In using the term “Other jouissance” here to refer to drives prior to castration, which in Chapter 
5 I will attempt to situate with respect to psychosis, I do not mean to suggest that all women are psychotics.  
This point will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.   
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Oedipal stage because that is a stage prior to the subject’s entry into language 
(prior to symbolic castration).  Accordingly, the drives are also asexual at that 
time.  For at the pre-Oedipal stage, prior to castration, the subject has not yet 
taken a sexual position.   
They are real drives in the sense that they lack symbolic representation 
but also because, for Lacan, in the real, nothing lacks.  Lacan says that the real is 
full.  That relates to the retroactively determined fantasy in neurosis that there 
once existed a perfect dyadic relation between mother and child, before the 
father and language intervened, supposedly ruining everything.  This is a 
fantasy of a sort of golden age in which everything was blissful:  a hypothetically 
perfect jouissance.   
Lacan formulates the mother’s status prior to the subject’s castration and 
entry into language by way of Freud’s concept of “das Ding” (“the Thing”).  For 
both Freud and Lacan, das Ding is the maternal object.  Lacan describes “the 
maternal thing, the mother, insofar as she occupies the place of that thing, of das 
Ding” (Lacan, 1959-1960/1992, p. 67).  Das Ding is the mother at the pre-Oedipal 
stage which is associated with the fantasy that there was a perfect dyadic relation 
prior to castration and the father’s intervention.  That is why, according to Lacan, 
“das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden good” 
(Lacan, 1959-1960/1992, p. 70).  As I already indicated, the fantasy of the pre-
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Oedipal, uninterrupted relation to the mother is connected with real drives, 
which Lacan attests to by stating that “What one finds at the level of das Ding . . . 
is the place of the Triebe, the drives” (Lacan, 1959-1960/1992, p. 110). 
I will now address what, for Freud and Lacan, happens to the status of das 
Ding and the real drives once the subject comes under the operation of castration.  
Freud describes the father coming onto the scene to issue a castration threat, 
prohibit incest, and thus separate mother and child.  The father bars the child’s 
unmediated access to the mother.  The father conveys to the child, “you can’t 
have your mother all to yourself; she is mine.”  That is a truncated, simplified 
version of Freud’s account of castration—with the literal, flesh-and-blood father 
being the bearer of castration.  That is also a childhood developmental model.   
Lacan follows Freud in associating castration—and thus the child’s 
separation from the mother—with the father, but Lacan slightly resituates the 
idea of castration by putting a linguistic spin on it (by taking it up by way of his 
theory of the signifier).  For Lacan, the focus is less on the flesh-and-blood father, 
as it was in Freud’s account, and more on the father as a function.  To emphasize 
the difference between the flesh-and-blood father and the operation of castration 
which gets represented by the father, Lacan refers to the “paternal function”6 and 
the “Name-of-the-Father.”  He describes the paternal function in terms of 
                                                 
6
 Sometimes also referred to as the “phallic function,” which will be described within the next couple of 
pages.   
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someone or something coming to intervene between mother and child to 
separate them.  This can be thought of in the sense of a prohibition and in the 
sense of a recognition of and naming of the fact that the mother has other 
desires—desires outside of the child.  The symbolic functions of prohibition and 
naming are best captured through Lacan’s French term for the Name-of-the-
Father, which is written as “Nom-du-Père.”  Because of the French homophony, 
“nom” can refer to both the “no” of prohibition and the father’s “name,” or to the 
name or designation of the mother’s desire as beyond the child.   
In sum, through the instating of the paternal function the child gets the 
impression that he or she is not the mother’s entire world—that the mother’s 
desire also lies elsewhere.  Another way of putting that, using more of Lacan’s 
terminology, is that the child is no longer identified with the imaginary phallus 
of the mother—meaning that the child is not what can fully complete and satisfy 
the mother or totally fill her lack.  Implicit in Lacan’s work is the idea that the 
paternal function can be carried out by someone other than the biological father, 
even the mother, in a sense, if the mother expresses that she has other desires 
besides the child.  The paternal function can operate in that way because, at its 
most basic level, the paternal function is the naming of the mother’s desire as 
outside of the child.  Another way to conceptualize the same structure is that the 
father gets named as the object of the mother’s desire—as what the mother seems 
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to want and have an interest in beyond the child—insofar as he stands as a kind 
of answer constructed within the child’s mind to the question of what the mother 
wants.  This again shifts the focus away from a literal castrating father and 
towards a function.   
Regardless of the particularities of how the paternal function gets imposed 
for each individual, it is always unique and takes place within the family 
narrative or what Lacan refers to as the neurotic’s individual myth.7  It is at this 
point—after the imposition of the paternal function—that things are no longer 
complete; there is a structural lack.  Castration creates a hole.  Another way to 
think about castration is in terms of a shift from a whole to hole.  Moreover, by 
way of castration, both the subject and the mOther are lacking.8  The subject—no 
longer the brute subject in the real which was represented with the symbol “S”—
is now lacking, which Lacan represents with the symbol “ S/  ” to indicate that the 
subject is struck through, in a sense, and is incomplete, divided, and lacking.  
This is the barred subject who is split, lacking, and castrated.  So too is the Other 
lacking, which Lacan represents through the symbol “A/  .”  This symbol is to be 
read as “the barred Other” (the symbol is an “A” with a line through it because 
the French word for Other is Autre).   
                                                 
7
 See Lacan’s (1953/1979) “The Neurotic’s Individual Myth.”  
8
 A bit further on, I will explain this in more detail and then address some of the consequences/effects of 
the subject’s constitutive lack.  I will then connect that with aspects of addictions. 
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The paternal function thus effectively interrupts the child’s hypothetically 
complete and unmediated access to das Ding—that is, the paternal function 
brings das Ding into existence by prohibiting access to it.  By logical extension, 
the paternal function sets limits on the jouissance in the real which I have 
described as a form of Other jouissance.  The result of the paternal function is 
that das Ding—cancelled out and prohibited, rendered impossible—becomes the 
primally repressed.  This is what Lacan means when he draws a connection 
between das Ding and the structuring of the unconscious:  “Das Ding is a 
primordial function which is located at the level of the initial establishment of the 
gravitation of the unconscious Vorstellungen [representations]” (Lacan, 1959-
1960/1992, p. 62).     
To return again to emphasizing Lacan’s linguistic model and thinking 
about castration by way of his theory of the signifier, it is important to note that 
the Name-of-the-Father is a kind of first signifier.  Lacan represents the 
imposition of the paternal function through what he refers to as the formula of 
the “paternal metaphor.”  In providing this formula, Lacan explains that he is 
making use of the general structure of metaphor itself, in which one term gets 
cancelled out and replaced by another.  He adds that the formula for metaphor is 
thus about “signifying substitution” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 464).  Here is Lacan’s 
formula of the paternal metaphor: 
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Figure I9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To simplify things, suffice it to say that the most basic way to read this formula is 
to say that it depicts in a formula what I described previously.  That is, the first 
half of the formula demonstrates that the Name-of-the-Father cancels out das 
Ding and represents the mother’s desire being named as beyond the child.  The 
latter half of the formula indicates that the Name-of-the-Father comes to signify 
what is then lost to language as the phallus.   
Lacan even directly associates the Name-of-the-Father not with the 
presence or absence of the biological father, as I explained, but with the 
“presence of the signifier” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 465).  With the institution of the 
paternal function, the presence of the signifier means that something is also, in 
one fell swoop, lost to language:  das Ding and the real jouissance prior to 
                                                 
9
 From “On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” by J. Lacan, 1959/2006, in 
Ecrits:  the First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 465.  
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castration.  The word kills the thing.  Put another way, language acts as a barrier 
and protects the child from an excessive, in some ways dangerous, unmediated 
relation to the mother.  It is dangerous insofar as the unmediated relation to the 
mother exists beyond the pleasure principle and kills desire, leaving no room for 
the individual to have a space of desire—breathing room—and to become an 
autonomous desiring subject.  The symbolic intervenes upon, limits, and protects 
against the real.   
To add one more symbol to this discussion:  the symbolic phallus—
indicated with the symbol “Φ”—stands for everything that is lost through the 
subject’s entry into language, through the process of symbolic castration.  Lacan 
puts it bluntly:  “the phallus is a signifier” (Lacan, 1958/2006, p. 581).  The phallus 
represents what is lost.  For that very reason, the paternal function is also 
referred to as the “phallic function” (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 59). 
I noted previously that castration involves limits being set on jouissance.  I 
described how, by way of the paternal function, the father represents the first 
inhibition of the aim of the drive.  Castration thus involves a shift from a 
seemingly unlimited and perfect jouissance prior to castration (jouissance in the 
real or real drives associated with das Ding) to what Lacan refers to as “phallic 
jouissance” (castrated, limited jouissance).  Jacques-Alain Miller also takes up the 
topic of differences on the level of jouissance:  
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[P]rohibition, the well-known incest prohibition, translates above all as 
the prohibition against satisfying desire for the mother (désir de la mère), 
and Lacan had already mentioned in Seminar VII that that is but a 
metaphor for the prohibition expressed in signifiers (l’interdit signifiant) 
of jouissance.  The incest prohibition means:  Thou shalt not have access 
to that which is your supreme jouissance. (Miller, 1996, p. 423) 
The subject cannot have the full (“supreme”) jouissance of das Ding, but he or she 
can have some jouissance.  This little bit leftover is phallic jouissance.  The phallic 
drive10 involves the subject’s attempts to recover some of the jouissance imagined 
to be lost through castration.   
The loss of das Ding is the precondition for the phallic drive.  That is, the 
loss of das Ding generates the phallic drive’s attempts to recover something of 
that which had been lost.  What is more, the loss itself generates repetition.  This 
is the case because attempts at refinding what was imagined to have been lost 
will always have to be repeated—cycles or circuits of repetition that, in fact, never 
succeed in refinding the lost object, precisely because it is irrevocably lost.  
Immediately after he introduces his formula for the paternal metaphor, Lacan 
addresses the connection between repression and repetition.  When he describes 
repression and the signifier, he notes that it “persists there in a repressed 
                                                 
10
 Lacan implores us to keep in mind, given the meaning of these concepts as I have been describing them, 
that the phallus is not the penis.  Since both men and women undergo castration—neurotic ones, at least—
both sexes have an experience of the phallic drive.   
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(verdrängt) state, and insists from that place so as to be represented . . . by means 
of its repetition automatism” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 465).   
Now that this theoretical groundwork has been laid, we can bring 
together three concepts:  1) primal repression; 2) Freud’s notion that the drives 
can only be known by way of ideas or “psychical representatives;” and 3) the 
question of the constancy or pressure of the drive.  The paternal metaphor results 
in primal repression.  The signifier that cancels out and names das Ding via the 
imposition of the paternal function and the repression that this signifier produces 
institutes what Lacan refers to as the “Other” and what Freud refers to as the 
“other scene.”  As I described earlier in this chapter, Lacan tells us that the 
unconscious is structured like a language.  This is similar to the structure of 
metaphor—one signifier stands in for (replaces) another that is repressed.  The 
drive’s striving towards refinding something that has been lost is thus directly 
related to the structuring of the unconscious.  This is why Lacan says that “The 
drive . . . is constructed by Freud on the basis of the experience of the 
unconscious” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722).  The loss of das Ding—which is 
operationalized in the formula of the paternal metaphor—generates the pressure 
of the drive to refind something of the jouissance imagined to have been lost.  
Lacan notes, “The activity in the subject I call ‘drive’ (Trieb) consists in dealing 
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with these objects in such a way as to recover from them, to restore to himself, 
his earliest loss” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 720). 
The phallic drive is the subject’s attempt to refind and hold on to 
remainders of jouissance.  That will become important in my discussion of the 
relation of the drive to addictions, later in this chapter.  I noted previously that 
for Lacan, the phallus stands in for all that has been lost to language:  Φ.  The 
way in which the loss occurs—by way of primal repression through the 
operation of the paternal function, with the Name-of-the-Father coming to 
signify the phallus, all that is lost to language, with das Ding and the correlative 
jouissance having been lost due to castration—is particular for each subject.  That 
is, this loss occurs uniquely for each subject, and within the context of the 
neurotic’s individual myth:  the particular way in which the entry into language 
and the structuring of the unconscious occur for each subject.  The structure of 
the paternal metaphor, though it can be generalized and reduced to a formula as 
in Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor, is unique for each subject.  It 
logically follows that the way in which each subject seeks to recover, through the 
activity of the drive, that which has been lost, is also particular.  This is precisely 
what I will explore through the case studies I present in the upcoming chapters.   
The particularity of the subject’s entry into language also means that the 
subject’s relation to the real—and thus the drive’s attempts to refind that which 
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had been lost—is symbolically structured.  This can be likened to Freud’s 
description of symptoms having a real core around which there is a symbolic 
structure:  “like the grain of sand around which an oyster forms its pearl” (Freud, 
1953/1905[1901], p. 83).  The symbolic and the real are intertwined in a complex 
relation, which relates to Lacan’s ideas about the structuring of the unconscious, 
as I described.  The relation between the real and the symbolic in the 
construction of the drive is also alluded to in an essay entitled “The Unconscious: 
A Psychoanalytic study,” by two of Lacan’s students, Laplanche and Leclaire, 
who note poetically that “the birth of the unconscious . . . stems from the capture of 
instinctual energy in the web of the signifier” (Laplanche and Leclaire, 1972, p. 167).  
Although the loss of das Ding is irrevocable, and one can never access the 
impossible jouissance imagined to have been lost, it is through the phallic drive’s 
attempt to hold on to some remainders of jouissance that the subject is able to 
access some jouissance—caught in the web, so to speak.   
Lacan’s account of the imposition of the paternal metaphor is about the 
subject’s entry into language.  This entry, as I explained, occurs by way of one 
signifier entering the scene and making a kind of cut.  That cut represents the 
castration threat, the prohibition of incestuous jouissance with the mother, and 
the “cancelling out” or barring of the mother.  Lacan brings together Freud’s 
childhood developmental model and Oedipal narrative with his own ideas about 
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the child’s entry into language and the unconscious being structured like a 
language.  This is the case because Lacan aligns the idea of the father barring the 
mother with the idea of the signifier making a cut and limiting jouissance.  As 
Lacan notes, “the signifier is what brings jouissance to a halt” (Lacan, 1972-
1973/1998, p. 24).   
Through the operation of castration, the signifier makes a kind of cut 
through which it also carves up the body.  The signifier’s limiting function 
inaugurates phallic jouissance.  That is, through castration the drive becomes 
limited and focused around the body’s erogenous zones.  Lacan describes the 
signifier’s action as a “cut. . . by which the function of certain objects . . . is 
determined” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 719).  This means that castration and the 
phallic drive result in the carving out of erogenous zones.  Through castration, 
limits are set on the imagined total jouissance associated with the mother/child 
dyad.  Jouissance, in being limited, is drained away from the body as a whole 
and is evacuated from all but the erogenous zones (holes, orifices of the body—
sites of interaction with the Other).  The modification of the drive results in a 
shift from a whole to holes.  Lacan describes this as a process of the drive 
“isolating” erogenous zones through castration:  “The very delimitation of the 
‘erogenous zone’ that the drive isolates . . . is the result of a cut that takes 
advantage of the anatomical characteristic of a margin or border” (Lacan, 
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1960/2006, p. 692).  The drives thus become limited, hierarchized, and organized 
around the erogenous zones.   
However, to strictly relate the “anal drive” to a literal bodily orifice can be 
problematic.  Lacan seems to affirm this in that he rejects the notion of a 
progression of developmental stages (e.g., that an oral stage would be followed 
by anal, phallic, and genital stages).  He notes that the process by which the 
libido or drive comes to be “must not be referred to some natural process of 
pseudo-maturation” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 64).  This is not about a progression of 
biologically predetermined maturational stages that one reaches at certain points 
in development.  That is why Lacan states that “There is no natural 
metamorphosis of the oral drive into the anal drive” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 180).   
For Lacan, this is about dialectical stages.  It is useful to think of them in 
connection with the role of the Other’s demand, which I will discuss in more 
detail within the next few pages.  That is, it is more useful to think of the “stages” 
as times when the Other makes a demand of the subject in which the subject can 
either say “yes” or “no.”  Accordingly, the “anal drive” can most usefully be 
thought of in terms of ways of relating to the Other—and the Other’s demand—
which are marked by withholding or giving.  What is at stake has much less to 
do with a bodily orifice than language and a relation to the Other that takes place 
within the structure of language.  Moreover, that demand can go in both 
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directions—for the subject or the Other—and follows a grammatical structure.  
For instance, the “oral drive” can take the form of a demand to eat, to be eaten, or 
to get oneself eaten.  Thinking about the drive with regard to stages or erogenous 
zones is meaningful only insofar as we can think of them as taking place in 
language and in response to language.  Lacan reminds us of this when he says 
that “drives are the echo in the body of the fact that there is a saying” (Lacan, 
1975-1976/2005, Class of Wednesday, November 18, 1975).  Insofar as the Other’s 
demand implies lack, and touches on the structural function of lack, these ideas 
further highlight the important role of emptiness in the drive.   
The loss of das Ding—and everything that I have been addressing that 
goes along with that operation—fundamentally results in emptiness, absence.  
What Lacan refers to as “object a” (objet petit a) comes to stand in for the loss of 
das Ding.  Lacan addresses the relation between object a and the emptiness that 
results from the loss of das Ding thusly:  “this object . . . is in fact simply the 
presence of a hollow, a void, which can be occupied, Freud tells us, by any object, 
and whose agency we know only in the form of the lost object, the petit a” (Lacan, 
1964/1981, p. 180).  The loss of das Ding creates the subject as lacking or desiring, 
and object a stands in the place of that lack.   
This touches on the very complex relation, within Lacan’s work, between 
desire and drive, of which I will not give an exhaustive account.  What is most 
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salient is that Lacan characterizes object a as both cause of desire and object of the 
drive:  the “object that is the cause of desire is [simultaneously] the object of the 
drive—that is to say, the object around which the drive turns” (Lacan, 1964/1981, 
p. 243).  That is the case insofar as the phallic drive circles around object a as 
what stands in for the loss of das Ding.   
The castrated subject is lacking, and lack is the precondition of desire.  We 
can only desire or want because there is something that we lack—something that 
we do not have.  Still, the lacking subject does not simply accept lack and remain 
stagnant in that position; the subject tries to recover some of the jouissance that 
was lost.  The desiring/lacking subject’s relation to the lost object, the subject’s 
position in trying to recover and hold on to some piece of lost jouissance, is 
articulated in what Lacan refers to as fantasy, which he represents in a formula:  
(S/   ◊ a).  This can be read most simply as:  the lacking subject’s relation to  
object a.   
For Lacan lack is constitutive, structural.  The Lacanian subject—
specifically the castrated, neurotic subject11—is fundamentally a subject of lack.  
When Lacan refers to “the subject” he is fundamentally referring to the split 
subject (lacking, divided, or barred).  The split subject is indicated by an “S” with 
a line through it (“ S/  ”) to indicate that the subject is split between conscious and 
                                                 
11
 As I will address in Chapter 5, 6, and 7, psychotics are technically not considered lacking subjects, as 
they have not undergone the castration that constitutes lack.   
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unconscious and that the subject is lacking the object.12  As I explained, the 
subject comes to be lacking or desiring by way of the operation of castration.  
Lacan affirms, “What analytic experience attests to is that castration is what 
regulates desire” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 700).   
I mentioned earlier that the subject and the Other come to be lacking at the 
same time, so to speak.  This indicates that the subject’s desire comes into being 
in relation to his or her interpretation of the Other’s desire:  
the condition of the subject . . . depends on what unfolds in the Other, A.  
What unfolds there is articulated like a discourse (the unconscious is the 
Other’s discourse [discourse de l’Autre]), whose syntax Freud first sought 
to define for those fragments of it that reach us in certain privileged 
moments, such as dreams, slips, and witticisms.  (Lacan, 1959/2006, pp. 
458-459).   
Moreover, Lacan explains that “the neurotic . . . is the one who identifies the 
Other’s lack with the Other’s demand” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 698).  He goes on to 
describe how the neurotic subject’s interpretation of the Other’s lack comes to 
structure his or her fundamental fantasy and experience of the drive.  Lacan 
explains that “the Other’s demand takes on the function of the object in the 
                                                 
12
 There are also other ways to understand the subject to be lacking—as in the idea of the subject lacking a 
signifier or being divided between signifiers—but these are beyond the scope of this work and will not be 
explored here.  For a fuller account of Lacan’s many ideas about the divided subject, see Fink’s The 
Lacanian Subject (1995).   
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neurotic’s fantasy—that is, his fantasy (my formulas make it possible to realize 
this immediately) is reduced to the drive: (S/   ◊ D)” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 698).  For 
example, in Chapter 4, I present a case study of Phil, an obsessional neurotic 
patient who interpreted his mOther’s demand as:  “die.”  That is, he imagined 
the Other’s demand as being for him to suffocate, fuse with the mother, and die.  
He then took marijuana as his object and in fantasy positioned himself as 
smoking to the point of feeling suffocated and seemingly fused with his mother, 
symbolically dying by being fused with or absorbed into her.   
The idea that the drive is a relation to demand also relates to the notion 
that a demand is always a demand for something.  That is, since demand seems to 
be for something, for some object, the subject confuses separation from the object 
for separation from desire.  As Lacan explains, “the drive divides the subject and 
desire, the latter sustaining itself only by the relation it misrecognizes between 
this division and an object that causes it.  Such is the structure of fantasy” (Lacan, 
1964/2006, p. 724).  It is thus due to a kind of primal confusion that subjects think 
that an object is what will satisfy them.  Subjects then try out objects, with 
varying levels of satisfaction, and it is because demand is always demand for 
something that subjects try to plug objects into the object a slot in fantasy.  I will 
discuss these ideas further—as well as Lacan’s related idea of the grammar of the 
drive, its “grammatical artifice” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 692)—in the case studies.  
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At this point, it should also suffice to note that we are beginning to address the 
important idea that the drive has less to do with a phenomenal object—for no 
object can satisfy the drive—than the way in which the subject is oriented in 
relation to its own and the Other’s lack (or what the neurotic identifies as the 
Other’s demand).   
Lacan makes it clear that the objects of the drive stand in for absence and 
that any number of objects can therefore come to occupy the place of lack.  He 
notes that the object “is in fact simply the presence of a hollow, a void, which can 
be occupied, Freud tells us, by any object” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 180).  As Lacan 
indicates, Freud too stresses the drive object’s contingency.  Freud asserts that 
there is no such thing as a “natural” object choice, no fixed one-to-one relation 
between drive and object:   
It has been brought to our notice that we have been in the habit of 
regarding the connection between the sexual drive and the sexual object 
as more intimate than it in fact is.  Experience of the cases that are 
considered abnormal has shown us that in them the sexual drive and the 
sexual object are merely soldered together—a fact which we have been in 
danger of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the normal 
picture, where the object appears to form part and parcel of the drive.  
We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thoughts 
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between drive and object.  It seems probable that the sexual drive is in 
the first instance independent of its object; nor is its origin likely to be 
due to its object’s attractions. (Freud, 1905/1953, p. 147-148) 
Lacan declares, “[a]s far as the object in the drive is concerned, let it be clear that 
it is, strictly speaking, of no importance” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 168).  Lacan and 
Freud, though they take slightly different angles, both emphasize the drive 
object’s absolute contingency. 
The concept of the contingency of the drive object has very important 
implications for the psychoanalytic study and treatment of addictions, as I hope 
to demonstrate in this project.  In Chapter 5, for example, I will discuss a patient 
whose addiction, when he first came to treatment, had already transferred from 
cocaine to shopping.  Although the contingent object his addiction centered on 
had changed, the structure of his addiction was still very much intact at the time 
when he was seeking therapy.   
Given the drive object’s contingency, it is important to expand our 
framework to consider the drive object as something other than a phenomenal 
object (an actual object, or object in the world).  That is the case also because the 
positions the subject takes with regard to desire and drive are governed by 
structural relations.  What is more, the place of the object is marked by a 
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structural lack.  This is why the drive object is not only contingent but also 
displaceable, as metonymy is based on lack.   
Although the drive object is something other than a phenomenal object, 
and the drive object can be considered contingent and displaceable, there are 
subjects who do develop an addiction to one specific substance (one particular 
kind of alcohol or drug, for instance).  As such, their drive object seems very 
fixed (not contingent or displaceable).  In Chapter 3, I discuss this issue through 
the presentation of a case study of Buck, a patient who drank massive quantities 
of one particular brand of alcohol.  This kind of addiction, in which the subject 
becomes addicted to one unique substance, is a fixation of the drive in which the 
subject believes that the object is anything but contingent.  Nevertheless, as I will 
address in Chapter 3, even that had less to do with the phenomenal object itself 
than with the signifier.  I will make the perhaps controversial argument that in 
that case, the patient was relating through his addiction not to the alcohol itself 
but to its name, the specific brand name of the alcohol he drank excessively.  In 
that case, the subject’s addiction had a very clear and unmistakable symbolic 
structure.   
Although addicted subjects often seem to operate according to an illusion 
that they have found an object that brings full satisfaction, no phenomenal object 
could ever satisfy the drive.  Lacan addresses that important point in his 
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discussion of the difference between an object of need and an object of the drive.  
He uses the oral drive to illustrate the point:  “no food will ever satisfy the oral 
drive, except by circumventing the eternally lacking object” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 
180).  The object is, in Lacan’s words, “eternally lacking”; it cannot be recovered.  
To think that it could be recovered, and that there could be a concrete object that 
would satisfy the drive, is a fantasy, a misrecognition.  Lacan doesn’t mince 
words:  “no object of any . . . need, can satisfy the drive” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 
167).   
He goes on to clarify that, beyond the fact that the drive is not satisfied by 
an object of need, satisfaction actually doesn’t come from any object at all.  Lacan 
explains that “[e]ven when you stuff the mouth—the mouth that opens in the 
register of the drive—it is not the food that satisfies it, it is, as one says, the 
pleasure of the mouth” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 167).  Something around the object 
gets satisfied.  In the example he offers of the oral drive, Lacan indicates that 
there is pleasure in the very filling of an orifice of the body, an erogenous zone.  
It gives one the temporary illusion of fullness, in all senses of the term implied by 
his example.  Lacan is making the case that in the drive, satisfaction is not about 
the object, but about something that is satisfied in the drive.   
Lacan offers the following as a formulation of the drive’s satisfaction:  “la 
pulsion en fait le tour” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 168).  One way to understand that is to 
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say that the drive “moves around the object” or “circles the object”—takes a tour 
or trip around the object.  Lacan defines the drive as satisfied by its very circling 
around the object:  a satisfaction inherent in the “circuit of the drive” (Lacan, 
1964/1981, p. 178).   
The satisfaction at stake in the drive can be thought of as a kind of trick in 
a few different ways.  First, in the sense of a magic trick, like an optical illusion:  
Even though the phenomenal object does not and cannot satisfy the drive, the 
subject sometimes harbors the illusion that it can.  That illusion is sustained by 
the object.  Moreover, as I described previously, although the initial object of the 
drive—as das Ding or the pre-Oedipal maternal object—can never be recaptured, 
the drive’s attempt, in circling around the objects a, to recapture something of 
that lost jouissance, brings its own satisfaction.  Something is satisfied in the very 
circuit of the drive.  Some jouissance is caught in the web.  The paradox of the 
drive—a trick—is that even though something is missed and not attained, 
something is satisfied (there is some satisfaction).  The drive is a one-trick pony:  
it is stupid and knows nothing but its circling around the object.  It does nothing 
but go in circles, repeatedly.  Nevertheless, the drive succeeds every time, even 
in failing to attain the object or to fill one’s lack.  Lacan describes the drive 
succeeding in being satisfied in not attaining or “snatching” the object by noting 
that “[b]y snatching at its object, the drive learns in a sense that this is precisely 
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not the way it will be satisfied” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 167).  The more one strives 
to attain satisfaction in a direct way, through a concrete object, the more one 
misses it, and the more one loses one’s way.  The drive, however, is what 
succeeds even in missing the object.  That’s the trick.   
In “Drives and their vicissitudes,” Freud suggests that the aim of the drive 
simply is satisfaction itself:  “the aim [Ziel] of a drive is in every instance 
satisfaction” (Freud, 1915/1957, p. 122).  Jacques-Alain Miller echoes this with a 
more Lacanian accent:  “The drive follows its own bent and always obtains 
satisfaction. . . .  The drive never comes to an impasse” (Miller, 1996, pp. 423, 
426).  Although, as Miller indicates, the drive always succeeds, always satisfies 
itself, the object itself always fails.   
Indeed, Lacan states that “[t]he object is a failure (un raté).  The essence of 
the object is failure” (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 58).  For Lacan, the object always 
fails because, fundamentally, object a is not das Ding.  As such, object a is out of 
synch, not what the subject sometimes imagines or hopes it to be:  “There is . . . 
always an essential division, fundamentally conflictual, in the re-found object, 
and, in the very act of its re-finding, there is therefore always a discordance in 
the re-found object in relation to the object sought after” (Lacan, 1956-1957/1994, 
p. 53).   
 70
Even though the drive always succeeds, the object’s failure results in one 
experiencing the jouissance obtained through the drive’s circuit as a kind of 
letdown.  Lacan describes a difference between the jouissance that is actually 
obtained and the jouissance that the subject hopes for:  “’That’s not it’ is the very 
cry by which the jouissance obtained is distinguished from the jouissance 
expected” (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 111).  Why is there a letdown?  Lacan 
continues to explain: 
Structure, which connects up here, demonstrates nothing if not that it is 
of the same text as jouissance, insofar as, in marking by what distance 
jouissance misses—the jouissance that would be in question if ‘that were 
it’—structure does not presuppose merely the jouissance that would be 
it, it also props up another.  (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, pp. 111-112) 
Lacan suggests that the fantasy of “more jouissance” is propped up by the 
structuring function of lack for the subject.  The subject, as a castrated, lacking 
subject, operates according to a retroactively determined fantasy that he or she 
has lost a supposedly perfect jouissance associated with das Ding.  This sustains 
the subject’s illusion that “that’s not it”—that the jouissance obtained is a rip 
off—and that there must be more.  The subject who gets caught up in futile 
quests for a mythical and impossible jouissance, seeking “more” jouissance, is 
truly tricked or deluded!  
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An addict who uses increasing quantities of drugs in an attempt to reach 
ever higher highs exemplifies someone who acts in accordance with that fantasy 
of “more” jouissance.13  As such, addiction often involves jouissance beyond the 
pleasure principle.  That striving is sustained by the neurotic’s fantasy that it 
might be possible to fill lack and overcome castration.  Since demand is 
experienced as demand for something, the subject takes objects in an attempt to 
fill lack, which, as I explained, cannot work.  Lacan describes the kind of 
satisfaction at stake in jouissance as “paradoxical” and notes, “the drive has for 
me no other purpose than to put in question what is meant by satisfaction” 
(Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 166).  That relates to “la pulsion en fait le tour” as the formula 
of the drive’s satisfaction and also to the way in which jouissance can be 
associated with a kind of painful enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle, that 
is, a kind of painful enjoyment that is generally ego-dystonic.  Freud alludes to 
the way in which jouissance is unacceptable, even horrifying, to one’s ego when 
he describes the Rat Man’s reaction to the idea of the infamous rat torture:  
“horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware” (Freud, 
1909/1955, p. 167).   
Jouissance is therefore associated with excess and with a paradoxical kind 
of satisfaction.  Freud indicates as much by noting that “patients derive a certain 
                                                 
13
 The names given to many drugs—especially ecstasy and heroin (“heroine”)—supports this fantasy! 
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satisfaction from their sufferings” (Freud, 1909/1955, p. 183).  Moreover, attempts 
to attain “more” jouissance involve the fantasy of a satisfaction for which, Lacan 
tells us, suffering subjects “give themselves too much trouble” (Lacan, 1964/1981, 
p. 166).  Nowhere is this more evident than in addictions.   
Addicts are often tricked by their drug of choice—the object they pursue 
according to the fantasy that through such phenomenal objects they could truly 
satisfy or fill their lack (and/or reach an impossible jouissance).  Such efforts are 
destined to fail, however, because, as both Lacan and Freud insist, the object is 
never it.  The addict being duped by the fantasy of what his or her drug object 
could be or could bring is similar to what Lacan describes in an anecdote of a 
voyeur being duped by an illusion:  “What the voyeur is looking for and finds is 
merely a shadow, a shadow behind the curtain.  There he will phantasize any 
magic of presence, the most graceful of girls, for example, even if on the other 
side there is only a hairy athlete” (Lacan, 1964/1981, p. 182).  Behind the veil of 
the addict’s fantasy, which sustains the illusion that his or her drug is truly “it,” 
is a reality that is very different and sometimes agonizing and horrifying.  
Addicted subjects often try to reach something they imagine would perfectly 
satisfy their lack and provide a kind of supreme jouissance—like hoping to 
access the beautiful woman imagined by the voyeur in Lacan’s example—but 
they go too far in their pursuit of jouissance and instead encounter, through the 
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misery of their addiction, nothing but a “hairy athlete”—a major 
disappointment.  
Lacan emphasizes that the analyst intervenes not with drugs but with 
words (Lacan, 1973-1974, Class of May 21, 1974).  That is particularly meaningful 
in the analytic treatment of addictions.  The goal of analysis is to transform the 
subject’s position in relation to jouissance.  That occurs via words, the talking 
cure, even as the process of analysis is often poised between the symbolic and the 
real.  It is to this that I will now turn by presenting several case studies.  These 
cases will detail how Lacanian analytic interventions can have a transformative 
effect on addicted subjects’ relation to the real of jouissance through speech—that 
is, by “treating the real by the symbolic” (Lacan, 1975-1976/2005, Class of January 
20, 1976).   
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Chapter 3 
ADDICTION AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS 
Buck’s Addictions:  As Oedipal as it Gets 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will present a case study of “Buck”—an obsessional 
neurotic patient who was addicted to multiple substances, most predominantly 
coffee and a specific brand of vodka.  His addictions were severe and had been 
going on for a few years already at the time when he sought treatment.  He told 
me during the initial consultation that he regularly drank between six and seven 
pots of coffee per day, in addition to consuming several other sources of caffeine 
on top of that, such as caffeinated soda.  His hands would often tremble, he had 
an almost constant facial tic, and his skin constantly felt irritated to him as his 
caffeine intake had led him to be dehydrated and unable to perspire.  He also 
drank huge amounts of alcohol—so much so that he would sometimes pass out 
and lose consciousness.  He even got kicked out of college during his freshman 
year due to alcohol poisoning (and underage drinking).   
I will describe the overarching structure governing how Buck related to 
the multiple objects of his addiction.  I will also emphasize that, contrary to Rik 
Loose’s argument that addictions are not symbolically structured, which I 
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reviewed in Chapter 1, Buck’s addiction did have a very clear symbolic structure.  
Moreover, multiple layers of Oedipal dynamics were inherent in his addictions.  
I will describe how his longing for a lost enjoyment connected with his mother, 
as well as his anger towards his father, were wrapped up in his addiction as it 
related to the oral and anal drive, respectively.  In order to provide a context 
within which those dynamics can be more fully understood, I will first discuss 
the primary features of obsessional neurosis according to Lacan.   
 
On Obsessional Neurosis 
Lacan essentially proposes three diagnostic categories:  psychosis, 
perversion, and neurosis (hysteria and obsessional neurosis being the two 
“types” or “dialects” of neurosis).  Whereas the diagnostic schema in the DSM-IV 
primarily establishes symptoms as determinative of diagnoses, Lacan’s 
diagnostic system instead looks at subjective positions and views differences in 
psychic structure as being determinative.  Lacan further specifies that the three 
diagnoses correspond to and are caused by three forms of negation:  repression 
in neurosis, disavowal in perversion, and foreclosure in psychosis.  In this 
chapter I will touch on the mechanism of repression in neurosis, and I will 
reserve a discussion of disavowal and foreclosure for the chapters on perversion 
and psychosis.   
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Repression constitutes neurosis.  Although repression is not directly 
tangible, one can glean how repression has been operative by listening carefully 
to the neurotic subject’s discourse and paying attention to the return of the 
repressed through his or her symptoms.  While repression is the primary, 
governing feature of neurosis, there are also a number of other commonly 
associated features.  For instance, in addition to repression and the return of the 
repressed, the following elements are characteristic of neurosis: 
[T]he instating of the paternal function, the assimilation of the essential 
structure of language, the primacy of doubt over certainty, considerable 
inhibition of the drives, . . . the tendency to find more pleasure in fantasy 
than in direct sexual contact, . . . the return of the repressed from within  
. . . in the form of Freudian slips, bungled actions, and symptoms, . . . 
uncertainty about what it is that turns one on, [and] considerable 
difficulty pursuing it even when one does know. (Fink, 1997, p. 112)  
Although these are features of neurosis in general, Lacan also suggests that the 
two forms of neurosis—hysteria and obsessional neurosis—substantially differ 
from one another.   
 For instance, while the hysteric is hyper-attuned to other people and their 
desires, the obsessive concerns himself primarily with neutralizing them.  That is, 
the obsessive attempts to annul the Other, and refuses to see himself as 
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dependent on the Other.  These dynamics make for a therapeutic relationship 
that is very different from the kind one is likely to encounter in working with a 
hysterical client, in that the obsessive is often, particularly at the outset of 
therapy, blissfully unconcerned with what his therapist says to him or seems 
interested in.  Accordingly, the clinician must make significant attempts to make 
herself present to the obsessive and to be recognized by him.  Lacan refers to this 
as bringing about a kind of “hysterization” of the obsessive.1   
With regard to the obsessional’s position in relation to desire, the 
obsessional maintains an impossible desire.  As Fink puts it, “Desire is 
impossible in obsession, because the closer the obsessive gets to realizing his 
desire (say, to have sex with someone), the more the Other begins to take 
precedence over him, eclipsing him as subject.  The presence of the Other 
threatens the obsessive with what Lacan calls ‘aphanisis,’ his fading or 
disappearance as subject” (Fink, 1997, p. 124).   
For instance, Buck’s obsessional style of maintaining an impossible desire 
involved significant self-sabotage:  making it impossible for him to get what he 
wanted.  When he had opportunities to perform well academically (which to 
Buck would have meant finally winning the love and approval of his father) he 
would repeatedly sabotage his efforts (for instance, by getting kicked out of 
                                                 
1
 In Chapter 4, I will describe how another obsessional patient, Phil, became hystericized at a certain point 
in the treatment.  
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school because his drinking problems led him to flunk all of his classes).  That 
style of self-sabotage therefore made it impossible for him to get what he wanted 
but it also made it impossible for him to give his father what Buck believed he 
wanted.   
That is, Buck positioned himself as constantly refusing to satisfy the 
Other’s demand—his father’s demand that he succeed in school—and he 
retentively withheld what his father demanded.  Buck’s addictions were situated 
within this refusal in that his addictions—his alcohol addiction most 
particularly—sabotaged almost everything in his life, particularly his education, 
and thus any chance at success.  Indeed, his alcohol addiction got him kicked out 
of one school, as I will describe later in this chapter, and at the time of treatment 
it was posing a serious threat to his academic status in the school to which he 
transferred—the dean was threatening him with expulsion.   
Furthermore, aphanisis might have taken the form of his father, while 
giving him recognition and approval, becoming all too present to Buck.  That is, 
if his father gave the sought after approval, it would turn him into a suffocating 
presence or one who Buck believed would then want more and more of him, 
metaphorically devouring him with infinite expectations or desires.  Alternately, 
Buck also experienced his mother as a suffocating presence whom he imagined 
he might get absorbed into and as associated with an enjoyment that he had lost, 
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which left him with a kind of hole that he tried to fill through some of the 
substances of his addiction.  Before discussing the dynamics of Buck’s addictions 
in more detail, I will first review some of his history so as to provide a context 
within which the roots of his addictions can be understood. 
 
Case History:  Buck  
 Clinical background.  
Buck, a twenty-one year old college student, originally sought treatment 
because he felt he was “falling back into” some of his “addictive behaviors.”  He 
said he felt he had an “addictive personality” and also wanted to work on 
breaking his cycles of depression and procrastination.  As the therapy 
progressed, it became clear that his addictions, depression, and procrastination 
were interwoven.   
During the initial consultation, Buck also told me that his mother was 
“dead-set against” his coming to our clinic.  She wanted him to find someone to 
work with under her insurance, so that she could pay for and be “more 
involved” in his therapy.  His father supposedly disapproved of therapy of any 
sort and suggested that Buck “try a little self-help.”  Buck told me that he felt it 
was important to him to come to our clinic and “do this on [his] own.”   
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Overview of Buck’s addictions. 
Buck told me during the initial consultation that he felt his most 
predominant current addiction was to caffeine.  He told me that he drank 
between six and seven pots of coffee per day, not to mention vast amounts of 
caffeinated soda.  He explained that he felt his parents “did it to [him]”—made 
him susceptible to caffeine addiction—because of how they “medicated” him 
with soda, coffee, and sugar when he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit 
Disorder (ADD) at eight years old.  He said that instead of giving him 
prescription drugs for his ADD, which he felt was merely overactivity and 
attention-seeking behaviors, they chose that kind of “home remedy.”  Buck 
intimated that he believed his parents medicated him in an attempt to suppress 
his anger towards them.  Indeed, Buck was given these “home remedies” 
precisely at a time in his childhood when he became somewhat rebellious and 
began to speak out against his parents.  That suppression of rage seemed to have 
lasting effects for Buck, which will become evident a bit further on.   
Around that time in Buck’s childhood, the family also went out to dinner 
almost every night of the week.  Buck told me that at the time he felt it was “a 
huge waste.”  Ironically, however, he reacted by trying to waste his family’s 
money even more!  When they ate out at the restaurants, he would order “glass 
after glass after glass” of soda, and he would stuff himself with whatever he 
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could snatch from the bread basket at the table, some appetizers, a full adult-
sized meal usually consisting of a pricey cut of meat, and, to top it all off, the 
most expensive dessert he could find on the menu.  He described how his little 
eyes would secretly scan the menu for the most expensive item from each meal 
category and that those would be his picks.  Buck seemed to do for himself what 
his parents had done to him.   His parents were stuffing him with sodas and 
sugary foods to treat his ADD, but he obviously took it to an extreme.  In 
addition to this connection, Buck might have been taking out some of his 
resentment towards his parents, by wasting their money,2 while nevertheless 
feeling indignant about how they were wasting the family’s money by going out 
to dinner so often.  It was clear that for Buck, resentment and wasting seemed to 
be quite strongly connected.  As Buck wasted his family’s money, his waist also 
grew.  He told me that during his childhood he had been quite thin until his 
parents started their “home remedy” for his ADD and that he started putting on 
weight from then on. 
 Buck’s resentment towards his parents continued throughout high school.  
Buck told me that during high school his parents were very strict with him and 
never let him experiment with any drugs or alcohol, a restriction he came to 
                                                 
2
 Buck would have accomplished a bigger waste of their money if he had simply left the food on the plate.  
However, he said he felt more “satisfaction” and also “power” through ordering and eating and drinking 
excessively.  “I made sure I got something—a lot—out of it,” he said.   
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resent quite a bit.3  His parents were obviously not able to watch him constantly, 
and Buck snuck around to experiment with drugs and alcohol.  He seemed to 
derive a great deal of jouissance out of sneaking around and supposedly doing 
things behind his parents’ backs, but he actually did them right under their 
noses!  Regardless, Buck told me that he felt if only his parents had been less 
“hands-on,” he wouldn’t have developed so many problems with drugs and 
alcohol during college.  Buck speculated that perhaps if his parents had let him 
experiment during high school, he might have learned how to “handle” himself.4  
“My biggest problem is that I have parents who love me too much,” Buck said 
dryly.   
 Buck told me that during college, he rebelled and became immersed in 
drugs and alcohol.  During his very first day at college, he began drinking.  He 
said that when he met his roommate, things were very “awkward” and he 
became uncomfortable in their new social situation of having to live together in 
spite of “immediately disliking one another.”  That night, Buck and his 
roommate drank vodka to the point of extreme inebriation, a pattern which 
continued almost nightly thereafter.  Indeed, supposedly to deal with the 
feelings of social awkwardness, Buck drank with his roommate and his 
                                                 
3
 Note the neurotic stance of blaming the other. 
4
 There seemed to be something important about the recurrence of Buck’s references to hands.  Although I 
am uncertain of their exact meaning—as that did not get elaborated in the treatment—I might speculate 
about a possible connection between masturbation and punishment. 
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roommate’s friends, and always the exact same thing:  Banker’s Club vodka.  
Buck said that the first time he took a sip of vodka, “it felt natural.”  With a look 
of bliss on his face, he explained, “It tasted like heaven to me.”  He also began 
drinking heavily with his rowing teammates, but with them he also sometimes 
drank beer.  He described the “frat atmosphere” of their drinking together, and 
again noted that drinking seemed to ease tension for him when he felt he didn’t 
quite belong in the group. Nevertheless, vodka seemed to be of greater 
importance to him.  What is more, a little jingle was often sung by Buck and his 
roommate’s friends when they drank together, something along the lines of, “Be 
a part of the club, the banker’s club.”   
 Given that Buck drank only one very particular kind of vodka, and in 
such large quantities, it is important to consider the possible meaning of the 
specificity of the object.  First, Buck’s father was a banker.  Moreover, Buck never 
felt he could bond with his father—he was never really part of his father’s 
“club,” metaphorically speaking.  According to Buck, Banker’s Club vodka is 
also very inexpensive.  I described previously Buck’s complaints about how his 
parents wasted their money—for instance, by going out to dinner so often during 
his childhood.  Eventually, Buck’s drinking reached such an extreme during his 
first year of college that he was hospitalized twice for alcohol poisoning.  At that 
point, he said, “everything went to shit.”  As he said that during the session, he 
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had a little anal slip of flatulence, though he pretended not to notice.  As a result 
of his hospitalizations for alcohol poisoning, he lost his sports scholarship and 
had to leave the university.  Perhaps that took on the value for him of wasting his 
parents’ money, through wasting his scholarship, and exacting some sort of 
revenge on them, though the exact cause of that possible desire for revenge is 
uncertain.   
 During Buck’s first year of college, his use of soda and caffeine increased 
exponentially.  He also began abusing several other substances, including 
Tylenol PM, cigarettes, and Adderol (a medication commonly prescribed for 
ADD).  More often than not, he mixed several of those substances together.  
Buck’s abuse of those substances resulted in self-destructiveness of different 
kinds:  procrastination, expulsion from school, and the production of agonizing 
physical symptoms.  That is, abusing those substances played into his self-
destructive cycles in similarly masochistic ways.  He even allowed himself to 
become so dehydrated from excessive intake of caffeine (and refusing to drink 
water to rehydrate himself) that he actually became unable to perspire.  That 
caused him great discomfort, and even pushed him to the point of curling up in a 
ball on the shower floor, crying because his skin was burning but would not 
perspire.  Nevertheless, in spite of the intense agony he was in, he still would not 
drink water, which underscores the severity of his masochistic tendencies. 
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When Buck’s parents then made him move home and transfer to a nearby 
university, he became resentful that they kept him under their watch and didn’t 
trust him.  He said he still continued with many of his addictions, but that he 
simply did so more covertly.  For instance, he described sneaking out of his 
parents’ house to chain smoke, and then sneaking back in late at night after they 
were asleep, and doing laundry to wash his clothes so they wouldn’t smell the 
cigarette smoke on his clothing.  “It’s like living a double life,” he explained.  He 
complained about the situation, but it was clear that he was also getting off on 
that secret addiction.  The jouissance he got from this sneaking around is 
suggested by Buck’s comment that the sneaking around “creates twice as much 
stress as the cigarettes treat.”  When I asked Buck about that sneaking around, 
and keeping things from his parents, he referred in particular to the impact 
finding out about it would have on his father, noting: “it would kill him if he 
found out.”  “Is that what this is all about, killing your father?” I ventured.  “All 
of these addiction patterns are a big ‘fuck you’ to my father,” Buck replied.  As 
we talked more about how those addictive behaviors might have been a way of 
him saying “fuck you” to his father, we noted that they nevertheless were very 
much directed at himself.  Buck affirmed this idea as we were talking about his 
chain smoking and other addictions, noting, “It’s a self-defeating cycle, like my 
entire life.”  Perhaps, then, defeating himself was tantamount to defeating his 
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father.  In order to better understand Buck’s addictions, it is important to more 
closely examine certain aspects of his history.   
 
Highlights of Buck’s history. 
From our first meeting, it seemed to be important to Buck that he address 
his family history in some detail.  He described how his family had a rather high 
social status and that they came from “old money.”  Buck told me that the family 
fortune came from his great-great-great-grandfather on his father’s side of the 
family, who had invented a new kind of building material.  The stories of his 
family being from old money were quite dramatic and often comical.  Indeed, 
Buck offered quite a few rather Gatsby-esque stories.  He described lavish family 
parties with people who were clearly of some importance but also quite quirky 
and even odd.  For instance, Buck described a rather dramatic grandmother who 
made a show out of refusing to eat but “constantly smoked like a chimney” and 
spoke with an affected snooty accent (which Buck enjoyed imitating); details of 
men philandering while their wives seemed to be indifferent or even relieved; 
and women histrionically making a show of hiding things from their husbands 
in spite of their husbands being completely unaffected by their displays.  Drama 
of various sorts seemed to have characterized much of Buck’s family history. 
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Buck explained that for the first four years of his life, he grew up in a very 
upper-crust area of Great Britain.  Buck told me that the family moved there 
because his father, who was a major player in international banking, was 
transferred there for work.  Buck described “rubbing shoulders with the elite of 
England,” a description which suggests that the young four-year-old Buck might 
have seen himself as bigger than he really was, either at the time or in hindsight, 
being figuratively on the same level as the British elite.   
Indeed, Buck characterized these early years in England as a sort of 
“golden age.”  In one sense, it was a golden age because those years were 
marked by great wealth and a lavish lifestyle.  Buck’s descriptions of those years 
also suggested childlike fantasies of rolling in piles of dollar bills or swimming in 
a pool of gold coins.  Richness and surplus characterized those years, and so too 
did the privilege of status.  That is, Buck was supposedly hobnobbing with the 
crème de la crème, enjoying all of the privilege of status while, as Buck commented 
with some pride, his father’s employer paid for everything.   
That lifestyle supposedly ended when the family left England.  Indeed, 
Buck’s “golden age” seemed to end after the family moved back to the States.  
When a subject looks back on something that has been lost, it is often viewed 
through the lens of nostalgia as a sort of paradise lost.  It isn’t particularly 
important whether such a time actually was so perfect—how could it be?—and 
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characterized by abundance; what is important is the value it later takes on for 
the subject.  This is similar to the way in which the subject imagines that he or 
she has lost a golden age of a more perfect jouissance—a jouissance fantasized to 
be associated with das Ding and a jouissance prior to castration, as I described in 
Chapter 2.  For Buck, the golden age in England certainly took on the value of a 
gold nugget of his childhood that was taken from him.  How did he react to that 
loss?  Primarily with anger, resentment, and attempts to recover and hold on to 
(retain) what he imagined he lost.   
Buck described feeling like an outsider when the family moved back to the 
States when he was four years old.5  He said he had a strong British accent and 
spoke “proper English” (the Queen’s English, I suppose).  To Buck his British 
accent also carried with it a stamp of elevated social class, much like the affected 
Boston Brahmin accent marked one’s belonging to a certain social and economic 
echelon.  Buck spoke disparagingly of the other children and their mothers, 
whom he encountered when he went to school in the U.S., noting that he felt 
they looked down on him and made fun of him for his manner of speaking.  He 
commented with derision, “They made fun of me for speaking proper English.”  
Buck felt like an outsider, but to him being an outsider took on qualities of being 
both privileged (special) and very devalued (rejected).  That may have 
                                                 
5
 Roughly an Oedipal age. 
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established a structure that carried throughout Buck’s life:  of imagining that he 
occupied the role of an exception, but as the simultaneously golden and 
denigrated one.  
Buck’s own way of describing his sense of occupying the role of exception 
or outsider was that he was never “group-minded.”  He gave numerous 
examples of how, throughout elementary school and high school, he made 
deliberate attempts to do the opposite of whatever was popular.  For instance, he 
told me he would often fantasize about a World War III in which the Soviet 
Union would win.  Another example that he mentioned on several occasions, 
suggesting its multivalent importance to him, was that when all of the other kids 
rooted for Luke Skywalker, he rooted for Darth Vader.  A consistent theme 
underlying all of the stories he told about how he was not “group-minded,” and 
how he deliberately went against the grain, was that he always did so for “no 
particular reason.”  Nevertheless, he might have wanted a victory of socialism 
over capitalism (represented as his father as a banker) and also of the father—
Darth Vader—over the son.  These fantasies may have retroactively structured 
the “outsider” stances that he took.  In Buck’s account, there was nothing 
particularly or inherently appealing about liking the opposite of what the others 
liked, other than the fact that it was precisely the opposite of what others liked.  
That allowed Buck to take a position against them, in opposition to them.  Taking 
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a position that was the direct opposite of the position taken by others meant that 
Buck never really took a position of his own at all.  Since he blindly did whatever 
was the direct opposite of what the others found appealing, he did not have to 
look within or call his own desires into question.  His desire was thus formed in 
direct opposition to the other’s desire, in a decidedly neurotic style.   
 
Gender relations, gender trouble.   
Adopting a stance in direct opposition to the other also resonates with the 
structure of some of Buck’s familial relationships.  For instance, he described 
being in many ways “the opposite” of his sister.  Rachel, six years Buck’s senior, 
was his only sibling.  Buck made a point of telling me during the initial 
consultation that the family nickname for his sister used to be something like 
“Raging Rachel,”6 which he said he related to her gender:  assuming that what 
made girls different from boys was that they were angry.  He described Rachel as 
“mainstream,” and clarified that while she was interested in “practical things” 
like “hard sciences” and math, he was more interested in “ethereal things” like 
languages and philosophy.  He noted, with an air of superiority, that those are 
subjects that most people are not interested in.  Explaining more about how he 
and Rachel were opposites, he told me that everything seemed to be easy for 
                                                 
6
 This is, of course, a pseudonym, but I have preserved the flavor of  Buck’s sister’s actual nickname.   
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Rachel, who apparently had always excelled at work or academics without 
putting forth much effort, while Buck felt as though nothing had ever been easy 
for him, even when he put forth considerable effort.  Buck also commented that 
although his sister had always done whatever their parents wanted her to do, he 
had not always been so acquiescent.  Buck felt his parents always compared 
them to one another, and that while his father had a clear preference for Rachel, 
Buck always felt he was his mother’s favorite.   
Regardless, perhaps partly because of them competing for their parents’ 
attention, Buck described his relationship with his sister as always having been 
contentious.  He recounted numerous verbal arguments and physical fights they 
had gotten into.  Buck seemed to have been the one initiating the physical fights, 
while Rachel seemed to have been the one initiating most of the verbal 
arguments and teasing.  Buck gave the example that when they were children, 
Rachel would often put snails all over her body and then do a little dance in front 
of him, attempting to frighten him.  It worked.  According to Buck’s account, that 
would “freak [him] out” and he would “scream and cry like a girl and run 
away.”  Buck told me he felt his sister has always had the “upper hand” in their 
relationship. 
Questions of gender identification and sexual position came up not only 
with regard to his relationship with his sister, but also within several other 
 92
contexts.  Take, for instance, the rather odd image that Buck reported when I 
asked him to describe his first memory.  He told me that the first thing that came 
to mind was a video of him as a two-year-old, in which he was dressed up in one 
of his mother’s long shirts, which was cinched around his waist with an army 
belt, and that he was also carrying a “fake sword” and wearing a fireman’s 
helmet that he always thought resembled a crown.  In many ways, Buck seemed 
to identify with his mother more than his father (and that meant that his phallic, 
masculine status was in question).  He described his father as “too rigid” and as 
someone who didn’t “care about ethereal things” and had a “wooden mind.” In 
relation to that phrase, note that, as I described earlier, the family fortune came 
from something about building materials, and that Buck seemed to oppose his 
father’s “wooden,” practical, and financial interests to his own “ethereal” 
interests, things more in line with languages and philosophy.  The phallic 
references inherent in describing his father as “wooden” are also obvious.  Buck 
complained of his father’s “faux machismo,” which Buck felt represented his 
attempt to portray a rather flimsy façade of being an alpha male—someone 
interested in sports, politics, and business.  Buck seemed to consider those 
merely stereotypical markers of masculinity, hence his accusation that his father 
displayed “faux machismo.”   
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Buck described his relationship with his father as alternately “distant” and 
“explosive.”  Buck told me that for the most part, he simply avoided interacting 
with his father.  On the occasions when they did interact, usually when there was 
something important to be discussed, such as Buck’s status in school, their 
relationship became explosive and verbal arguments inevitably ensued.  Buck 
said he felt he had “power issues” with men in general, most particularly his 
father.  (I will address Buck’s relationship with his mother in more detail in a 
later section of this chapter, in which I address the oral drive, and I will also 
return to Buck’s relationship with his father in a section on the anal drive.) 
Gender and sexuality seemed to have been particularly problematic for 
Buck during high school.  He told me that during that time he began to worry 
that he might be gay.  He said he saw the other boys beginning to take an interest 
in girls but that he did not share their curiosity, which led him to think that there 
might be “something wrong” with him.  Eventually, he said, the other kids tried 
to “use that against” him—knowing that he was sensitive to issues about his 
sexuality—and make fun of him, telling him that everyone “knew for sure” that 
he was gay.  Buck told me that he became very “defensive” and tried to deal with 
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his insecurity by putting up a front and telling everyone, very angrily, that he 
would “beat the gay out of [his] own son.”7   
During his senior year of high school, Buck became interested in Maureen, 
a girl who always sat in the bleachers during his sports practices.  Although he 
had admired her from afar for several months, he had never spoken to her at all.  
He finally asked one of his teammates to approach her to find out if she might be 
interested in dating him.  Apparently Maureen rejected him on the spot, which 
Buck characterized as a major narcissistic wound for him.  He said he became 
“enraged”8 and then began “stalking her,” following her around school and 
watching her when she didn’t know he was there.  At the time of treatment, 
Maureen was dating one of Buck’s closest friends, and Buck continued to 
maintain an impossible relationship with her, asexually admiring her while 
knowing he couldn’t have her because she was someone else’s girlfriend.  That is 
also a feature of obsessional neurosis—the other man’s desire for a woman 
generates his desire, precisely as an impossible desire. 
                                                 
7
 Buck referring to the idea of having a son of his own some day, and one who might be homosexual, 
suggests a possible underlying fantasy that his father would beat any signs of homosexuality out of him.  
Buck stating that he would “beat the gay out of” his son is thus faux machismo covering his fear of being 
homosexual.   
8
 Later in this chapter I will address some possible connections that might have existed on an unconscious 
level for Buck regarding rage and sexuality.  For now, I’ll raise the following speculations:  Did he refuse 
to seek out relationships with women on a sexual or even romantic level because he might perceive their 
sexuality to be “raging?”  Perhaps it would mean he would be eclipsed?  Would it take on the value of 
annihilatory fusion? 
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Buck also told me that his history of relationships was extremely limited.  
He said he had only ever gone on three dates with someone—a girl whom he 
dated about a year prior to starting therapy.  He said he broke things off with her 
when she began to give him the impression that she wanted to move towards 
having a sexual relationship with him.  He told me that he became “intimidated” 
by the fact that she was much more sexually experienced than he was and that 
she wanted sexual contact from him (which he hadn’t been giving her).  He said 
he eventually broke up with her due to those issues, and he added that he never 
even knew what to do doing during kissing.  Was Buck identifying with his 
father?  He had described his father as “the most asexual person” he had ever 
encountered and reported that his parents literally never touched one another, at 
least as far as he had seen.  Regardless, even in the way in which Buck 
approached Maureen during high school, it was clear that he frequently set 
himself up for failure.  It should have been obvious that she was attending every 
sports practice due to her being either interested in or dating another boy there, 
which could hardly have escaped Buck’s notice!  Indeed, setting himself up for 
failure had become a major motif in Buck’s life, which was also evident in his 
addictions, which I will now address in more detail.   
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“Gaping holes” and the role of emptiness:  Orality and the drive. 
The clinic in which I was treating Buck required the administration of 
psychological assessment measures within the first few sessions of a new case.  I 
chose to give Buck a Rorschach test.  Many of his card responses were 
interesting, in that he kept seeing what he referred to as “gaping holes” in many 
of the inkblot images, as well as images suggestive of either annihilatory or 
symbiotic fusion.  I will touch on a few of these to highlight what light they shed 
on the role of emptiness and the oral drive in some of his addictions.  
Indeed, the most predominant theme that came up over the course of 
Buck’s Rorschach had to do with feeling engulfed.  Linked with that dynamic 
was the recurrence of his apperceptions of holes and open mouths in the blots.  
For instance, Buck said he felt one blot was “either Darth Vader or a woman” 
(which we can easily see as being suggestive of parental figures), and in both of 
those responses he focused in particular on how the character’s mouth was open 
and seemed to him to be a “gaping hole.”  Similarly, in his response to another 
card, Buck again focused on a mouth detail and said that the blot appeared to be 
an image of a “grandmother with no teeth.”  He said she had a weak chin and 
that because she had neither teeth nor dentures, she must have had an over- or 
underbite such that her mouth was “always a little bit open.”  He then said that 
he had another thought about what else that blot image could be:  the jaws of a 
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shark.  He noted in particular the structure of what he imagined was a chin and a 
“strong looking link” at a certain place where the upper and lower portions of 
the jaw met.  Again he commented that what he saw was an open mouth, 
“another gaping hole.”  There seemed to be an interesting shift across those two 
apperceptions for that card.  The first—the grandmother with no teeth—seemed 
to be associated for him with weak figures (perhaps weak parental figures, 
fantasized or real) who would not pose to him any threat of engulfment.  The 
second—the shark jaw—was in stark contrast to the first one, and seemed to 
radiate for him a feeling of being threatened with engulfment.  In response to 
another card’s inkblot, Buck noted the “scary” feeling he got from the image, and 
talked about his sense that the image was of a mouth or head descending on 
someone and eating his or her head and upper body.   
I asked Buck to tell me more about the times when he felt engulfed, and 
he told me that he often felt that way around his parents.  He lamented that his 
parents didn’t understand him and wanted to be very involved in his life, which 
he found “invasive.”  He complained that since they didn’t trust him they kept 
him trapped in their house like a prisoner or a child—“holed up.”  What is 
evident in all of this is an interesting connection between the role of the oral 
drive for Buck and his experience that when the Other became present to him—
had a role in his life and claimed to want something of him—he felt suffocated 
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and devoured.  Imagining the Other’s desire to be obliterating is a radical form of 
the obsessive’s experience of aphanisis, to be sure! 
In considering the possible role of the oral drive in Buck’s case, it is 
important to more closely address Buck’s relationship his mother.  That is 
particularly important in light of my hypothesis that many of Buck’s addictive 
patterns had to do with attempting to defeat the father by attempting to defeat 
himself.  My sense was that his addictions were Oedipally-structured symptoms 
by which he was trying to hold on to a piece of lost enjoyment associated with 
the mother (and with the “golden age” of the family’s stay in England) and 
through which defeating the father would take on the value of winning the 
mother.   
In speaking about the history of what he himself referred to as his “oral 
fixation,” Buck described often feeling compelled to put “anything at all” into his 
mouth.  He described getting satisfaction from putting a whole host of things 
into his mouth, such as pens, paperclips, food, cigarettes, alcohol, and Mountain 
Dew.  Buck also said that whatever he put into his mouth became a “pacifier.”  I 
punctuated that by echoing his word choice back to him with the inflection of a 
question—“Pacifier?”—and I asked him what came to mind.  He told me that 
when he was a young child he used to wrap the fingers of one of his hands 
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around his mother’s curls9 while sucking the thumb of his other hand.  He told 
me that later he would fall asleep by sucking the thumb on one hand and 
touching the fur on his teddy bear with the other hand, which is of course an 
interesting variation on the original configuration with his mother.  His excessive 
consumption of alcohol, food, and cigarettes can be understood as attempts to 
recover a lost enjoyment connected to his relationship with his mother.   
Coincidentally enough, Buck also described himself as “obsessive” about 
how he put things into his mouth, particularly in reference to his drinking.  He 
said he felt the primary function of his drinking was not so much to get drunk, 
per se, but rather to pass the time.  He said he often felt the need to do 
something, to put anything at all in his mouth, in order to pass the time.  Perhaps 
this can be likened to the obsessional’s relation to time (and issues of 
procrastination in Buck’s particular case)—in the logic of waiting for the 
father/master to die in order to then live.  Perhaps Buck’s experience of time 
within the context of the oral drive had to do with an attempt to recover a little 
leftover jouissance in the meantime—akin to a mere pittance of the pleasure of a 
golden age.   
The connection between Buck’s experience of the oral drive and his 
longing for a sort of golden age also related to his passion for coffee.  Indeed, 
                                                 
9
 Note that just as the drive circles around a hole, so too does a curl encircle a hole or emptiness! 
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coffee was very serious business to Buck.  “I love coffee like some people love 
wine,” he declared.  As he leaned back against the couch and stared off into the 
distance, he began telling me about his passion for coffee.  As he did so, I was 
reminded of how the character of J. Peterman on Seinfeld acts when he begins 
telling stories of his exotic adventures in far-off lands, with extremely poetic 
descriptions that he then includes as copy in his catalogue to sell eclectic and 
creatively named products such as “The Urban Sombrero” and “The Himalayan 
Walking Boot.”  Buck began telling me about his love of dark roast coffee above 
all the other roasts.  “You can taste the earth, where it came from,” he cooed.  
Appearing to conjure up a sense memory of how coffee profoundly transported 
him somewhere, he described in minute detail the characteristics of a particular 
kind of roast that gets left out on the ground somewhere in the heart of Africa for 
several weeks.  He described how in the process of the beans laying atop the 
African soil, they became exposed to the elements—they were rained on, “kissed 
by the wind,” and “pressed up tight against the soil, all cuddled up.”  Buck also 
described how the coffee beans were also on top of animal manure in some 
places and absorbed some of that as well.  He commented on how “perfect” it 
seemed to him that the coffee beans that were exposed to manure became, 
through the process of time passing as the beans were exposed to the elements, 
the most delectable ones.  Seeming fascinated by the process, he noted:  
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“Everything goes into everything else.”  He continued:  “It’s beautiful, symbiotic, 
everything becomes one in perfect harmony.”  Buck fell silent for several 
moments, staring off into the distance with his lips slightly apart.   
While the idea of a sort of fusion towards One was evident in Buck’s 
homage to coffee, it is worth considering the relation between wholes and holes.  
Buck characterized his relation to coffee in terms of wholeness and plenitude, but 
there was also another way in which he took in all of his oral objects—running 
the gamut from soda, to alcohol, to paperclips—excessively and repeatedly in 
response to his experience of a hole, and of being lacking.  That is, he was trying 
to fill a hole and overcome his lack.  For instance, in speaking of his impulses to 
devour large quantities of food or drink, Buck recounted a time when he forced 
himself to finish a gigantic hamburger and a towering pile of fries even though 
he wasn’t actually hungry at the time.  When I asked him about why he ate 
everything in spite of not being hungry, he had a slip of the tongue and instead 
of saying “Because I want it to be empty” (he told me he meant to refer to 
wanting the plate to be empty) he said “Because I wanted to not be empty.”   
As I described in Chapter 2, Lacan formulated that the drive circles 
around an emptiness—a void or a hole—and that the subject takes objects in an 
(impossible) attempt to fill that emptiness.  Jouissance and an attempt at 
recovering it is what is at stake.  Buck’s pattern of taking in oral objects certainly 
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relates to some jouissance associated with the scene of sucking his thumb while 
touching his mother’s hair.  While the structure of Buck’s relationship with his 
mother seemed primary with regard to orality and the drive, turning now to the 
question of the role of anality and the drive will return us to Buck’s relationship 
with his father. 
 
“Piles and piles of shit”:  Anality and the drive. 
It is high time (pun intended, as we will see) that Buck’s anger is 
examined in more detail.  During the initial consultation, Buck warned me that 
he had gotten into a number of verbal and physical altercations10 in his day and 
announced with decidedly flat affect:  “I am a very angry person.”  Indeed, when 
he was in elementary school and was resentful of being made fun of by the other 
kids, he literally wrote up a list of people that he wanted to kill—a more extreme 
form of a mental “shit list,” to be sure!  Apparently, that list became the subject of 
several PTA meetings.   
Later in the therapy Buck also told me about his resentment about having 
been rejected by his top-choice university, which I will refer to as “Golden 
University.”  He said he believed that if only he would have submitted college 
applications one year earlier, he would have been accepted into Golden 
                                                 
10
 Interestingly enough, the physical altercations seemed to be limited to his relationship with his sister. 
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University.  He said he was sure that he was only rejected because that school 
raised the SAT score requirements the year he applied, which resulted in him 
falling just short of being accepted—falling just below the newly-raised bar.  
Buck told me how “insulted” he was by that rejection and how much of an 
impact it had on him when he then had to go to what he felt was a less desirable 
school, which I will refer to as “Crap College.”  Having to enroll in Crap College 
took on, for Buck, the meaning of being rejected by the academic big Other—not 
being seen as valuable or worthy, and thus cast out like a little turd.  Reacting in 
his typical style, Buck became resentful and depressed—angry at the Other but 
also angry at himself, two gestures which for him were never easily separable.  
Nevertheless, instead of expressing his anger directly or doing something more 
constructive with his feelings, he acted out in his self-destructive patterns—
drinking, smoking, using various substances, and procrastinating with his 
academic work to the point of compromising his academic career—which might 
be understood as bearing anger towards himself and others in one fell swoop 
(anger at others being turned around on himself).   
When Buck moved back home after losing his scholarship during his 
freshman year at Crap College, his parents became watchdogs, much to Buck’s 
dismay.  They didn’t trust that he wouldn’t fall into his addictions again, as he 
had done at Crap College, and they also wanted to keep a close eye on his 
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academic progress at his new university, where his parents wanted him to be, 
which I will refer to as “The University of the Other’s Desire.”  Indeed, Buck’s 
father was the primary figure who nagged him about his academic work.  That 
was not entirely unfounded, in that during his sophomore year at The University 
of the Other’s Desire Buck took incompletes in four of his classes and managed 
just barely to pass the others.  He was sent a letter by the Dean warning him that 
his status at the University was precarious and that disciplinary action would 
ensue if he didn’t get his grades back on track.   
Once Buck’s father got wind of that letter, he began to “nag” Buck and to 
insist on getting weekly updates from him about his academic progress.  Buck 
responded by becoming even more angry and resentful and by procrastinating 
even more.  As Buck complained about his father’s invasiveness and his own 
procrastination, he said, referring to his father, “He sees my education as his.  I 
can’t do any work . . . because it’s for him!”  Buck’s education became something 
his father was so “invested” in—both in terms of his concern and also in footing 
the entire bill for his schooling—that on some level, for Buck, his education 
became his father’s.  Buck thus perceived his education to be a little turd/gift that 
he retentively didn’t want to hand over to the Other.  Buck exclaimed, “An 
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education should be yours!”11  He continued, railing against his parents, “They 
see it as an investment so they feel they can intervene and intrude at any time.  
But they should just leave me alone!”  Buck’s procrastinating and keeping 
himself on the verge of getting kicked out of school was, in fact, a way of wasting 
his father’s money, and really making him pay.  That seemed to be yet another 
example of Buck’s pattern, which started early in his childhood, of wasting 
things.  Nevertheless, although he complained about his father badgering him 
about his academics, Buck’s procrastinating and wasting his education was a 
way of keeping his father quite actively invested and invasive.  Perhaps it was a 
way of keeping him alive while perpetually—and angrily—waiting for him to 
die, to “go.”   
As Buck complained of his parents’ invasiveness and their excessive 
“investment” in his education, he said, “They want to help me but I wish they’d 
just let me go.”  Wishing they would let him “go” might have a double 
meaning—wishing that his parents would let him be separate and autonomous, 
and also wishing that they could let him “go” (experience “relief” such that he 
would no longer be angry and retentive/withholding).  Buck’s retentiveness kept 
his anger directed at himself and kept him unable to “produce” anything.  
Moreover, as Buck described the connection between his parents considering his 
                                                 
11
 Buck’s use of the “general you” in that statement can be thought of as a slip.  Rather than saying 
something like, “An education should be one’s own,” he said “yours”—the Other’s.   
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education to be theirs and his procrastination and inability to take action to 
resolve his academic situation, he said, “It puts me in a hole.”  He said he reacted 
by becoming depressed and wanting to “sleep and do nothing.” In that sense, 
Buck became identified with feces, withdrawn into a death-like dark anal lair.  
Indeed, during a later session Buck declared that thinking about his academic 
debacle made him feel “like a piece of shit.”  As he reflected on how he felt 
overwhelmed by what seemed to be an endless hole that he might not be able to 
get out of, he slowly sunk deeper into the couch as he gestured with his arms 
above his head, in a pose like Atlas, saying, “It feels like I’m under piles and piles 
of shit.”  A connection between Buck’s procrastination, depression, and addiction 
suggests itself in  Buck’s pattern of becoming depressed about his academic 
situation, for instance—then procrastinating even more, and then turning to 
alcohol or drugs to help “pass the time,” which only exacerbated his situation of 
perpetually and passive-aggressively waiting.  Buck had to keep his father alive 
in order to have an enemy/rival and yet he also wanted to kill his father.   
Nevertheless, an important question is: what was Buck waiting for?  His 
self-destructive patterns seemed on the one hand to be inverted attempts to 
destroy the father, but ones that were very strongly directed at the self.  Perhaps 
that was an example of the classic feature of obsessional neurosis—waiting for 
the master/father to die.  Still, it is equally plausible that Buck’s perpetual 
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waiting actually had the function of keeping the master/father alive.  For 
example, not finishing his course work certainly kept his father angry and 
involved.  Perhaps in making his situation worse and worse he was 
unconsciously waiting to be punished by his father.  That is, perhaps he was 
trying to get himself yelled at by his father—note the grammatical form of the 
drive—and was deriving jouissance from that.   
I already described how Buck often suppressed his anger, but there were 
also times when his anger emerged—explosively.  That is, Buck’s anger 
sometimes exploded either through his mouth or through his bowels.  At times 
he had angry verbal outbursts with his father, which often followed long periods 
of avoiding his father—that is, periods during which his anger built 
incrementally (excrementally?) and then eventually reached a peak and erupted 
in a volatile argument.  Buck even described experiencing “an adrenaline rush, a 
high” when he was very angry and also when he saw that his father was very 
angry.  Being angry with his father seemed to bring both Buck and his father to 
life.  Interestingly, Buck was, regarding his choice of substances, more inclined 
towards uppers, which further indicates that there was an excitement value—
jouissance—he experienced in getting himself wound up to a certain explosive 
point.  That explosiveness was not only verbal but also physical at times.  For 
instance, his mixing of substances and his excessive consumption of coffee 
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during his freshman year at Crap College affected his bowels; he would be 
flatulent and severely constipated for days before switching over to diarrhea.  
Perhaps those explosive moments—of anger expressed through a verbal 
altercation or explosive diarrhea—were precisely the moments when Buck felt 
most alive.   
 
The end of therapy:  How Buck ultimately “went.” 
Although Buck seemed to be enthusiastic and engaged in therapy, and 
even said that he felt he should have come to the clinic a long time ago, his 
attendance, like other aspects of his functioning, was irregular.  He also began to 
accumulate a debt with the clinic as a result of falling behind with his session 
payments.  He was holding on.  Moreover, whenever we had a particularly good 
or productive session, he would invariably miss the next one and begin 
backtracking from the initial progress we had made.   
His unwillingness to pay his bill, in spite of numerous attempts to address 
this with him from different angles, became one of the primary “obstacles” to the 
therapy.  I got the impression that he was pushing me to become angry with him, 
perhaps even to threaten him or terminate the therapy entirely.  He told me that 
he could not pay his bill in spite of our having agreed upon a very low session 
fee so that he could manage to pay it on his own.  I had the sense that he was 
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repeating with me the same situation he put his parents in:  pushing them to 
anger and perhaps even threats, which I pointed out to him, and drew a 
connection between that and the dynamics of his relationship with his father and 
his professors, but to no avail.  In hindsight, perhaps the fee should have been set 
at the price of a bottle of Banker’s Club vodka!   
 During what became one of our last sessions, Buck told me that he wanted 
to stop coming to therapy.  He said he wanted to do so in order to “focus all of 
[his] energy” on his academic work and on raising his grades so that he would 
not lose his scholarship, which is what his Dean had threatened.  He thanked me 
and said that the therapy had helped him to “feel much better” and that he felt a 
lot of “relief.”   
However, Buck discontinued the therapy prematurely, in my opinion, as I 
felt there was more that could have been worked on.  I’m reminded of Buck’s 
complaint about his parents:  “They want to help me but I wish they’d just let me 
go.”  Perhaps, in a way, I let Buck “go” (though I encouraged him to stay) within 
the therapy itself, in a way that brought him some relief—that is, he no longer 
had to hold on to all of his anger, including how it was wrapped up in his 
addictions, and instead his anger was given verbal expression.  Although the 
therapy was certainly not as “productive”—according to my definition, 
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anyway—as my other cases, perhaps what Buck wanted to “produce” was 
something a bit different and he had found enough relief.   
It is possible that Buck’s decision to stop treatment coincided was a shift 
such that, in choosing to focus on his academics, he no longer wanted to waste 
his father’s money (by risking flunking out of school) and provoke such anger in 
him.  It is possible that by the end of treatment Buck’s jouissance was a bit less 
wrapped up in that circuit.  Buck’s drinking did reduce, though only somewhat.  
He drank a bit less excessively than he had at the beginning of treatment and he 
drank mainly beer—no longer did he mention Banker’s Club vodka.  However, 
he continued to smoke cigarettes excessively (seeming to derive quite a bit of 
jouissance out of sneaking around to smoke) and continued to drink quite a bit of 
coffee, by anyone’s standards, though he reduced his consumption by about 
half.12  At the end of treatment he was not using any drugs, to the best of my 
knowledge. 
Perhaps those marked minor shifts with regard to Buck’s position in 
relation to the drive.  His jouissance linked to his father and the Banker’s Club 
vodka was somewhat less pervasive but I felt his drive-related attempts to regain 
and hold onto a jouissance associated with his mother remained unchanged.  
Perhaps there was a shift of emphasis from father to mother.  The therapy did 
                                                 
12
 Three pots of coffee per day still seems excessive!  
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not go far enough to effect more substantive change with regard to the drive.  I 
had the sense that the early phase of the work, which involved calling attention 
to and highlighting the signifiers related to his addictions and patterns of drive 
satisfactions, could have progressed, if Buck had remained in treatment, into a 
later phase which might have had more of an impact on the drive roots of his 
addictions.  Buck stayed long enough to work on the level of the symbolic but 
not to experience adequate working through, which would have involved a more 
substantive impact on the real drive roots of his addictions.  Perhaps Buck 
reached a point at which he had experienced some change but was unwilling to 
part with any more of his jouissance.  He certainly had a pattern of holding on.  
What became clear was that Buck did at least begin viewing his education as 
more his than his father’s.  Ultimately, I do not know if Buck’s decision to stop 
treatment and focus on his academic work resulted in his getting a better handle 
on his education or enjoying wasting it yet again.  I wasn’t sure if, in leaving the 
therapy, he was coming or going.
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Chapter 4 
 
ADDICTION AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS 
The Color of Emptiness: 
Re-enacting the Paternal Metaphor—From Darkness to Light—In an Attempt 
to Transform “Mamajuana” into Ordinary Marijuana   
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will present a case study of “Phil,” an obsessional 
neurotic patient who was addicted to marijuana.  I will address how Phil may 
have been re-enacting the paternal metaphor through his drug use (and the 
circumstances that got played out around that) in an attempt to reassure himself 
of the Name-of-the-Father—that is, to reassure himself of limits against being 
devoured by an incestuous jouissance associated with his mother as that 
jouissance related to his smoking.  I will also discuss Phil’s perception of the 
Other’s demand and how his drug use related to that.  I will describe how by the 
end of treatment Phil’s drug use changed and he seemed to experience jouissance 
differently, such that his position in relation to the drive shifted into something 
much more livable.   
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The Drive’s “Color of Emptiness” 
 
In “On Freud’s ‘Trieb’ and the Psychoanalyst’s Desire,” Lacan makes a 
brief reference to the drive’s “color of emptiness” (couleur de vide).  Referring to 
the drive, Lacan notes that 
Its sexual coloring, so categorically maintained by Freud as its most 
central feature, is the color of emptiness:  suspended in the light of a gap.  
That gap is the gap desire encounters at the limits imposed upon it by the 
principle ironically referred to as the “pleasure principle,” the latter being 
related to a reality which, indeed, is but the field of praxis here. (Lacan, 
1964/2006, p. 722) 
Although in that brief text Lacan does not unpack the multiple meanings 
suggested by the concept of the drive’s color of emptiness,1 I will focus in 
particular on how, as Lacan reminds us beginning in Seminar XI, and as I 
described in Chapter 2, the jouissance of the drive is attributable to its circling 
around an object beyond which is a semblant of emptiness.  That is, there is 
always a gap between the objects of the drive and the lost satisfaction for which 
the subsequent objects stand in as always insufficient replacements.  Insofar as it 
                                                 
1
 Given the scope of this chapter, I will not address some of the other ways to understand the drive having a 
“color of emptiness”—for instance, as in Lacan’s idea of there being no sexual relation, and that there is a 
gap between the partner and the object a.  Considered from that vantage point, the drive’s satisfaction thus 
again takes on the color (the quality) of a gap or emptiness. 
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is irreparably lost, that place of satisfaction is always empty, and the drive’s 
attempts to recover some jouissance take on the color of emptiness.   
As I explained in Chapter 2, the drive is not satisfied by the tangible object 
itself.  The satisfaction of the drive has more to do with the particular position 
the various drive objects occupy and thus how they are implicated in the drive’s 
circuit.  It is also important to keep this in mind when we think about addictions, 
in that the drive satisfaction of an addiction is often about much more than the 
drug object in and of itself.  Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate through the 
presentation of the case to follow, a symptom such as an addiction can have a 
real core, around which there is a symbolic structure.  Freud describes this as 
being “like the grain of sand around which an oyster forms its pearl” (Freud, 
1953a/1905[1901], p. 83).  Utilizing techniques that aim at working with the 
symbolic structure around the real of the drive is crucial if the analytic process is 
to have an effect on the real of the drive through the symbolic medium of speech.  
That is the case because, fundamentally, “psychoanalysis has but one medium: 
the patient’s speech” (Lacan, 1953/2006 p. 206). 
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Case History:  Phil 
 Clinical background.  
A patient whom I will refer to as Phil was in his early thirties when I 
began working with him.  The therapy took place over the course of a few 
months, until he relocated to a different state.  In spite of his age, he had not yet 
graduated college and had a rather low-level, low-paying job.  From the first 
session, Phil identified himself as an “addict” and stated that he wanted to quit 
smoking marijuana “cold turkey.”  He explained that over the years his drug use 
had fluctuated, but that his smoking was now “out of control.”  He had made at 
least six separate attempts to pursue university studies in various schools across 
the country, but every time his drug use would become so problematic as to 
eclipse his studies, and he would wind up flunking out of school.  Phil told me 
that he kept trying to complete college because “that was what people did” but I 
did not get the impression that he was actually trying to learn anything, enrich 
his life, or reap the rewards or pride that might go along with receiving a degree; 
indeed, Phil did not desire symbolic achievements.  He even asserted that his 
inability to complete a college degree was his way of “keeping adulthood at 
bay.”  Phil told me that rather than pursuing an “adult life” in which he had a 
well-paying job, complete with a wife, family, and white picket fence, he had 
always been much more interested in drugs, marijuana in particular.   
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With regard to his drug use, Phil told me that he only smoked at night (a 
detail which is important, as we will see a bit further on) but smoked quite a bit 
of marijuana and felt he couldn’t stop himself.  He explained that over the years 
his drug use had fluctuated, but that, by the time he decided to seek treatment, 
his smoking had gotten “out of control.”  Phil told me that he smoked a 
substantial amount of marijuana every night, even though he didn’t want to.  
That is, at the end of the day, although he claimed that he wanted to resist the 
urge to smoke, he felt he never could.  He always found himself in the same 
predicament of giving in to the urge, always magnetically drawn to a situation 
he supposedly wished to, but felt he could not, resist.  Referring to his drug use, 
he stated:  “It has to be stopped.”   Note the passive form—“It has to be 
stopped”—as opposed to something like “I have to stop smoking.”  By saying “it 
has to be stopped,” Phil presented himself as someone who felt helpless, 
desperate, and trapped—caught within an arbitrary order that supposedly had 
power over him.   
 
On beginning the treatment.  
It is evident in the grammatical form of Phil’s complaint—“it has to be 
stopped”—that he positioned himself as appealing to an Other for help.  As I 
would soon find out, Phil often put himself in situations in which it was in fact 
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someone else who might become responsible for putting a stop to his drug use.  
During our first session in particular, it became clear that Phil was hoping that I 
would put an end to his drug use.  Indeed, he told me that prior to coming to the 
clinic where I was working he had assumed that being in treatment would mean 
that he would be required to stop using drugs.  When I told him that this was not 
a requirement, and that he would be the one to make choices about his drug use, 
he was disappointed and stated that he felt he wouldn’t be able to “give it up” 
unless someone else “forced” him to do so.  He told me that he was going to try 
to quit “cold turkey,” but that if he couldn’t handle that yet, he would at least 
commit himself to not smoking on the nights prior to our sessions.  Note that this 
was a plan that Phil himself came up with and was, in fact, able to hold himself 
to for the duration of the treatment—not once did he smoke the night before an 
appointment.   
 
From demand to desire. 
When Phil asked me to demand that he stop smoking, I refused to satisfy 
his demand.  My choice was driven by many general reasons having to do with 
establishing an analytic rather than a behavioral approach to the treatment of 
addictions, which I will discuss further in Chapter 8, as well as my sense that in 
Phil’s particular case I should not allow his familiar dynamic of taking a passive 
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position—getting others to do things for him—to be repeated.  Instead, it was 
something to be analyzed.   
Such reasoning was based on the particularities of Phil’s situation, but my 
choices were also strongly guided by Lacan’s assertion that clinicians should not 
satisfy their patients’ demands.  Indeed, Lacan insists that “Demand is exactly 
what is bracketed in analysis, it being ruled out that the analyst satisfy any of the 
subject’s demands” (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 535).  One reason why the analyst 
should not satisfy the patient’s demands is that the patient may be demanding 
something he or she does not actually want:  “Just because people ask you for 
something doesn’t mean that’s what they really want you to give them” (Lacan, 
1965-1966, Class of March 23, 1966).  What is more, Lacan equates every demand, 
at its core, with a demand for love.  Not only was Phil making a demand, he was 
demanding that I make a demand of him (i.e., demanding that I demand that he 
stop smoking).  Lacan clarifies that there are good reasons for sustaining and not 
satisfying patients’ demands:  “the analyst is he who sustains demand, not, as 
people say, to frustrate the subject, but in order to allow the signifiers with which 
the latter’s frustration is bound up to reappear” (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 516).  The 
point is also to allow the patient’s desire to emerge—to direct the treatment 
towards the patient’s recognition of the truth of his or her desire (Lacan, 
1961/2006, p. 535).   
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Phil’s demand for a separation from the drug was certainly not the same 
as a demand for analysis2 or increased insight through therapy, and so I made an 
intervention during the first session in an attempt to incite desire and curiosity—
that is, to try to create the initial conditions for beginning analytic work.  I told 
Phil that I would not necessarily endorse getting him to stop smoking as the only 
goal of our work.  I told him that I wanted the two of us to work together to 
explore the various facets of what might be involved in his drug use as well as 
many other aspects of his life.  I emphasized that there was no direct or preset 
route to him experiencing changes related to his issues with marijuana and that 
therapy would involve exploring many things, not just his drug use.  Essentially, 
I asked him to agree to speak—and to speak not only about his issues with 
marijuana, but also about things like his dreams, fantasies, and relationships.  I 
thus asked him to trade demand for desire and speech.  I addressed all of this 
and said to Phil, “Let’s explore it,” and he agreed.   
My intervention also stemmed from my belief that a simple and 
instantaneous separation from the drug, even if he could maintain abstinence, 
would not automatically be equivalent to a modification of his position in 
relation to desire and jouissance and would be more like a short circuiting of the 
goals and effects of sustained analytic work.  The particular way in which I 
                                                 
2
 The hope is that patients will eventually give up their specific demands and instead pursue the open-ended 
process of analysis on its own terms and by exploring questions they have about themselves.   
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formulated this intervention, asking Phil to agree that we would try to “explore 
it,” was deliberately ambiguous, touching perhaps on the way in which “it” 
might have been as yet unsymbolized, and drawing together snippets of his own 
discourse during that first session.   
 
A jouissance crisis. 
Although Phil entered treatment with a complaint about his drug use, he 
reported two rather different modes of using, and it was a very specific 
experience associated with one type of drug use that he wanted to bring to an 
end.  He told me that sometimes he would smoke marijuana and have the sense 
that he was still in control of his drug use, even though he felt the amount of 
marijuana he smoked was excessive.  Other times, however, he felt his smoking 
reached a point at which he was “no longer in control,” and it was this latter type 
of drug experience that became the central focus of his complaint.  Indeed, Phil 
said he was seeking treatment because something about the smoking in which he 
was “no longer in control” had become “just too much” and, in his account, 
caused a great deal of suffering.  Phil was no longer enjoying what he had once 
enjoyed; his smoking had become painful.  Phil entered treatment in the midst of 
a jouissance crisis.  Fink notes that “The moment at which someone seeks 
therapy can thus be understood as one in which a breakdown occurs in that 
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person’s favorite or habitual way of obtaining jouissance.  It is a ‘jouissance 
crisis.’  The jouissance-providing symptom is not working anymore or has been 
jeopardized” (Fink, 1997, p. 9). 
Phil told me that the “highest highs” of smoking actually became anxiety-
inducing for him.  What is striking about Phil’s reported experience of feeling 
anxious when he smoked and reached those “highest highs” is that something 
other than or more than the drug itself seemed to be operative.  He described a 
viscous feeling, like “dark syrup” oozing throughout him, that accompanied 
these “highest highs” and made him feel “suffocated” or “consumed.”  He 
described this experience of being overwhelmed by a diffuse and nebulous 
darkness rather poetically, noting, “The darkness comes over me, seeps throughout 
every pore of my being, like little dark cloud fingers slowly creeping through my body, 
taking over, possessing me entirely:  body, mind, and soul.”  Phil claimed that the 
drug experience associated with darkness overtaking him had become so 
problematic that he felt it was urgent that it be stopped immediately, stating, 
“It’s killing me.”  Marijuana is generally not considered to be one of the most 
addictive substances, much less a drug that kills, and so when Phil spoke of his 
drug use and noted, “It’s killing me” and “It has to be stopped,” I didn’t assume 
that “it” was necessarily marijuana itself.  Instead, I suspended judgment and left 
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room for the various possible meanings of “it” to emerge more fully throughout 
our work.   
The first clue came with his first slip of the tongue, when instead of saying 
marijuana, he said “mamajuana.”  Not surprisingly, I asked Phil to tell me about 
his mother.       
 
Intervening between the real and the symbolic. 
Over the next couple of months of sessions, Phil spoke in detail about how 
he and his mother had always been extremely close, and that their close bond 
began when she was pregnant with him.  Phil attributed this early bond to the 
one thing that made his mother’s pregnancy with him different from her 
pregnancy with his older brother (Phil’s only sibling):  she smoked cigarettes 
while she was pregnant with Phil.  He explained that his mother had always 
been a “chain smoker,” but that when she was pregnant with his brother, she 
was able to quit “cold turkey,” as he put it.  Note that this is also the wording he 
used during the first session to describe how he himself wanted to quit smoking 
marijuana, which, as we shall see, begins to suggest an interesting connection 
between his smoking marijuana and his mother’s smoking cigarettes.   
Over the course of those initial months of sessions, Phil’s discourse was 
quite thick and heavy, like the dark viscosity he associated with his experience of 
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the excessive “highest highs” of smoking marijuana.  He spoke rapidly, said 
quite a bit—in great detail—and was very anxious.  Further, Phil spoke about 
things in such a way that his suffering was very present in his speech.  That is, 
his speech was jouissance-laden—it seemed almost to carry the heaviness of his 
suffering and keep him stuck there, not moving forward.  He tried to make 
meaning out of everything, and brought a profusion of words, but in a way that 
backfired.  It perhaps backfired precisely because his speech was not getting at 
something (a different kind of level of meaning) and remained stuck in being a 
replication of the excessiveness inherent in his suffering rather than being able to 
move beyond it.   
During another session, several months into the therapy, Phil spoke about 
two topics:  his mother’s smoking when she was pregnant with him and also the 
fact that he had recently been feeling even more overwhelmed while smoking 
marijuana.  Phil told me his grandparents explained his mother’s inability to stop 
smoking while she was pregnant with him by saying, “With you, she just 
couldn’t stop it.”  “She just couldn’t stop it?” I echoed.  Phil said, “Well, I meant 
to say that my grandparents said, ‘She just couldn’t stop.’”  Sticking close to the 
specificity of what he actually said,3 I said to Phil, “But you said ‘she just couldn’t 
                                                 
3
 Lacanian analysis focuses not on what the patient “meant” to say—which would mean privileging their 
conscious, egoic discourse—but rather what the patient actually said.   
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stop it,’ and during our first session you said, ‘It has to be stopped,’ and ‘It’s 
killing me. . . . ’”  I then ended the session by saying “Let’s stop there for today.”   
My impression was that Phil seemed to feel there was something limitless 
about his mother’s smoking as well as his own, and that something about the 
absence of limits in both of those areas was contributing to his suffering.  That is, 
contributing to his jouissance crisis.  During the session following the one just 
described, Phil reported that a great sense of relief had set in for him following 
where we ended the session.  Throughout the therapy, he had described going 
through life always with a “dark cloud” looming right over his head, which he 
felt was a mix of anxiety, depression, and a sense of impending doom.  The dark 
cloud also might be associated with marijuana or cigarette smoke as well as 
Phil’s description of the “little dark cloud fingers” that he felt seized him when 
he smoked.  Smoke had also been equated with Phil’s mother and then with 
himself, which I will elaborate on a bit further on in this chapter.   
Phil said that after that session, the cloud seemed to be a bit further away, 
and he felt he suddenly had much more “room to breathe.”  He said he wasn’t 
sure why he was feeling that way, but that it felt good.  The intervention had 
created space for him—let in air, so to speak.  The intervention also affected him 
on the level of his body, as it gave his body more possibility—possibility for 
something different through his breathing:  taking in fresh air as opposed to toxic 
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smoke.  That felt sense of having more room to breathe coincided with a 
diminishment of Phil’s anxiety.  That makes sense in light of Lacan’s notion of 
anxiety as a lack of lack4 (something being too present or suffocating being what 
generates anxiety).  Phil began to experience more lack, more of a space of desire, 
which he experienced as anxiety-relieving.  Later in the therapy he told me that 
since that session he no longer experienced the “dark cloud” that he had always 
felt to be looming overhead.  It was a crucial shift for him. 
Perhaps my intervention, in splicing together pieces of his discourse and 
scanding5 the session as I did, might have hit the real6 and also had an anxiety-
relieving, limiting function.  Something about linking Phil’s comments (“She just 
couldn’t stop it;” “It has to be stopped;” and “It’s killing me”), and then ending 
the session, allowed those words to resonate and created an impact.  Scansion 
can also be implemented in such a way as to also have an impact on the drive:  
“it is insofar as the analyst intervenes by scanding the patient’s discourse that an 
adjustment occurs in the pulsation of the rim through which the being that 
resides just shy of it must flow” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 716).  I hoped also to create 
                                                 
4
 See Lacan’s Seminar X.  
5
 To “scand” is the verb form of “scansion.”  “Scansion”—stemming from the French verb “scander,” 
which means “to scan”—is a way in which the clinician can punctuate something or make a kind of cut, 
such as by ending a session on a particular note that the clinician hopes will resonate for the patient and 
have an impact (often an impact beyond meaning).   
6
 Fink explains that the analyst’s interpretation can “hit the real” by aiming at what the patient had been 
unable to say and circling around repeatedly while also not reducing it or tying it down to any one meaning 
through an unambiguous interpretation.  The analyst’s intervention can hit the real by having an impact on 
or shifting this cycle of circling around some piece of the real:  something that had been unspoken or 
unsymbolized.  (Fink, 1997, pp. 47-49).  
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something of a limit precisely where he was speaking of the suffering that the 
absence of limits brought him—to demonstrate, beyond the creation of a 
meaning effect, that what was supposedly killing him could be mitigated, that 
there was something that could be done about “it.”  Perhaps this intervention 
also began to open up a space through which a process of symbolization could 
unfold—a space similar to the gap that he felt had suddenly emerged between 
him and the dark cloud.   
My intervention went in the direction of the cause of desire, the real, and 
brought an absence of meaning.  That is consistent with Lacan’s assertion that “it 
is not the effect of meaning that is operative in interpretation, but rather the 
articulation in the symptom of signifiers (without any meaning at all) that have 
gotten caught up in it” (Lacan, 1960/2006, p. 714).  Affecting the drive roots of a 
symptom involves shaking up, without reducing to any one meaning, the 
signifiers that became encoded with the jouissance of the symptom.  Lacan’s 
guidelines on how to assess the value of clinical interventions thus place the 
emphasis on the results or impact of the intervention, rather than something like 
the patient’s ego wrapping around a new meaning.  He posits that an 
intervention’s “well-foundedness . . . [can only be] gauged by the material that 
emerges afterward” (Lacan, 1961/2006, p. 497).  Interventions are aimed at 
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advancing the analytic process—spurring the work along and getting the patient 
to say more.   
 Indeed, during the session that followed the one described above, Phil 
responded by bringing not more meaning but rather a hole in his knowledge.  
An important shift had occurred, which proved to be productive in that much 
important material began to emerge.  Phil posed two questions:  he expressed 
curiosity as to why his mother smoked while she was pregnant with him as well 
as why he himself continued to smoke so much in spite of the distress that 
resulted for him when he did.7  The emergence of a question in the early stages of 
any therapy or analysis is always an important marker, particularly with 
obsessional patients, signaling a hysterization of discourse, an acknowledgment 
of lack (e.g., a hole in knowledge) and a relation to an Other.  Lacan even 
suggests that “The structure of a neurosis is essentially a question” (Lacan, 1955-
1956/1993, p. 174).  The hysteric’s question, which focuses on sex/gender identity, 
is “Am I a man or a woman?” (or: “What does it mean to be a woman?”), and the 
obsessional’s question, a more existential one, is “Am I dead or alive?”  
Resonances of the obsessional’s question having to do with Phil’s case will be 
addressed a bit further on. 
                                                 
7
 As we will see, these indeed turned out to be related. 
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Since a question implies a lack—fundamentally not knowing something, 
having a lack or gap in one’s knowledge—and desire is based on lack, Phil 
beginning to pose questions also marked a shift from demand to desire.  Phil had 
been demanding, among other things, that someone put a stop to his drug use, 
but, instead, he questioned his drug use.  Essentially, jouissance was questioned, 
talked about, rather than just lived out in a painful cycle of repetition.   
Perhaps my interventions during the previous session put a limit on Phil’s 
style of thinking, which gave meaning to everything, and so his limitless 
jouissance saw a limit for the first time.  My intervention stopped a certain kind 
of push towards the endless creation of meaning—a limitless flow of more and 
more meaning that seemed to lack a stopping point.  My intervention aimed less 
at meaning-making than at having an impact.  This is consistent with Lacan’s 
claim that “Analytic interpretation is not designed to be understood, it is 
designed to make waves” (Lacan, 1976, p. 35).   
My intervention also allowed the symbolic to be present where previously 
only jouissance had been present.  That is, prior to the session of note, Phil had 
used signifiers to be continually suffocated, to dwell in the toxic smoke of 
jouissance.  The way he spoke of his drug use and his distress was such that both 
remained ever-present, unmodified, and even perpetuated by his cycle of being 
overwhelmed, seeing himself as helpless and trapped in an arbitrary order that 
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had power over him, and lacking an end point to that.  His style of drug use also 
had made jouissance continually present, involving as it did a sexualized (even 
incestuous on the level of fantasy) relation to his mother.  What is more, his 
smoking involved a kind of imagined abuse by his mother, in that her choice to 
smoke so much while she was pregnant with him resulted in Phil being born 
dangerously underweight (he almost died).  Those are nothing other than the 
layers of the death drive.  Phil’s horror at being consumed by his mother, 
overwhelmed by the jouissance of the smoke that was “too much,” was the real 
core of his symptom/addiction—the grain of sand—around which was a rather 
elaborate symbolic structure, the oyster as in Freud’s analogy.  Both the real core 
and the symbolic structure of the symptom are intertwined and interventions 
must target both in order to affect the drive. 
Accordingly, my interventions were poised between the symbolic and the 
real, between meaning and non-meaning.  What followed in the sessions 
thereafter was that jouissance was taken up by way of the symbolic.  Jouissance 
became a question for Phil.  Jouissance became something that could be talked 
about in a different way, and perhaps modified, rather than something that 
could only be lived out in a painful way—which involved his suffocation—and 
in seemingly endless, limitless, cycles of repetition.  The advent of Phil’s 
questions during that stage of the treatment opened the door to working on the 
 130
fundamental fantasy.  His questions touched precisely on how his drug use 
related to jouissance and his relation to his mother, and thus the fundamental 
fantasy itself.  
 
“Mamajuana” and the fundamental fantasy. 
The multiple resonances involving the connections between Phil’s and his 
mother’s smoking became even more amplified after the session in which I lined 
up Phil’s comments (“She just couldn’t stop it;” “It has to be stopped;” and “It’s 
killing me”) and then ended the session.  Indeed, the material that unfolded in 
the subsequent sessions seemed to give voice to the multiple layers of “it,” as 
both something and nothing.  Over the course of several sessions, one layer 
unfurled as Phil began discussing his sense that his mother’s supposed inability 
to stop smoking while she was pregnant with him meant that he must have 
occupied a unique role of being, paradoxically, both very strongly loved and also 
very strongly hated.  Obsessionals often complain that their mothers loved them 
too much.  One thing underlying that is an Oedipal fantasy of a privileged love 
relation with the mother. 
First, as for being very strongly loved, Phil speculated that the fact that his 
mother smoked with him and not with his brother made him special, and made 
their relationship oddly privileged from the start.  Phil told me he imagined how 
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he must have been such a happy baby in the womb, as he pictured himself being 
encircled by his mother’s cigarette smoke.  He would often joke about that, 
saying that being in a smoky womb must have been quite “trippy.”  He likened 
that to being high at a party and losing oneself in the drugs and music:  “It’s like 
when you’re dancing around and you’re so buzzed and immersed in the drugs 
and the music that everything melds into one—you can’t tell the difference 
between you, the music, and the drugs.”  His mother’s inability to quit smoking 
took on the value of love in that Phil imagined that his mother’s smoke was a 
liminal entity that unified them.   
Phil took the idea of being united with his mother through the smoke as 
evidence of his mother’s love but also of her hatred.  That is, precisely because 
she couldn’t “stop it,” and smoked so much during the pregnancy, Phil was born 
dangerously underweight and quite frail; he almost died.  Phil concluded that his 
mother’s intense love/hate for him, manifested in her smoking while she was 
pregnant with him, was quite literally almost lethal.   
Phil may have interpreted his almost dying as an infant—which he 
attributed to his mother’s excessive smoking during the pregnancy—as what his 
mother desired or even demanded.  That takes us back to Lacan’s ideas about the 
role of the Other’s demand in the drive.  In Chapter 2, I explained Lacan’s notion 
that neurotics often mistake the Other’s desire for demand.  One possible way to 
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interpret Phil’s perception of his mother’s demand is:  “Fuse with me in the 
smoky womb and suffocate:  die.”  Since the neurotic takes the Other’s demand 
as the object in fantasy, Lacan aligns his formula of the drive (S/   ◊ D) with his 
formula of fantasy (S/   ◊ a).  The Other’s demand determines the drive object, 
which is taken up in the structure of fantasy.  Phil’s fundamental fantasy might 
be read as something like:  to be suffocated by (fused with, devoured by) 
someone or something associated with his mother (and thus smoke and 
darkness).8  In that manner, Phil’s fantasy can be written in a formula as 
something like:  
(S/   ◊ “Mamajuana”). 
Instead of being positioned in relation to object a as cause of desire, Phil was 
positioned in relation to something that went beyond the pleasure principle:  a 
more toxic jouissance that he was steeped in.9  That was a relation based on 
jouissance rather than desire, such that his status as a lacking/desiring subject 
was eclipsed, a more correct depiction of which might be: 
(S ◊ “Mamajuana”). 
                                                 
8
 Within the next few pages, I will describe Phil’s attraction to women with “dark” features. 
9
 It could be objected that Phil situated himself as object a for his mother’s jouissance, in that he imagined 
her to be a mother who enjoyed suffocating her child.  That would indicate a hysterical structure.  
Nevertheless, I believe what is most operative in his case is the structuring role of his perception of the 
Other’s demand and how, through his smoking, he repeated for himself a kind of satisfaction—though 
experienced sometimes as suffering—that involved his imagined experience of recovering or 
reexperiencing some jouissance he imagined to have experienced with his mother prior to the imposition of 
the Name-of-the-Father.  That, along with all of the other features of obsession within the case, in my 
opinion places Phil within the category of obsessional neurosis.  
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Phil’s fantasy was reduced to the Other’s demand, and thus to the drive.   
Although Phil felt his mother’s smoking was evidence of her love and her 
hatred, jouissance was also a central factor.  That is, she couldn’t stop smoking 
because she enjoyed it so much, and was hooked.  Since he imagined that the 
smoke became continuous with him in the womb, Phil logically aligned himself 
with the substance his mother enjoyed—if she enjoyed the smoke, and he was 
unified with the smoke, then she enjoyed him.  “It went from her mouth to all 
around me,” Phil said of the smoke.  Note that this is a rather striking reversal.  
In Phil’s own associations and language, it works both ways:  smoke as him and 
his mother, and smoke as evidence of both his mother’s love and his mother’s 
hatred.  In the therapy, Phil provided the two terms of the syllogism:  1) 
mom=smoke, and 2) Phil=smoke, and in the work I drew the conclusion:  then 3) 
Phil and mom are one.  That was a kind of overcoming of repression:  reinstating 
the broken thought connection10 which had been severed but re-enacted in the 
drive circuit of his addiction.  As Lacan attests, “The neurotic symptom acts as a 
language that enables repression to be expressed.  This is precisely what enables 
us to grasp the fact that repression and the return of the repressed are one and 
the same thing, the front and back of a single process” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 
60).   
                                                 
10
 As I described earlier, Freud formulates repression as a severing of affect and thought.   
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Resonances of the oral drive predominated in Phil’s case.  That was 
evident in Phil’s fantasies of being incorporated by the mother from the start 
(fused with her in the smoky womb).  The oral drive was also manifested 
through Phil’s drug use:  inhaling and thus incorporating something associated 
with the mother through his smoking marijuana later in life, fearing being 
devoured or overtaken by it.  Note that I am referring to the oral drive not just 
because Phil’s smoking involved his oral cavity, but principally because the 
logical (and grammatical) structure of what we refer to as the oral drive—
devouring and being devoured—operated in the case.   
What is more, Phil’s oral drive manifested as a death drive.  That was due 
to the close association of the jouissance of his excessive smoking—
“mamajuana”—with fantasies of being absorbed in the mother’s womb.  Further, 
it tipped into a death drive because of Phil’s interpretation of the Other’s 
demand as being:  “die.”  The obsessional’s question—“Am I dead or alive?”—
thus took on a very particular meaning in Phil’s case in that the drive satisfaction 
of his addiction aimed at a lethal immersion in das Ding, so to speak, and thus at 
his own effacement.   
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Dark. 
I have been laying the groundwork to elaborate on several points of 
connection between three key elements in the case:  Phil’s mother, darkness, and 
jouissance.  First, recall Phil’s description of the darkness he felt overtook him 
during the “highest highs” (the excessive jouissance) of smoking: “The darkness 
comes over me, seeps throughout every pore of my being, like little dark cloud 
fingers slowly creeping through my body, taking over, possessing me entirely:  
body, mind, and soul.”  His description of the drug-related high associated with 
darkness (marijuana/ “mamajuana” smoke) strongly resonated with the 
enjoyment he imagined he derived from being unified with his mother in the 
dark and smoky womb.   
During his childhood, Phil’s mother made him watch horror films with 
her in the darkness of their living room when his father was away on business 
trips.  With a gleam in his eye Phil told me that as they watched horror films, he 
and his mother would engage in “intimate touching.”  The jouissance associated 
with the excitement of his intimate embraces with his mother in the dark recalls 
his description of the darkness that overcame him when he smoked.  His 
mother’s nicotine-stained fingers—memories of which he described numerous 
times throughout the therapy—that touched him in the dark were represented 
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through his account of marijuana use in which “dark cloud fingers”—fingers 
simultaneously associated with darkness and smoke—possessed him. 
Another event in which darkness, jouissance, and Phil’s mother were 
featured was a primal scene in which Phil caught sight of his mother’s naked 
body as she left her bed.  He said he was able to decipher the outlines of her 
breasts, but that what he saw of her pubic area was “darkness.”  He said he was 
able to see “everything and nothing.”  That can be heard a bit differently: 
“Everything there was to see but no thing.”  The scene thus related to Phil’s long-
standing fear of the dark but also may have contributed to his developing a 
specific attraction to women with dark features. 
In fact, Phil was attracted only to women who had dark features.  The 
condition for finding women sexually exciting was that, physically, something 
about them had to be dark, such as having dark hair, eyes, or skin.  His finding 
darkness compelling in women thus took on a rather fetishistic character, 
although dark features became more of an object a for Phil than an actual fetish 
in the proper sense of the term.  This is also an important issue in terms of a 
differential diagnosis—this was a case of obsession with perverse features, and 
Phil did not, in my opinion, have a perverse structure.  The object is symbolically 
determined—determined by the signifier—and in Phil’s case it was linked to the 
“darkness” associated with the mother’s smoky womb and the “dark cloud 
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fingers” associated with his mother’s embraces.  Even for Freud, the libidinal 
object often has more to do with the signifier than a tangible object in the world.  
As he discussed in his “Fetishism” essay, the example of the fetish of Glanz auf 
der Nase (shining on the nose, glance at the nose) is grounded in a linguistic 
transformation, via an error of translation (Freud, 1927/1961, p. 311). 
 
Between darkness and light:  Re-enacting the paternal metaphor. 
Although Phil found women with dark features sexually exciting, his 
relationships with them never lasted very long.  Those relationships were short-
lived because he would frequently argue with the women and push them to 
break up with him.  This also played out in the transference, which is not 
surprising—not only because through the transference relationship with the 
therapist the subject repeats important dynamics but also because I have dark 
hair and eyes.  Phil sometimes seemed to experience an erotic transference, 
finding something about his relationship with me and/or our work exciting.  He 
would then sometimes become agitated—excited or even anxious—and push me 
to end the treatment.  For instance, he would say that everything that was 
happening in the therapy was clearly “too much” and that maybe I couldn’t 
“handle it,” couldn’t help him, and that I should just end the treatment.  More 
grist for the analytic mill.  
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One way to interpret Phil’s pattern of pushing girlfriends to break up with 
him is that perhaps Phil was trying to get the women to lay down the law—to 
say no to his verbal abuse and enact a sort of mini-castration by breaking up with 
him.  If that were applicable to what Phil was doing with the women—getting 
them to lay down the law—that might have been more indicative of a perverse 
structure.  However, although Phil pushed the women’s buttons, he was usually 
the one who ended the relationships.  Perhaps, then, through his repeatedly 
breaking up with women with dark features, Phil was trying to act as his own 
Name-of-the-Father and set limits on the maternal figure (the women being 
associated with his mother).  Phil was repeatedly trying to re-enact or prop up 
the paternal metaphor.   
With his drug use, too, Phil seemed to seek out and re-enact something 
having to do with a limit-setting function.  When he reached the anxiety-
inducing “highest highs” of his drug use, he sought to put an end to that 
experience and to limit the excessive jouissance.  Phil described his experience of 
smoking as first satisfying but then suddenly so excessive that it was utterly 
intolerable.  As he described it, “I enjoyed it, and then it enjoyed me.”  That was 
aligned with his fantasy of his mother overtaking and devouring him.  Thus the 
active form of his position in relation to the oral drive—devouring:  ”I enjoyed 
it”—was followed by the passive form—to be devoured:  “It enjoyed me.”  That 
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was also a shift from ordinary marijuana use (which had a beginning and an end 
and brought a pleasant and tolerable level of enjoyment) to the overload of his 
smoking that was associated with “mamajuana” (which was anxiety-inducing, 
barely tolerable, and felt limitless).   
With his mother Phil shared a kind of excessive jouissance—connected 
with being in her womb—through the symbolism of the smoke.  In his fantasy, 
both of them enjoyed the smoking, which took on a quality of excess:  beyond the 
pleasure principle.  That was the excessive jouissance that he sought to limit, 
which he experienced through the “mamajuana” form of his drug use.  He 
associated such experiences with the feeling of darkness possessing him.   
During those “mamajuana” smoking experiences, Phil would often repeat 
a sequence of events:  leave his apartment, go to something like a convenience 
store, and commit petty theft in a manner that made it likely, in his mind, that he 
would get caught.  Phil imagined that he would get caught for stealing but also 
that he would get reprimanded for his drug use.  That was the case because he 
would smoke quite a bit of marijuana prior to going out stealing, and he 
imagined that it would be obvious to onlookers that he had been smoking so 
much.  Phil often entertained masochistic fantasies about the police finding him 
and throwing him in jail—that is, ultimately setting limits to what he 
experienced as an overwhelming, seemingly limitless jouissance.   
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However, Phil almost never actually got in trouble with the police and 
never got caught at all for stealing or smoking.  More often than not, he would 
test the limits of how much he could get away with—for instance, how many 
small items he could abscond with by hiding them under his clothing—but not 
actually get caught or reprimanded by the police (or anyone else, for that matter).  
A perverse subject would have orchestrated things in such a way as to actually 
get caught by the police, as was the case with Gary, a perverse subject I will 
discuss in Chapter 5.  Whereas perverts live things out in action, neurotics dwell 
more often in fantasy rather than action.   
That begs the question:  Why was Phil repeating the cycle of smoking so 
much and then going out to steal, supposedly hoping to get caught for both, if 
that cycle didn’t actually result in him getting caught?  I already suggested that 
Phil was re-enacting something having to do with a limit-setting function and 
that he was attempting to get limits set on jouissance.  As I described in Chapter 
2, Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor describes how the instating of the 
Name-of-the-Father results in limits being set on das Ding and an incestuous 
jouissance with the mother.  While I considered Phil to be structurally neurotic—
the Name-of-the-Father was instated for him—he had traces of perversion, as I 
have been describing.  That may have been attributable to the Name-of-the-
Father having being imposed in a fragile way—perhaps through things like 
 141
getting the impression that no father was around to separate him from his 
mother’s “intimate touches” as they watched horror films in the dark—such that 
what he lived out through the cycles of using drugs and trying to get caught by 
the police involved attempts to reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father.  That 
involved re-enacting the paternal metaphor, which in his particular situation 
involved seeking light to cut into darkness and hoping limits would be set to 
“mamajuana,”11 which is akin to the signifier making a cut in jouissance through 
the operation of the paternal function.  The particular form Phil’s re-enactment of 
the paternal metaphor took can be reduced to its simplest form and depicted 
schematically as:  
 
Light/Name-of-the-Father 
________________________ 
Dark/“Mamajuana” 
 
Reassuring himself of the Name-of-the-Father by way of his re-enactments 
of the paternal metaphor also meant reassuring himself that “mamajuana” could 
be limited—that there was something that could prevent him from being 
devoured by “it.”  Lacan describes the Name-of-the-Father as precisely what 
intervenes and offers protection against being devoured by the mother, as in a 
fantasy of a passive form of the oral drive in which the mother is a voracious 
                                                 
11
 Mama wanna:  mama wants to be with Phil, fuse with Phil and suffocate him.   
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crocodile whose gaping maw threatens one with the ever-present risk of being 
devoured:   
 A huge crocodile in whose jaws you are—that’s the mother.  One 
never knows what might suddenly come over her and make her shut her 
trap.  That’s what the mother’s desire is.  
Thus, I have tried to explain that there was something reassuring. 
. . .  There is a roller, made out of stone of course, which is there, 
potentially, at the level of her trap, and it acts as a restraint, as a wedge.  
It’s what is called the phallus.  It’s the roller that shelters you, if, all of a 
sudden, she closes it. (Lacan, 1969-1970/2007, p. 112) 
 Perhaps a fantasy is also evident in Phil’s seeking punishment by the 
police (symbolic Others as representatives of the law) after experiencing, through 
the “mamajuana” form of his smoking, what he equated with an incestuous 
jouissance associated with his mother.  This is a variation on the obsessional’s 
fantasy of believing himself to be deserving of the father’s punishment for a 
privileged relationship with the mother.  The way in which Phil gave meaning to 
his experiences and lived out cycles of setting limits on an excessive jouissance 
supported that fantasy, sustained it.  As such, that fantasy had very real effects.  
Working with the drive means also working with the fundamental fantasy. 
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Nevertheless, the particular ways in which Phil aimed to get limits set to 
his drug use revealed ways in which he was re-enacting the paternal metaphor to 
reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father.  That was all the more poignant 
given the ways in which something about “light” and “yellow” related to 
something about Phil’s actual father, which I will discuss in the following 
section. 
 
The light of sublimation. 
Phil’s frequent fantasies of being caught and punished by the police 
always involved a very particular element that came up in several of his 
fantasies, dreams, and, as we will see, his creative writing:  a yellow light.  For 
instance, he imagined that the police who would catch and reprimand him for 
his drug use would have bright yellow flashlights.  Phil even reported a dream in 
which he was smoking in a dark basement and then was startled out of his drug 
haze by what he described as police outside a basement window, shining the 
yellow light of their flashlights into the basement.  The yellow light cutting into 
darkness also featured in a number of poems he wrote, particularly ones about 
the rhythmic flashing of the yellow light of a lighthouse.  The yellow light in 
these examples took on the value of that which might make a cut in jouissance, 
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and set limits to it, perhaps in the style of a paternal function—that is, to cut 
through and delimit the overwhelming darkness. 
Yellow also seemed to have struck a chord with Phil as he told me during 
one session about his favorite song, entitled “Yellow.”  He was compelled by the 
fact that the songwriter wrote the song with gaps—unfinished lines of lyrics—
within it.  He told me that the songwriter knew there was something 
fundamentally missing from the song because of that, but that he couldn’t come 
up with the right word to end each unfinished line.  The songwriter was sitting 
at a desk, struggling to figure out what was missing from the song, and looked 
over and noticed the phone book next to him:  the Yellow Pages.  He then 
decided to insert the word “yellow” into each of the incomplete portions of the 
lyrics and to make “Yellow” the title of the song, to boot.  Phil told me that this 
delighted him because there was no inherent meaning to the word yellow or 
why it was in the song, but that it simply completed the song.  He called it “an 
example of pure creativity.”   
What makes Phil’s preoccupation with yellow even more striking relates 
to a way in which it is connected with a name associated with both his father and 
himself, in their native tongue.  As such, something about “yellow” might have 
functioned as a signifier that could establish a place for Phil, albeit a fragile one, 
within a paternal lineage, in that it was associated with both his father and 
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himself.  For Phil, “yellow” became associated with desire and a name of his 
father, while “dark” became associated with jouissance and his mother.  Perhaps, 
then, “yellow” represented something akin to a signifier acting as support of 
castration, something like a version of a Name-of-the-Father.   
Furthermore, both “yellow” and “dark” came together in the structure of 
Phil’s addictions and drive satisfactions.  This was so in that Phil sought to limit 
the excessive jouissance that for him was often associated with “darkness” of 
various sorts, with indications of “yellow” or light.  For instance, the incestuous 
jouissance associated with his mother’s caresses in the dark and the feeling of 
dark cloud fingers possessing him or dark syrup oozing throughout him during 
his “highest highs” of smoking marijuana became limited, whether in fantasy or 
action, through maneuvers like trying to get caught by the police, whom he 
associated with the yellow light of their flashlights.  Even the highly charged 
arguments with women with dark features, during which he would become so 
angry that he felt he would “black out,” were a way he tried to get limits set, by 
pushing the women’s buttons, test the limits of the relationship, and ultimately 
breaking up with them.  That is, Phil sought breathing room, space, like shining 
light into darkness. 
A number of Phil’s artistic productions also reflected an attempt to 
symbolize something about “dark” and “yellow.”  For instance, the flashing 
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yellow light of a lighthouse became a recurring theme in many of the poems he 
wrote.  The yellow light of the lighthouse is similar to many of the other 
instances of “yellow,” such as the yellow light of the police flashlights.  Such 
representations may suggest the symbolization of an invocation to the Other, a 
wish to re-enact the paternal function, tantamount to asking for someone to be 
able to shine a light into the darkness of jouissance with his mother during the 
horror films, and set limits to it, thus creating breathing room and a space 
wherein his own desire might come to the fore.  The repetition of the coming and 
going of the beam of the lighthouse even parallels the coming and going of Phil’s 
father, with his frequent traveling, throughout Phil’s childhood.  Like his writing 
of poetry, the analytic work, through a process that includes opening up a space 
of symbolization, can create an effect of sublimation.  Over the course of our 
work, Phil’s anxiety and drug use reduced significantly.  Indeed, speech can 
bring a bit of light to darkness. 
 
A modification of jouissance:  From “mamajuana” to ordinary marijuana. 
Although the treatment was cut short due to Phil moving to a different 
state, substantial improvements had already been made.  By the end of the 
treatment, Phil was generally much less anxious, felt “freer,” and had more 
“room to breathe.”  He was in far less mental and physical distress overall.   
 147
As I described earlier in this chapter, after the session in which I linked 
Phil’s comments about “it”—“She just couldn’t stop it,” “It has to be stopped,” 
and “It’s killing me”—and then ended the session at that point, he reported that 
a significant impact had been made.  Part of that involved no longer experiencing 
the “dark cloud” looming overhead, as I described earlier.   
Such interventions operate not on the level of clear and unequivocal 
meaning-making, but rather on the level of utilizing equivocation and the 
polyvalence of the signifier as a way of reorganizing multiple levels that coalesce 
in a symptom, such as an addiction, and having an impact on it.  I have seen such 
analytic techniques create these oddly transformative effects on a number of 
occasions with a variety of patients.  Lacan insists that interpretations that 
attempt to reduce symptoms to specific meanings miss the opportunity to shake 
up the drive roots of the symptom, which lie not in sense but in the clustering of 
signifiers invested with jouissance.  Further, we should keep in mind Lacan’s 
insistence that “it is only through equivocation that interpretation operates.  
There must be something in the signifier that resonates” (Lacan, 1975-1976/2005, 
p. 17, as qtd. in Fink 2007) and that “analytic interpretation is not designed to be 
understood, it is designed to make waves” (Lacan, 1976, p. 35).   
That highlights an important difference between Freud and Lacan 
regarding clinical technique.  Freud argues that “therapy works by transforming 
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what is unconscious into what is conscious” and that “as soon as the unconscious 
processes concerned [in symptom formation] have become conscious, the 
symptom must disappear” (Freud, 1916-1917/1963, p. 347/346).  Lacan has a 
different take: 
It is false to think that an analysis comes to a successful denouement 
because the analysand consciously realizes something. . . .  What is at 
stake is not a move from an unconscious level . . . to the conscious level, 
the seat of clarity, by some mysterious elevator.  What is at stake is not, 
in fact, a move to consciousness but, rather, to speech . . . and that speech 
must be heard by someone. (Lacan, 2001, p. 139-140, as qtd. in Fink 2007)  
That is, putting things into words isn’t enough; work must also target the level of 
the signifier’s “’literating’ structure” (Lacan, 1957/2006 p. 424) and thus attempt 
to fundamentally reorganize the subject’s position in relation to the drive.   
Indeed, the ways in which Phil’s drug use changed over the course of 
treatment suggest that his position in relation to the drive might have been 
modified.  Phil did continue to occasionally smoke marijuana.  However, he 
eventually no longer experienced the sense of being overwhelmed, in a kind of 
anxious agony that led him to seek limit-setting through his re-enacting the 
paternal metaphor (going out stealing and hoping to get caught, as I described).  
He no longer felt overtaken or devoured by what emerged for him through 
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smoking.  For Phil, “mamajuana” became what I will refer to as “ordinary 
marijuana.”   
I believe that marked a shift within the structure of how he was living out 
the drive, such that there was a shift from oral to phallic jouissance.  By that I 
mean to refer to the logic of the drive and its structure.  That is, the oral drive 
relates to fantasies of devouring and being devoured, and seems limitless and 
overtaking.  The phallic drive, on the other hand, relates to an experience of 
jouissance that is more limited and has a beginning and an end—a start and a 
stopping point, like tumescence and detumescence, or like the Name-of-the-
Father as a stopping point, a fundamental marker of limit.   
At the beginning of this chapter I referred to a passage from Lacan’s “On 
Freud’s ‘Trieb’ and the Psychoanalyst’s Desire,” in which Lacan describes the 
drive having a “color of emptiness:  suspended in the light of a gap.  That gap is 
the gap desire encounters at the limits imposed upon it by the principle ironically 
referred to as the ‘pleasure principle’” (Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 722).  One way in 
which the ideas inherent in Lacan’s reference apply to Phil’s case is in terms of 
his re-enacting of the paternal metaphor, which involved the alternation of 
“dark” and “light” and was his way of trying to reassure himself of the Name-of-
the-Father.  To do so was to seek a space or gap of desire, and light, and to shift 
from a painful jouissance beyond the pleasure principle to something more 
 150
manageable, more livable.  Ultimately, that is what he was able to accomplish 
through the process of the treatment itself, but through language, through 
speech.  Indeed, the treatment involving working with, and having an impact on, 
the signifiers that were invested with jouissance for Phil, and in so doing created 
both more of a space of desire and also a modification within his experience of 
the drive, as I described. 
It seems fitting to conclude by referring to Freud’s example of a child who 
was afraid of the dark and said, “If someone speaks, it gets lighter” (Freud, SE 
XVI, p. 407).  Although the child in Freud’s example longs for his mother, the 
light Phil longed for seemed instead to be associated with a father, perhaps a 
reassurance of the Name-of-the-Father.  Accordingly, the jouissance or drive 
satisfaction at work in Phil’s addiction took on its color from, and fell somewhere 
in the gap between, the play of “dark” and “light,” and indeed in the alternation 
between them. 
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Chapter 5 
ADDICTION AND PERVERSION 
A Thief is Being Beaten 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present the case of “Gary,” a structurally perverse 
subject who had a history of drug and alcohol addiction which then shifted to a 
kind of addiction to shoplifting, according to Gary’s description.  Although he 
was clean at the time when he sought treatment, I viewed the structure of his 
addiction to nevertheless be fully intact.  I will describe how his shoplifting and 
criminal activities functioned as attempts to enact castration and bring the Other 
into existence, and to metaphorically (and sometimes literally) get himself 
beaten.  In describing the latter, I will rely on Freud’s ideas from his essay “’A 
Child is Being Beaten’:  A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of the Sexual 
Perversions.” 
 
On Perversion 
Since there are so few cases of perversion written from a Lacanian 
perspective, I hope the case presentation in this chapter will highlight certain 
important features of the perverse structure, while also paying heed to the 
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specificity of the structure as it shows itself in Gary’s addictions.  In turning now 
to the case, we should also be attentive to Lacan’s reminders that “Perversion is 
indeed something articulate, interpretable, analyzable, and on precisely the same 
level as neurosis” (Lacan, 1959/1982, p. 16) and also that “Perversion does not 
appear as the pure and simple manifestation of a drive, but it turns out to be 
related to a dialectical context which is as subtle, as composite, as rich in 
compromise, as ambiguous as a neurosis” (Lacan, 1957-1958/1998, p. 230-231, as 
qtd. in Nobus, 2000). 
To move on now to a brief consideration of Lacan’s structural diagnostic 
category of perversion, note that while neurosis is governed by the mechanism of 
repression, the essential differential feature of perversion is that it is governed by 
the form of negation that Freud and Lacan refer to as disavowal.  Simply put, 
whereas the neurotic initially accepts or takes in some thought, experience, or 
portion of reality only to repress it and put it out of mind later on (and Lacan 
specifies that this has to do with a thought about the subject’s own drives), the 
pervert instead disavows or denies some aspect of reality.  Freud puts this in 
terms of a disavowal of a perception of the female genitals (and a belief in the 
maternal phallus), which we can understand as leading to issues around sexual 
difference.  Lacan formulates disavowal as the perverse subject’s denial or 
refusal to accept a paternal castration threat (indeed, that threat is often never 
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posed at all in perversion).  The paternal function has not been fully instated for 
the perverse subject—the father has not fully intervened between or separated 
mother and child.  The mother’s lack is thus not symbolized, and the child who 
comes to develop a perverse psychic structure is taken as her imaginary phallus, 
or that which can satisfy her and fulfill her needs.  The result is that the perverse 
subject can be prone to experiencing anxiety (Lacan formulates anxiety as a lack 
of lack) and generating anxiety in others (perhaps trying to push the other 
person to bring about a mini-castration and thus bring relief of anxiety to the 
perverse subject).   
Since the father’s role as symbolic separator (the paternal function or 
Name-of-the-Father) needs shoring up in perversion, the perverse subject 
engages in attempts to bring the law into being—to get the law laid down—as a 
way of making the Other exist, thus propping up the paternal function.  This 
often manifests itself, as was the case for Gary, in frequent instances of 
shoplifting or getting into trouble with the law, thus getting himself sanctioned 
by judicial Others.  Fink articulates the pervert’s disavowal and the dynamics 
and behavior that result from it:  
I know full well that my father hasn’t forced me to give up my mother 
and the jouissance I take in her presence (real and/or imagined in 
fantasy), hasn’t exacted the ‘pound of flesh,’ but I’m going to stage such 
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an exaction or forcing with someone who stands in for him; I’ll make 
that person pronounce the law. (Fink, 1997, p. 170) 
The pervert has not fully undergone a sacrifice of jouissance, which results in 
later attempts to act that out by getting the law laid down (bringing the Other 
into existence).   
Given these dynamics, a clinician working with a perverse subject should 
anticipate that the patient is likely to cause anxiety in the clinician and flaunt his 
crimes and seedy behavior as an attempt to get the clinician to symbolically 
castrate him, to bring the Other into being by getting the Other to lay down the 
law.  In working with Gary, being attuned to and anticipating such dynamics 
enabled me to direct the treatment so as to avoid being pushed into the position 
of symbolic castrator, and instead to begin drawing Gary into the analytic 
work—for instance, by exploring myriad unconscious formations.  I focused in 
particular on how Gary’s addiction fit into his pattern of trying to enact 
castration, to get the law laid down.  Before addressing how his addiction 
manifested itself through variations in the grammatical structure of a beating 
fantasy (which I will use Freud’s work on “A Child is Being Beaten” to explicate) 
I will first review some of Gary’s family history and trace the development of his 
addiction. 
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Case History:  Gary  
 Clinical background.  
Gary, a Caucasian man in his mid-forties, sought treatment because he 
was feeling anxious, depressed, and suicidal.  Although he had a long history of 
addiction to cocaine and alcohol (as well as other drugs on occasion), at the time 
of treatment he had been clean for several months.  Nevertheless, he was in a 
great deal of distress.  During the initial consultation, he told me that he was 
seeking treatment because he wanted to “locate the emptiness the drugs once 
filled.” 
At the beginning of treatment, Gary was single and living with his 
mother.  He had had one long-term but unsatisfying relationship with a woman 
(with whom he had a daughter, who was generally not in contact with Gary) and 
several sexual relationships with men.  He was unemployed and, due to having a 
criminal record, had been having trouble finding work.  A few months into the 
treatment, Gary disclosed that he had been imprisoned on two or three 
occasions, for the sexual assault of a child as well as various other crimes.   
For about a year and a half, Gary and I met twice-weekly for sessions.  
Our work ended when I left the clinic and referred him to another clinician.   
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Overview of Gary’s addictions. 
At the beginning of the treatment, Gary told me that although he was 
currently not using any drugs or alcohol, he had a very severe and long-standing 
history of addiction.  During the initial consultation, Gary declared that the last 
time he used cocaine he wound up hospitalized and almost died.   
Gary endorsed alcohol, cocaine, and heroin as his substances of choice.  
He told me that his first experience of inebriation dated back to when he was 
eleven or twelve years old.  As a teenager, he continued to drink very heavily 
(primarily hard alcohol), even to the point of losing consciousness on several 
occasions.  He also began using cocaine as an adolescent and heroin as a young 
adult.  His drinking and drug use continued in its severity throughout his 
adulthood and ceased only when he was incarcerated (between his mid- to late-
thirties and early forties) and no longer had access to drugs or alcohol.  He was 
able to maintain his sobriety after he was released from prison; nevertheless, 
when he began treatment with me I considered the structure of his addiction to 
be fully intact in spite of the fact that he was not using drugs or alcohol.   
The central element that Gary played out through his cycles of drug and 
alcohol addiction was trying to get caught by the police or punished by various 
male authority figures, or symbolic Others.  Once he was no longer using drugs 
or alcohol he simply reenacted that very same structure through shoplifting.  
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That is, he felt unable to stop shoplifting and derived a great deal of jouissance 
from the excitement of trying to steal and risk getting caught by the police (the 
same dynamics that he lived out through his drug and alcohol use).  Gary 
sometimes even referred to himself as a “shopaholic” and was able to recognize 
that his addiction shifted from drugs and alcohol to shoplifting.  Gary told me 
that he would steal at least one item each time he went into any kind of store or 
even newspaper stands, and that he stole myriad items such that there did not 
seem to be any particular meaning behind what he stole.  What was most salient 
was that he would shoplift whenever he could and that he kept pushing the 
limits of what he could steal and how many of each item he could steal, to the 
point of getting into trouble with the police for his shoplifting.   
An important diagnostic difference between Gary and Phil (whose 
addiction, as I described in Chapter 4, functioned as an attempt to reassure 
himself of the Name-of-the-Father) is that although Phil pushed limits to risk 
getting caught and punished by the police, he never actually allowed things to 
reach that point.  Gary, on the other hand, did, and even wound up in jail for 
multiple crimes.  As I stated in Chapter 4, Phil was neurotic but was trying to 
reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father through the specific patterns he lived 
out with his addictions.  Gary, however, was structurally perverse and was 
trying not to reassure himself of the Name-of-the-Father (indeed, it was never 
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fully instated at all) but rather to enact castration and bring the Other into 
existence.   
For Gary, getting into trouble with the police for his drug or alcohol use or 
other crimes, which ranged from petty theft to much more serious crimes such as 
sexual assault (which occurred while he was using), took the form of 
symbolically being beaten by a father figure.  This is central to his perverse 
structure, in that through his addictions—whether alcohol, drugs, or 
shoplifting—he lived out a drive pattern such that he got himself beaten, got the 
law laid down, and enacted castration.  I will describe this in more detail a few 
pages further on, when I discuss the course of treatment.  For now, it is 
important to note that for Gary, becoming a “thief” was quite overdetermined.  A 
review of several important aspects of his history will illustrate that.  
 
Family history. 
 Gary grew up in a household comprised of his mother and several sisters. 
Gary’s father was generally not in the picture.  Gary told me that he never felt 
like a part of the family, and he often referred to himself as an “appendage of the 
family.”1  Gary described his mother as “cold” and “harsh.”  He said his mother 
treated him very differently than his sisters and would treat him as “a slave,” 
                                                 
1
 This, along with other details of Gary’s childhood, suggests an identification with the imaginary phallus.   
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yelling at him constantly and forcing him to do arduous chores but never asking 
his sisters to help out around the house.  Gary told me that his mother always 
said to him, “I have to love you, but I don’t have to like you.”   
 At some point in his childhood, Gary was told that his father allegedly 
killed someone on the day that he was born and that he had been incarcerated 
for several years because of that crime.  Gary stated that his earliest memory, 
dating back to when he was approximately four years old, involved waiting for 
his father to come home from jail.  Gary told me that he recalled witnessing an 
“upsetting” scene when his father came home that day, which was the only day 
his father was actually present during his childhood.  Gary described his mother 
“shuffling” him, along with his sisters, from the first floor of the house to the 
basement.  Gary said his mother must have done that because she had 
anticipated that “something bad was about to happen.”  Gary said that his 
paternal grandfather, who was visiting the family that day to welcome Gary’s 
father home from jail, followed them into the basement and chased Gary’s 
mother with a butcher’s knife.  Gary said his father then chased both his mother 
and grandfather with the butcher’s knife.  Gary then wasn’t sure where his 
mother went but noted that his father then pushed his grandfather to the floor 
and began “beating or assaulting” him.  Gary said he hid behind a pillar while 
that was occurring but peeked several times, frightened yet enthralled by what 
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was occurring.  As the story goes, the police were called and his father went right 
back to prison.   
 Gary reported another childhood memory, his description of which 
paralleled the memory just described with regard to a few details.  Gary told me 
that when he was approximately seven or eight years old, he was sexually 
molested by his uncle.  He said that although he loved to go to the movies, his 
mother never took him there, and so he would frequently visit his cousin because 
his uncle would take them to the movies.  Gary said his uncle would get him 
alone and then “push [him] down” and molest him.  He said he didn’t know it 
was “bad or wrong” until one day his cousin walked in on them—he knew by 
his cousin’s face that what was happening was “bad” and he felt “ashamed” 
thereafter.  “I prostituted myself to go to the movies,” he said.   
 Later in his life, Gary’s addictions were stuck in a cycle of repetition that 
encompassed several details from these scenes, including various kinds of 
assaults, getting caught/beaten, and attempting to bring the Other into existence.  
This was particularly relevant given the relative absence of a symbolic Other 
during his development.  Although Gary’s father was not present for the 
majority of his childhood, he existed through his mother repeatedly telling him 
that his father’s nickname for him was “Thief.”  Gary’s mother told him his 
father called him that on the day when he returned home from jail, and that he 
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continued to refer to Gary as “Thief” whenever he spoke with his mother when 
she visited him in prison.  Gary’s mother took this a step further and frequently 
said to Gary, “You’re a rotten thief, just like your father.”  Throughout his life, 
and by way of his addictions in particular, Gary became a thief who tried to get 
himself beaten.   
 
 
Course of treatment and results. 
An important focus of the treatment was tracing and unpacking the 
several staves of the beating fantasy as it functioned for Gary.  That is, Gary’s 
addictions were intertwined with attempts to get the law laid down.  Properly 
speaking, it was the latter to which he was truly addicted.  His addictions were 
caught in repetition because it was through them that he attempted to enact 
castration and bring the Other into existence.   
In his essay “A Child is Being Beaten,” Freud addresses masochism, the 
origin of the perversions, and the prevalence of beating fantasies.  He notes that 
“It is surprising how often people who seek analytic treatment for hysteria or an 
obsessional neurosis confess to having indulged in the phantasy: ‘A child is 
being beaten’” (Freud, 1919/1955, p. 179).  He outlines the multiple levels and 
transformations of the beating fantasy in which, on an unconscious level, beating 
and loving are equated.  As will become clearer through my discussion of the 
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case of Gary, beating fantasies in perversion are different from how they function 
in neurosis.  In perversion they take the form of something actually lived out 
through action—often by way of criminal activities through which the pervert 
tries to get himself caught by the authorities—which functions as an attempt to 
enact castration.  I will make use of Freud’s ideas to address how I formulated 
and attempted to work with Gary’s addictions insofar as they were linked with 
incurring punishment.  That is, through his addictions he got into trouble with 
the law and thus metaphorically got himself beaten and punished.  Making 
himself into a thief and a criminal who would get punished took on the value of 
getting himself punished by a paternal symbolic Other, and thus bringing the 
Other into existence. 
Gary lived out his addictions in a way that was directly related to his 
perverse structure in which castration was not fully operative.  That is, he 
engaged in attempts to complete castration, which took the form of getting high, 
engaging in criminal acts, and then metaphorically getting himself beaten 
(punished or caught) by the police (symbolic or judicial Others).  Moreover, the 
jouissance at stake in such patterns was evident in Gary’s description of how he 
felt when he got high and then got caught or punished:  “like sticking your finger 
in a socket or plugging something in and getting an electric shock.”  Gary 
sometimes literally got himself beaten (he provoked other men until they beat 
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him up) and also metaphorically got himself beaten, as in the examples just 
described.  Freud even emphasized that “punishments and humiliations . . . may 
be substituted for the beating itself” (Freud, 1919/1955, p.186).   
In the therapy we worked on tracing all manifestations and permutations 
of the beating fantasy.  This included instances in which Gary tried to get himself 
beaten and also, though less often, instances in which Gary tried to 
metaphorically or literally beat others.  This exemplifies the grammar of the 
drive.  That is, Lacan finds it useful to conceptualize the drive as having a 
grammatical structure, such that beating fantasies can be in the active, passive, or 
reflexive voice (to beat, to get oneself beaten, etc.).  In that, Lacan relies on 
Freud’s indications that the beating fantasy can manifest itself according to 
different permutations:  
beating-phantasies have a historical development which is by no means 
simple, and in the course of which they are changed in most respects 
more than once—as regards their relation to the author of the phantasy, 
and as regards their object, their content and their significance. (Freud, 
1919/1955, p. 184) 
An example of how Gary lived out a beating fantasy was that for several 
years he engaged in a sexual relationship with a man in which he became the 
man’s “sex toy.”  Gary allowed him to have rough and often quite violent sex 
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with him and let the man literally beat him during sex.  During the therapy we 
made a connection that that man lived on the same street where Gary, when he 
was a child, once saw his father drive up to the house, pause for a second, and 
drive away.  Other than the day when his father came home from jail and began 
“beating or assaulting” his grandfather, that was the only other time Gary saw 
his father.  Gary’s father’s existence was thus inextricably linked with beatings or 
assaults, such that Gary’s sexual relationship with the man just described might 
have taken on the meaning of getting himself beaten by his father.   
The exploratory work of the therapy allowed Gary to recognize that he 
was “setting [him]self up for pain.”  Gradually, that was rendered less necessary 
and his tendency to metaphorically get himself beaten and to engage in criminal 
behaviors, most notably shoplifting, decreased.  This went hand-in-hand with 
Gary coming to recognize that his addictions were not about what he thought 
they were about, insofar as they were really about trying to get the law laid 
down.  What is more, through the therapeutic work we explored connections 
between the structure of those behaviors and the details of the memories 
(perhaps screen memories) about Gary’s father “beating or assaulting” his 
grandfather and about Gary having been sexually molested by his uncle.  Gary 
came to acknowledge that through the structure of his cycles of addictions, he 
was “punishing himself.”  Although given his history of having assaulted a child 
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he had very good reasons to punish himself (which, though I am choosing to not 
focus on that in this chapter, given its scope, was by no means ignored in the 
treatment itself) his larger pattern of seeking punishment predated the child 
molestation and related to overarching difficulties on the level of his perverse 
structure. 
Within the therapy itself, working on the issues around his cycles of 
addictions also involved my not allowing Gary to be a “Thief” in the therapy.  
That is, when he commented on valuing the therapy a great deal (he once called 
it “highway robbery” that he was able to get quality therapy at such an 
affordable price), and asking to delay his payment, I insisted that he pay his bill 
regularly and in full.  When he reported extreme distress and suicidal thoughts 
but then wanted to cancel the next session or come in but not allow those issues 
to be worked on, I insisted he come in (and did not discuss his feelings with him 
by phone—which would have felt like him trying to steal therapy and 
sympathies—but simply encouraged him to come in for an appointment so that 
we could discuss them).  In this manner I did not allow him to be a thief and thus 
hoped to shake up that identification for him.   
While I worked to help Gary with his addictions and the other things 
wrapped up in them—criminal activity, etc.—my work targeted difficulties on 
the level of his perverse structure itself.  Gary often complained of not having 
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much of a personality or identity (he described sometimes feeling like a 
“chameleon”).  In many ways, that can be understood as the pervert’s inability to 
assume a position.  Most broadly, Gary seemed to have identified with “Thief,” 
as a kind of master signifier or designator of identity, and as a way of 
maintaining a link with his father.  The therapeutic work aimed to dialectize the 
master signifier “Thief”—to mobilize it, loosen its fixity, and make room for 
other aspects of his identity or sense of self to emerge or to be created by him.   
The language I used with him was chosen so as to emphasize temporality 
and changeability—for instance, by using the past tense and formulations such 
as, “you had been…” whenever he talked about drugs or crime.  I did this to help 
create more space within the present for him to come to be in a new way, and to 
mobilize different identities for himself.  This process also involved, as I began to 
describe earlier in this chapter, putting “Thief” in relation to other signifiers, 
memories, and meanings.  That can be understood as a process of creating new 
metaphors—breathing new life into the place where he had been identified with 
“Thief” and creating space for new aspects of self to emerge. 
That was confirmed by a dream he reported later in the treatment that 
indicated that his identity as a “Thief” was dying.  This was also interpreted in 
the context of his occasional suicidal feelings.  Without going into detail about 
why I did not consider Gary to be a suicide risk, I will simply note that I 
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interpreted his suicidal feelings as indicators of his sense that the thief identity 
was dying and that he wasn’t sure who else he could exist as.  Following the 
sessions that focused on those interpretive moves, Gary reported that he felt 
much better, was no longer suicidal, and had a newfound sense of energy and 
lightness.   
That shift away from his thief identity also marked a shift within the 
structure of his addictions.  I believe that was evidenced by the sharp decrease in 
his behaviors that involved being a criminal and a thief and that involved getting 
himself beaten.  He shifted from being a thief to instead becoming someone who 
invests, works, and earns.  Even within the therapy itself, rather than stealing 
sympathies, he became engaged in the more creative work of free associating, 
making connections, and so on.  What is more, by the end of treatment Gary 
found a job and was working part-time.  Many of his relationships also 
improved, particularly his relationship with his friends and his daughter.  He 
described having a much easier time holding a conversation with people (which 
had been excruciating for him prior to treatment).  Additionally, Gary told me 
during one of our final sessions that he was very grateful for the therapy and that 
it was the first time in his life that he had hope and could envision a future for 
himself.  Although our work was cut short because of my departure from the 
clinic, and although Gary did make notable progress through the treatment, I felt 
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Gary would benefit from continued therapy.  I encouraged him to continue the 
work with another clinician, and I have reason to believe that he did.   
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Chapter 6 
ADDICTION AND PSYCHOSIS 
Psychosis and the Drive 
 
Introduction 
In order to formulate the psychotic’s relation to the drive, I want first to 
discuss two things:  the mirror stage and Lacan’s work on the paternal metaphor.  
In the cases that follow, I will then discuss how the drive functions in psychotic 
patients’ addictions.  Although in Chapter 2, I reviewed Lacan’s theory of the 
paternal metaphor as it applies to neurosis, in this chapter I will focus on Lacan’s 
ideas about how the paternal metaphor fails to operate in psychosis.  That will 
help us to understand several things, including the psychotic’s relation to his or 
her body and the status of the psychotic’s ego.  These preliminaries are necessary 
in order to formulate strategies for working with addicted psychotic patients that 
are different from those used with neurotics. 
 
The Mirror Stage and Psychosis 
Lacan’s work on the mirror stage is by now well known in the US.  I will 
review it quickly with an emphasis on the differences between how the mirror 
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stage operates in neurosis and in psychosis.  That will help us to understand the 
status of the ego for the psychotic and the consequences that result from a non-
neurotic passage through that phase of development.   
In his first description of the mirror stage in 1949,2 Lacan posits that prior 
to that stage a very young child experiences him- or herself as a chaotic jumble of 
feelings and perceptions.  The mirror image gives a unified form to this chaotic 
jumble.  The child experiences his or her body in bits in pieces.  There is no 
distinction, no separation or boundary, between the child and the world.  The  
whole and unified image in the mirror both organizes the child’s perceptions and 
sensations and delimits the boundaries of the child’s body as distinct from the 
rest of its world.  It thus establishes the “me” and the “not me” (it is a first 
delineation of self and other).   
When Lacan reformulates the mirror stage in 1960,3 he does two things:  1) 
he makes the mirror into more of a metaphor, and 2) he places greater emphasis 
on the role of the symbolic order in this developmental moment or phase 
(thereby putting more of an emphasis on the dimension of speech and language).  
He focuses less on the mirror as a concrete object than on the mirror function that 
can be carried out for the child by way of a parent figure.  The emphasis shifts 
from the role of the image in the mirror to the importance of the role of the 
                                                 
2
 See “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in 
Écrits.   
3
 See Lacan’s Seminar VIII.   
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Other.  In this version of the mirror stage, the child acquires a sense of self by 
way of the Other’s recognition.  Lacan explains that the child’s image in the 
mirror takes on its value or importance because it is ratified (entériné) by the 
Other.  The Other recognizes and approves of the child, says “yes, that’s you,” 
and this allows the child to have a sense of self.  Thus the image is libidinally 
invested, which allows the child to internalize this sense of self received through 
the Other.  In this manner, the Other’s recognition and approval of the child 
fundamentally contributes to the formation of the child’s ego.  That is, this 
process results in the child internalizing an image of itself as seen through the 
Other.   
Note also that in this process the child comes to perceive itself as its 
parents do—or at least as the child understands its parents’ perception.  This 
happens through the dimension of speech and language, through what the 
parents say about the child and to the child.  The child assumes its parents’ ideals 
and goals, and this is the process of assuming what Freud called the ego-ideal.  
With the advent of the ego-ideal, there is a stable point outside of the ego that 
allows the ego to cohere (the ego forms in relation to the ego-ideal as an 
organizing point, so to speak).  This also means that the ego holds together; the 
ego-ideal keeps it from coming undone or disintegrating.  This ego-ideal also 
establishes one’s sense of self—a cohesive or stable ego—insofar as it stems from 
 172
the Other’s recognition of a unified self.  At this point we can see that this phase 
of development involves and brings about more than an imaginary image of 
wholeness giving form to a chaotic jumble of sensations; it also involves an 
internalized set of symbolically expressed goals, ideals, and expectations, as well 
as a relation to an Other.  (This does not happen for the psychotic—we’ll come 
back to this and address the consequences of this later.)   
Here is the next logical step:  In this manner (in the neurotic way of 
proceeding through the mirror stage), the imaginary is overwritten by the 
symbolic.  What happens is that the imaginary order is reorganized, 
restructured, by the symbolic order according to the way in which the child is 
talked about by its parents, the impression or sense of self the child gets from the 
way its parents talk about it and present their view of the child through 
language.  In other words, this symbolically-governed version of the mirror stage 
is retroactively imposed on the imaginary version, such that the goals and ideals 
are posited as having come from the parent who approvingly held the child up 
to the mirror.  The imaginary is thus overwritten by the symbolic.  With this 
rewriting, several things occur:  the drives are hierarchized, the subject’s 
relationships are not bogged down in the imaginary (the subject is not 
imprisoned in the imaginary), and the subject develops a stable sense of self.   
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In psychosis, however, the ego-ideal is not established, and the imaginary 
is not overwritten by the symbolic.  The lack of ego-ideal for the psychotic (and 
lack of place within the Other’s desire, which will be discussed further in the 
next section) results in a tenuous sense of self.  Since in psychosis the imaginary 
is not overwritten by the symbolic, and the ego-ideal does not lead to the 
creation of a cohesive ego, something else needs to come into play in order to 
hold the subject together.  Later in his career Lacan formulates his concept of the 
sinthome:  something that comes to knot the three orders of imaginary, symbolic, 
and real together to allow the subject to cohere.  In Seminar XXIII Lacan 
discusses his belief that James Joyce’s writing functioned as a sinthome that held 
his psychical structure together for the duration of his life.  Lacan hypothesizes 
that during Joyce’s childhood the Name-of-the-Father (discussed in Chapter 7 
and also discussed a few pages further on) might not have been operative, but 
that his writing became something that filled in for that absence, thus stabilizing 
his ego by way of supplementation or suppletion (suppléance)—a way of making 
up for or filling in for a lack or deficit—and preventing him from ever 
experiencing a psychotic break.  In one of the case studies to follow, we will see 
how a psychotic woman who believed she was Jesus Christ engaged in a writing 
project which seemed to function as a kind of sinthome, insofar as her writing 
functioned as an attempt to reconstitute and reorganize her ego after its 
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dissolution following a psychotic break.  In that chapter I will explain how her 
writing was also a fundamental part of her delusional structure and that both 
were attempts to reconstitute herself (her ego) after her psychotic break. 
In psychosis, the instability of the ego results from the failure of the 
imaginary, symbolic, and real to become organized and held together (as they do 
in neurosis).  We have been examining this in terms of the symbolic’s failure to 
overwrite the imaginary.  The result is that imaginary relations dominate in 
psychosis and are often marked by competitiveness, aggression, and paranoia.  
The psychotic gets bogged down in the imaginary rather than having 
relationships marked by neurotic features such as striving for symbolic 
recognition from authority figures, attempting to achieve, feeling guilt, and 
worrying about being good enough, measuring up, and so on.   
Lacan warns clinicians not to situate themselves in the position of 
symbolic Other in relation to a psychotic patient because this is a position that 
has no precedent for the psychotic and an encounter with someone in this 
position could potentially destabilize them.  Positioning oneself as someone who 
might become perceived by the psychotic patient to have some sort of hidden 
knowledge about them can trigger paranoia (given their problematic slippage 
between inside and outside, this is potentially destabilizing).  The clinician 
should therefore not indicate that psychotic patients mean more than they say 
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(have holes in their knowledge, and so on), because this might cause them to see 
the analyst as a persecutor.  The clinician risks triggering a break in a psychotic 
patient should the clinician situate him- or herself “in a tertiary position in any 
relationship that has as its base the imaginary couple” (Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 481).  
Lacan is essentially saying that the clinician working with a psychotic patient 
must situate him- or herself along the imaginary axis, because the failure of the 
symbolic to overwrite the imaginary means that the imaginary is all that is there 
to be worked with (and shored up).  Although this way of positioning oneself is 
sometimes quite risky, it is often the only position available. 
Lacan alludes to the imaginary needing to be shored up, propped up, 
stabilized, or supplemented in some way in psychosis when he describes how 
the psychotic can often stabilize the imaginary by adopting “imaginary crutches” 
(Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 205).  We can see how a sinthome is indeed something 
like an imaginary crutch, something that shores up the psychotic’s ego and thus 
the imaginary order.  Sometimes the psychotic subject finds ways to take on or 
build such crutches for him- or herself and sometimes this occurs through the 
work of therapy.  Furthermore, as we will see in one of the cases to follow, 
shoring up the psychotic’s imaginary is one of the primary techniques in 
working with psychotic patients.  In fact, psychotics often turn to drugs or 
alcohol in an attempt to regulate these breaches if the imaginary crumbles or is 
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somehow compromised and reveals the hole in the symbolic that is constitutive 
of their psychotic structure.   
Why does Lacan warn clinicians who are working with psychotic patients 
to not situate themselves along the symbolic axis, in the position of Other?  For 
the psychotic there is no precedent for a relationship with the big Other.  To 
explain why will require a brief review of Lacan’s work on the paternal 
metaphor.  In this chapter I will focus in particular on Lacan’s ideas about the 
failure of the paternal function to be instated in psychosis and the consequences 
that result from that failure.     
 
The Paternal Function and the Other’s Demand in Psychosis 
Castration, paternal metaphor, paternal function, imposition of the Name-
of-the-Father—these terms are practically synonymous for Lacan.  In short, these 
are all ways of referring to the way in which the father comes to set limits on the 
mother/child relation.  As Fink explains, “the father serves a separating function:  
he acts as a bar or barrier between mother and child, refusing to allow the child 
to be no more than an extension of the mother” (Fink, 1997, p. 92).  The father 
acts as agent of prohibition and division or separation and creates a space 
wherein the subject can come to be in his or her own right.  The mother is then 
seen as lacking, desiring, and desiring something beyond the child (the child is 
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not the sole object of the mother’s desire, that which makes her complete).  The 
mother’s desire then has a phallic signification.  Lacan represents these concepts 
through his formula for the paternal metaphor: 
Figure II4 
 
 
 
 
 
The instating of the paternal function occurs in neurosis.  In psychosis, however, 
this does not occur.  For Lacan this is the fundamental difference between 
neurosis and psychosis.  The psychotic does not undergo castration, which is 
another way of saying that the paternal metaphor is not instated in psychosis or 
that what Lacan refers to as the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed.   
We can make sense of Lacan’s formula of the paternal metaphor by 
considering the family narratives we hear from our patients.  Psychotic patients 
often report that they were either not wanted by their parents (and were either 
told that directly or simply got that impression based on how their parents 
treated them) or that their parents treated them like inanimate objects, like things 
                                                 
4
 From “On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” by J. Lacan, 1959/2006, in 
Ecrits:  the First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 465.  
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or like pets rather than like human beings.  Either way, what this amounts to is 
that they did not receive symbolic recognition.  The conditions necessary for 
them to come to be as autonomous desiring subjects were not present.   
One way to understand this is by way of a developmental perspective that 
focuses on the status of the Other’s desire and the impact that has on the 
developing child.  Lacan tells us that for the psychotic, the Other is not lacking.  
Since the parental Other does not lack, does not desire, the psychotic thus cannot 
become the Other’s lack (as in the case of neurotics) and does not have a place 
within the Other’s desire.  Whereas in neurosis the subject comes to be in relation 
to the Other’s lack, this relation generating their neurotic fantasy, the psychotic is 
left without a place.   
For psychotics, a delusional structure can develop in response to this 
absence of a place in the Other.  What I am suggesting is that a delusion in 
psychosis can take the place of fantasy in neurosis.  Whereas fantasy is the 
neurotic’s response to the Other’s desire, a delusional structure is a possible 
psychotic response to the status of the Other as being complete and without lack 
in psychosis.  That is, the neurotic’s fantasy is a way of formalizing or describing 
in structural terms how he or she situates him- or herself in relation to the 
Other’s lack.  For example, by becoming the professional football player that 
one’s father wished he himself had become, the neurotic child attempts to 
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complete the Other’s lack.  The structure of that relation to the Other’s lack is the 
fundamental fantasy (S/   ◊ a).  The psychotic’s delusion is often another kind of 
narrative (a replacement for the missing family narrative that would describe 
how he or she was wanted, what the Other desired or expected of him or her) 
and forges for the psychotic a narrative about how he or she does have a place—
often in a very grandiose form.   
As we will see in one of the cases of psychosis to follow, in which “Janice” 
had a delusional structure in which she believed she was Jesus Christ, a delusion 
can often give the psychotic a mission or place in the world, and often a very 
privileged one at that.  For instance, Janice’s delusion of being Jesus Christ and 
having a “mission” to save the African-American children created for her a place 
in the Other and gave her a purpose—gave her a place within a kind of imagined 
lack or demand (imagined by way of the delusion itself).  The delusion thus 
supplements and stands in for the absence of what happens in neurosis, in which 
the neurotic’s fundamental fantasy is constructed in relation to the Other’s desire 
and in relation to the subject’s fantasies about what the Other wants of him or 
her.   
As I explained in Chapter 2, the neurotic often mistakes the Other’s 
demand for the Other’s desire.  The neurotic’s fantasy and position with respect 
to the drive take shape in relation to the Other’s demand.  I suggested that a 
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delusion in psychosis can come to occupy the position that fantasy would occupy 
in neurosis.  A delusion does imply a relation to the world—but obviously a 
delusional way of relating to the world.5  In psychosis, demand can still be 
experienced as a demand for something (as I explained in Chapter 2 with regard 
to the neurotic’s experience of demand).  That implies that in psychosis demand 
can play a similar role of muddling up the relation to objects in the delusion, by 
way of the subject presuming or making the assumption that there is an object 
that would satisfy, that whatever particular object of demand the psychotic 
relates to might satisfy.  
Nevertheless, as I will argue further in Chapter 7 through the presentation 
of the case of Janice, the psychotic’s experience of demand is different from the 
neurotic’s experience of demand.  I am hypothesizing that psychotics experience 
demand in a different register, and that this is due to the fact that their 
development is different, in that they have not been Oedipalized or castrated—
have not undergone the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father.  The neurotic 
experiences demand as coming from outside him- or herself, by way of the 
Other’s demand—as in his or her interpretation of speech coming from the 
Other, an articulation of the Other’s demand coming from outside.  The 
                                                 
5
 Just as the neurotic’s way of relating to the world is fantasmatic.  
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psychotic, on the other hand, experiences demand as coming from inside him- or 
herself, most typically by way of hallucinations.   
Command auditory hallucinations, such as the ones Janice experienced, 
are a form of demand:  a voice commanding the psychotic to do something.  The 
command hallucination for the psychotic is, like demand in neurosis, language of 
the Other or speech directed at him or her, but there is a difference in register in 
psychosis such that the demand is coming from another place.  In neurosis the 
language of the Other comes from the Other’s demand as he or she perceives it 
through the Other’s speech, but in psychosis the demand comes from inside by 
way of the hallucinated voice.  The rub is that the psychotic’s own experience of 
the auditory hallucinations is that they are coming from outside—the psychotic 
doesn’t understand that the voices are coming from inside him or her and 
instead attributes them to some external source or agency, often by way of 
persecutory delusions and ideas of reference.  The way in which some psychotics 
experience hallucinated voices is also consistent with Lacan’s assertion that 
psychotics, rather than inhabiting language (as neurotics do), are inhabited by 
language.  Psychotics who experience command hallucinations experience the 
drive by way of demands expressed through imposed speech.   
In neurosis the imposition of the paternal function organizes the drives 
and orients and organizes them by way of the operation of repression and the 
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entry into language.  In psychosis, however, the failure of the paternal function 
results in the psychotic lacking a means of having some distance from and being 
defended against the drives.  Psychotics thus sometimes escape into delusion 
and/or turn to drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addictions as ways to defend 
against the drive.   
This means that the imposition of the paternal function has consequences 
for the status of jouissance for the subject.  That is, the father sets limits on the 
mother/child relation also in terms of setting limits on jouissance.  This is 
essentially the incest prohibition.  Castration means that some jouissance is given 
up, sacrificed, and that limits are set on it.  Accordingly, some protection against 
a jouissance that is too much or is overwhelming is erected.  In cases of 
psychosis, instead of a wall of protection there is something more like a hole.  
Whereas in neurosis the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father installs 
fundamental limits and barriers, in psychosis it is absent, and instead there is 
something like a hole where the Name-of-the-Father should be.  Lacan also 
describes how “in psychosis something hasn’t functioned, is essentially 
incomplete, in the Oedipus complex” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 201).  Let’s look 
more closely at how this hole left in the absence of the Name-of-the-Father comes 
to be and what some of its consequences are.   
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A Fundamental Hole 
Part of Lacan’s unique contribution to the psychoanalytic study and 
treatment of the psychoses is that he also considers them through the dimension 
of language.  In so doing, Lacan highlights the fact that castration fundamentally 
results from the effects of the signifier.  Lacan explains that in psychosis, just as 
the father does not act as a barrier or agent of separation and division between 
mother and child, so too, for the psychotic, language does not serve as a barrier 
against the real.  This is another way of saying that in psychosis there is a lack of 
symbolic mediation between self and world.  This means that for Lacan the 
paternal function can be understood not only developmentally by way of the 
mother-father-child triad, but also as a function relating to limits and lack which 
has effects on language.  In psychosis, the father does not set limits on the 
mother/child relation.  Similarly, the signifier does not set limits to jouissance.  
These concepts are fundamentally linked.  This is important for us to understand 
because the topic of this section of my project (how addictions in cases of 
psychosis relate to the particular status of the drive in psychosis) is based on my 
notion that the addictions are fundamentally related to the foreclosure of the 
Name-of-the-Father for psychotic subjects.  That is, an addiction can often 
function as a kind of sinthome for such patients, standing in for the absence of the 
Name-of-the-Father, and the drug or alcohol can serve as substances psychotics 
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turn to in an attempt to regulate their drives, or as a defense against their drives, 
which will be discussed in more detail a bit further on.   
It is important to look a bit more closely at why language does not 
function in the same way for a psychotic as for a neurotic subject.  For Lacan, the 
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis leaves a hole in the symbolic.  
For neurotics, the prohibition of incest and installation of the Name-of-the-Father 
establish a sort of barrier of language (symbolic mediation/protection against the 
real) and establish anchoring points.  Lacan describes the installation of the 
Name-of-the-Father as a kind of anchoring point or quilting point6 (point de 
capiton).  Without this, as is the case in psychosis, words and meanings are not 
tied together.  This is similar to Freud’s idea that in psychosis there is a 
disjunction between word-presentation and thing-presentation.  The psychotic’s 
characteristic concreteness of language and inability to create new metaphors can 
be seen to result from this.   
What are some other consequences of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-
Father, in terms of language and jouissance?  Since the psychotic subject doesn’t 
have the signifier of the father (Name-of-the-Father7), the psychotic subject is left 
without a signifier to symbolize the real.  The psychotic faces the real without a 
signifier that would have two related functions:  to symbolize and to create lack.  
                                                 
6
 For a fuller discussion of the Name-of-the-Father as a quilting point, see Lacan’s Seminar III, pp. 258-
270. 
7
 Or signifier of the phallus, as I described in Chapter 2 and as I will explain within the next pages.  
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For the psychotic subject, who has not undergone castration, jouissance is thus 
experienced as an anxiety that threatens to overwhelm the subject (and it thus 
stands in opposition to desire).  As I explained in Chapter 2, for psychotics the 
Name-of-the-Father has not been instated—das Ding and the jouissance 
associated with the relation to the mother prior to castration have not been 
named and limited.  That is why psychotics experience drives in the real—drives 
that lack symbolic representation; that are not hierarchized or organized 
according to erogenous zones, or modulated (as they are by way of the instating 
of the Name-of-the-Father for neurotics); and that threaten to overwhelm, 
invade, or overtake the psychotic.   
For the psychotic, drives are prior to castration, and relate to the mother.  
As I explained, it is owing to the psychotic’s porous boundaries between self and 
other, self and world—and the failure of the Name-of-the-Father to be instated—
that the psychotic has little protection against drives.  Since the drives have not 
been limited—barriers have not been established between the psychotic and the 
maternal object or das Ding—they constantly threaten to overtake or overwhelm 
the psychotic.  Lacan compares the mother to a crocodile that threatens to devour 
the subject:  
The mother’s role is the mother’s desire.  That’s fundamental.  The 
mother’s desire is not something that is bearable just like that, that you 
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are indifferent to.  It will always wreak havoc.  A huge crocodile in 
whose jaws you are—that’s the mother.  One never knows what might 
suddenly come over her and make her shut her trap.  That’s what the 
mother’s desire is.  (Lacan, 1969-1970/2007, p. 112) 
For psychotics there is a sense of there being too much, as jouissance has not 
been limited by way of castration.  The psychotic is often easily overwhelmed, 
and has little protection against the real.   
For the psychotic, language does not create a barrier between the 
individual and the outside world or between the individual and the real.  One 
way in which Lacan explains this is by comparing the Name-of-the-Father to a 
kind of stick inserted into a crocodile’s mouth to prop it open (the idea here 
being that the paternal function bars the mother, thus protecting the subject from 
being metaphorically devoured by her).  Lacan continues his analogy:  “There is 
a roller, made out of stone, of course, which is there, potentially, at the level of 
her trap, and it acts as a restraint, as a wedge.  It’s what is called the phallus.  It’s 
the roller that shelters you, if, all of a sudden, she closes it” (Lacan, 1969-
1970/2007, p. 112).  Psychotics, since the phallic function has not been operative 
and the Name-of-the-Father has not been instated for them, lack that which 
would have regulated their relation to the real and thus to drives or jouissance 
that threatens to invade.  
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Lacan says that the psychotic not having language as a barrier is due to 
the failure of the paternal function.  This is what he means when he clarifies that 
“psychosis consists of a hole, a lack, at the level of the signifier” (Lacan, 1955-
1956/1993, p. 201).  What is lacking in psychosis (the absence of which leaves a 
kind of hole) is precisely the Name-of-the-Father.  Lacan also discusses the 
concept of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis at some length 
in “On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis” (1959).  In that 
work, Lacan explains that the failure of the paternal metaphor to function in 
psychosis means that there is something like a fundamental hole left within the 
structure of language.  Lacan explains that a hole in the symbolic is constitutive 
of psychosis:   
I will thus take Verwerfung to be “foreclosure” of the signifier.  At the 
point at which the Name-of-the-Father is summoned—and we shall see 
how—a pure and simple hole may thus answer in the Other; due to the 
lack of the metaphoric effect, this hole will give rise to a corresponding 
hole in the place of phallic signification. (Lacan, 1959/2006, pp. 465-466)   
Lacan represents the resulting hole in the place of phallic signification with the 
symbol “Po” in the following diagram, to allude to a kind of hole in the symbolic:  
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Figure III8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What this means is that in psychosis the father does not cancel out the 
mother, so to speak, as happens in the successful imposition of the paternal 
metaphor in neurosis, and the mother’s desire is not signified.  Instead there is a 
hole, an absence of phallic signification, represented in the diagram by (Po).  In 
Jacques-Alain Miller’s commentary on the graphs used in Lacan’s Écrits, he 
clarifies the meaning of (Po) in Lacan’s diagram pictured above:   
The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father (here Po ), which leads to the 
absence of representation of the subject, S, by the phallic image . . . skews 
                                                 
8
 From “On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,” by J. Lacan, 1959/2006, in 
Ecrits:  the First Complete Edition in English (B. Fink, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton & Co., p. 476.  
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the relation among the three fields:  the divergence of the imaginary and 
the symbolic, the reduction of the real to the slippage between them. 
(Lacan, 1959/2006, p. 862) 
 That is, in response to the question “what does the Other want of me?” there is a 
void for the psychotic, nothing (recall that in psychosis the Other is considered to 
be not lacking).  The Other’s desire is not signified—there is no symbolic 
inscription.  Consequently, jouissance rather than desire predominates for the 
psychotic.  Since castration and lack/desire have not been instated, there is 
jouissance.  Perhaps we can think of this as a jouissance prior to castration that 
stands as an overwhelming real threatening the psychotic subject with being 
overwhelmed or overtaken by it, like being devoured by a crocodile. 
As for the drive in psychosis, we can begin to see that the psychotic falls 
under the sway of real drives that have not been subjected to the operation of 
castration.  For the individual prior to castration the drives are not attached to 
representations (or:  the signifier/the Name-of-the-Father has not established 
limits on them).  The psychotic’s experience of the drive can thus sometimes look 
like a manifestation of tremendous anxiety, being overwhelmed by something 
that seems unnamable, or feeling invaded or overtaken in some way.   
The following diagram from Lacan’s Seminar 23 is instructive on these 
issues: 
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Figure IV9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this diagram Lacan situates anxiety in the area where the real invades the 
imaginary.  Recall from our discussion of the mirror stage that in psychosis the 
imaginary is not fully overwritten by the symbolic.  This means that the 
psychotic is left vulnerable to the real, with little protection, barrier, or symbolic 
mediation against it.  When the real invades the imaginary and symbolic 
                                                 
9
 From J. Lacan, 1975-1976, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII, The Sinthome, (C. Gallagher, 
Trans.), Unpublished, Class of Decemer 16, 1975. 
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mediation is lacking, the result is anxiety.  What is also located between the real 
and the imaginary is the jouissance of the Other (JA/  ).   Anxiety and the 
jouissance of the Other can both manifest in similar ways:  as eruptions of being 
overwhelmed, seemingly overtaken, and experiencing a sense of lack of recourse 
to the signifier (a sense that something can’t be described, is unnamable, lacks 
symbolic inscription).   
We will see examples of such experiences in the cases to follow.  I would 
suggest that, at least in many cases of psychosis, the psychotic subject 
experiences a real jouissance, or Other jouissance, that has not fully come under 
the operation of the phallic function.  I refer to “Other jouissance” within the 
context of my discussion of the psychotic’s relation to the drive to indicate that, 
as I began to introduce in Chapter 2, I am referring to a jouissance prior to 
castration, closely aligned with a real that has not been delimited by the signifier, 
and a jouissance that thus lacks symbolic or phallic inscription.  This is also 
related to the experience of (JA/  ) in which some real invades the imaginary 
without the mediation of the symbolic, which results in a manifestation of 
anxiety or overwhelming on the level of the drive—a sense that there is too 
much, and that lack is lacking—in the absence of the mediation of the 
symbolic/the signifier.  Drugs and/or alcohol then often function as attempts on 
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the part of the psychotic subject to fend off, delimit, or regulate that experience of 
Other jouissance, an invasion or overwhelming on the level of the drive.   
Essentially, that means that the drives that are (logically, hypothetically) 
prior to castration are prior to the subject’s passage through the imposition of the 
paternal metaphor and the limiting function of the Name-of-the-Father.  What is 
at issue in psychosis, in my opinion, is a primordial jouissance prior to castration 
that does not get organized and limited by the Name-of-the-Father.  Strictly 
speaking, prior to the imposition of the Name-of-the-Father, there are no drives 
in the sense that drive is the relation of the subject to demand (S/   ◊ D), but there 
is jouissance.  There is a difference between symbolically determined drives and 
the kind of jouissance characteristic of psychosis.  Finding appropriate terms to 
theorize these ideas is difficult, and that is complicated by the fact that Lacan 
himself never addressed these ideas let alone provided terminology for them.  To 
refer to those “drives” in psychosis as forms of Other jouissance is admittedly 
problematic.  For instance, in Seminar XX Lacan associates Other jouissance with 
women.  In using the term “Other jouissance” here I do not mean to suggest that 
all women are psychotic!  What I am suggesting is that whereas neurotic women 
go through the passage of the castration complex and emerge with two possible 
modes of jouissance—phallic and Other—though neurotic men emerge with 
access only to phallic jouissance, an argument which is beyond the scope of this 
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project, psychotics may experience another somewhat different form of Other 
jouissance.  That is the case because they never go through the castration process 
at all and they thus experience something other than phallic jouissance.   
To emphasize the key point:  the difference, though this is a problem 
perhaps of semantics or terminology, is in whether or not the individual has 
gone through castration.  Lacan does not offer a specific term to designate the 
drives prior to castration.  Furthermore, I am arguing that those may be related 
to the drives psychotics experience, which Lacan also does not formulate.  I am 
simply referring to them as either “primordial drives,” “drives prior to 
castration,” or “forms of an Other jouissance” prior to castration or the 
imposition of the paternal metaphor in order to emphasize that because the 
psychotic does not undergo castration he or she experiences something other 
than phallic jouissance.   
 
Psychosis, the Body, and the Drive 
Viewing psychosis either from the perspective of Lacan’s work on the 
mirror stage—in which for the psychotic subject the symbolic does not fully 
overwrite the imaginary—or from the perspective of the paternal function, in 
which the Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed for the psychotic, we can see that the 
psychotic subject is more vulnerable to the real because there is a lack of 
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symbolic barrier against, or protection from it.  The psychotic subject’s ways of 
responding to this vulnerability can vary, including, to name a few, the 
construction of a delusional system, a sinthome (both discussed previously), or 
the development of an addiction.  Those are all ways of regulating the real in the 
absence of the symbolic mediation/protection that the neurotic has at his or her 
disposal thanks to the paternal function having successfully been instated.   
How do psychotic subjects’ lack of protection against the real relate to 
their experience of the body?  The neurotic’s body is a body overwritten by the 
signifier—it is, in fact, a body of signifiers—and as a consequence of castration 
and the operation of the signifier jouissance is generally evacuated from all areas 
of the body except for the erogenous zones.  Another way to say this is that for 
the neurotic, jouissance has a phallic inscription, which I described previously.  
As Jacques-Alain Miller notes, the neurotic’s experience of castration and the 
cutting in of the signifier, or the Name-of-the-Father, involves the idea that the 
“signifier penetrates the body” (Miller, 1996, p. 425).   
For the psychotic, on the other hand, who has not undergone symbolic 
castration as the neurotic has, jouissance is not delimited in this way and lacks a 
phallic inscription.  The psychotic has not experienced a sacrifice of jouissance, a 
draining off of some of the real.  The signifier, which would have established lack 
and boundaries, and an organization and regulation of the drive, has not 
 195
penetrated the psychotic’s body.  Accordingly, that means that the psychotic’s 
body is instead penetrated by jouissance—jouissance not having been drained 
away and delimited by the operation of castration or the penetration of signifiers 
that bring regulation of the drive.  The psychotic’s body is awash in an Other 
jouissance, perpetually vulnerable to invasions of unregulated drive that leave 
the psychotic feeling as though he or she is being penetrated and overtaken.   
 I will now turn to Freud’s analysis of the memoirs of Schreber10 to pick up 
this question and consider an example of bodily phenomena in psychosis.  Recall 
that Schreber described feeling the “nerves of voluptuousness” under his skin, 
bodily disintegration, and strange sensations that he could not quite describe—
that did not have symbolic inscription or representation, we might say.  Indeed, 
psychotic subjects often speak of strange sensations in their bodies,11 and one 
way to understand those bodily experiences is in terms of an experience of the 
jouissance of the Other.  Schreber’s body is inundated with, invaded by, the 
jouissance of the Other, the jouissance of God.  We will see in the two case 
studies which follow, in Chapters 6 and 7, examples of psychotic subjects who 
experienced related forms of jouissance invasions.   
                                                 
10
 See Freud’s “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Schreber],” 
SE XII, 9-82, and Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988).   
11
 Lacan even describes jouissance itself as a bodily substance and an enjoying substance (la substance 
jouissante) (Lacan, 1972-1973/1998, p. 263).  
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Owing to the often very fragile distinction between self and other in 
psychosis, the psychotic is particularly vulnerable to an experience of a collapse 
of boundaries, or even something that gets experienced as a sort of invasion.  In 
many ways such experiences can be attributed to inadequacies relating to the 
mirror stage and the paternal function.  In psychosis, since the image of the body 
is not supported by a symbolic identification, the image remains fragile and 
inconsistent.  When the imaginary is compromised or collapses, the psychotic 
sometimes faces a confrontation with, or an invasion of, the real—the psychotic 
then experiences a jouissance invasion, an invasion on the level the drive.12  
Schreber describes invading the divine agencies that he feels invade his body and 
mind just as much as they supposedly invade him.  Here again we are seeing 
evidence of the predominance of imaginary relations in psychosis in his rivalry 
with his tormentors as well as the porousness of boundaries in psychosis and 
almost nonexistent distinction between self and other.  Similarly, perhaps it can 
be said that he enjoyed God as much as God supposedly enjoyed him—the 
jouissance of the Other thus supposedly working in both directions according to 
how it is experienced by the psychotic, given the psychotic’s porous boundaries 
and difficulty distinguishing between self and other.  
                                                 
12
 Just as the psychotic often experiences a lack of control in terms of jouissance invasions, so too does the 
psychotic sometimes experience a lack of control over the drives which manifests in instances of violence, 
etc, with a corresponding lack of guilt over their actions. 
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As we have seen, since the psychotic subject does not have the symbolic as 
mediator or as protection against the real, the psychotic is vulnerable to 
invasions of the real (jouissance invasions).  In such cases the psychotic might 
use drugs or alcohol as a form of protection against the drive and against the 
real.  That is, the psychotic’s addiction can be used in an attempt to regulate and 
modulate some overwhelming real that lacks a signifier, and that does not have 
symbolic mediation.  Sometimes the drug or alcohol use can fit into the psychotic 
subject’s delusional structure such that the substance is actually a form of 
sinthome, something that is holding the psychotic subject together.   
This is why we need to understand how drugs and alcohol function for 
each subject.  Clinical approaches that lack theoretical grounding and that simply 
reduce all addicted subjects to the same (without regard for their different 
structural diagnoses, and thus the major differences in how the drug functions 
for them) can be dangerous.  Cases of psychotic addicts for whom their drug or 
alcohol use functions as a kind of sinthome are of particular note.  If a clinician 
fails to recognize the way in which a psychotic addict’s drug use might be 
functioning as a sinthome, as the only thing holding him or her together, and too 
hastily intervenes to get such a patient to stop his or her drug or alcohol use, thus 
removing the substance or very glue that has been holding the psychotic 
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together, this can in fact trigger a psychotic break.  I have seen cases in which this 
had occurred, and with very negative consequences.   
It is often the case that psychotic addicts do not really use drugs or alcohol 
in an attempt to get high, but rather to set limits to some overwhelming real, or 
to modulate something that lacks symbolic inscription.  For instance, in Chapter 
6, I will describe how Nadia’s alcohol use functioned as an attempt to come 
down from some experience of an overwhelming jouissance invasion and to try 
to find words for that which seemed to be unnameable, seemed to lack symbolic 
inscription.  In other cases of psychosis, the drug can function so as to provide a 
self-induced high instead of the uncontrollable highs that come on 
spontaneously, and the cycles of being affected by the drug—experiencing a 
high—and then coming down from that high function as ways in which the 
psychotic tries to find a pseudo-regulation for their unregulated experience of 
jouissance.  Often, as we will see in the two case studies that follow, drugs or 
alcohol function within and facilitate some effort on the part of the psychotic to—
through things like writing or other activities, sometimes linked to a delusional 
structure—translate, modulate, and potentially give words to some jouissance 
experienced in the real.  In many situations, the drug is all the psychotic has to 
regulate the real.  Let us now turn to the two cases to see examples of this and 
how to work with these clinical phenomena.  
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Chapter 7 
ADDICTION AND PSYCHOSIS 
A (W)hole Feeling:  Filling in and Creating Holes to Modify the Drive 
 
Analysis is a matter of suturing and splicing  
(Lacan, Seminar of Wednesday, January 13, 1976). 
 
Introduction 
A fundamental argument I am making in this project is that neurotics and 
psychotics have radically different experiences of the drive, and that this is due 
to the fact that their development results in different organizations of the drive—
the neurotic goes through the castration process and the psychotic does not.  In 
neurosis, the operation of castration produces holes, as I explained in Chapter 2.  
The drive is then oriented around those points of absence, those holes, and 
circles around object a as an attempt to recover some enjoyment imagined to 
have been lost.  In psychosis, however, castration has not been operative, and 
there is thus no creation of a hole or lack constitutive of desire and linked to the 
establishment of an object a.  There is, however, a different kind of hole—a radical 
hole in the place where the Name-of-the-Father should have been.   
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The circuit of the drive in psychosis is thus different from the circuit of the 
drive in neurosis, and the former often has to do with attempts to either fill in or to 
create holes.  As for filling in holes, the psychotic’s experience of the drive can 
involve finding ways to fill in or defend against the radical hole where the 
Name-of-the-Father should have been.  The psychotic often turns to an addiction 
as something that, loosely speaking, stands in for the absent function of the 
Name-of-the-Father, insofar as the addiction can function as an attempt at 
organizing and defending against jouissance (which in neurosis the Name-of-the-
Father would have done).   
As for creating holes, note that the psychotic has not been castrated and 
thus experiences a lack of lack—since the cut of the Name-of-the-Father has not 
been instated and has not created holes by way of establishing the psychotic 
subject as a lacking and desiring subject, as is the case in neurosis.  The psychotic 
thus sometimes turns to an addiction as an attempt at creating holes—making a 
kind of cut or hole in jouissance.  As I will explain within this chapter, the 
psychotic’s experience of the drive also relates to the status of the Other’s 
demand in psychosis—and frequently involves the psychotic being positioned as 
the object for the Other’s jouissance and being unable to separate from that 
position (which is perhaps a kind of fixation of the drive). 
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In the following discussion of a case of a psychotic woman whom I will 
refer to as “Nadia,” I will examine the patient’s relation to the drive according to 
ways she turned to various addictions as attempts to either fill in or create holes 
(and all as ways of regulating the drive).  She had a severe alcohol addiction—
drinking heavily and frequently, often even to the point of blacking out and 
losing consciousness—which had begun several years prior to the beginning of 
the therapy.  Nadia also suffered from severe bulimia—she would binge and 
purge at least once per day, often even more frequently, which had also been 
going on for several years prior to the beginning of treatment.  What is more, she 
frequently engaged in cutting (self-injurious behavior of cutting her body with a 
blade) either alone or by having partners cut her during sex.  Nadia told me that 
under her clothing her body was almost covered in scars from cutting.   
I will focus on how Nadia’s cutting and her bulimia—both of which are 
often considered to be forms of addictions—were ways in which she tried to 
create holes.  Another of her patterns of addiction—having to do with cycles of 
drinking and writing—instead functioned as her attempt to fill in holes.  Through 
drinking and writing Nadia tried to manage and fill in different kinds of anxiety-
inducing holes that she found herself encountering and feeling engulfed by (the 
imaginary no longer serving as a layer of protection or defense against them).  
These will be explained in detail through the presentation of the case.  
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Moreover, the patient came for treatment during a psychotic break, and as 
such the imaginary had fundamentally crumbled and had been punctured by the 
real.  I will first address how the patient initially sought treatment, and I will 
move on to discuss her history so as to outline how for her, given various 
precursors in her history, she came to develop a psychotic structure such that her 
imaginary was continuously vulnerable to coming undone.  That is, I will explain 
how for the patient the three orders of imaginary, symbolic, and real were not 
knotted together in a solid way, which left her vulnerable to encountering holes 
and unraveling.  Because her alcohol use and writing were attempts at managing 
those vulnerabilities, as I will explain, the treatment focused more broadly on 
working on the level of her psychotic structure itself—including ways in which 
what had been keeping her together had crumbled—and working to modify her 
position in relation to the drive.   
A fundamental argument I am making in this chapter (and in this project 
overall) is that by working on the level of the cause of the addiction—and how the 
addiction functions with regard to the subject’s psychic structure and position in 
relation to the drive—the addiction can be fundamentally transformed.  Working 
in this way means that addictions can shift as their cause gets modified and that 
some improvement or resolution of the addiction follows from the work being 
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done on a much more structural level.  With Nadia, I worked on the level of the 
organization of the drive and jouissance itself.   
 
Case History:  Nadia 
Clinical background. 
Nadia is a Mexican-American woman in her mid-twenties whom I treated 
in intensive psychotherapy for approximately two years.  Nadia’s mother tongue 
was Spanish, and so, in light of my own familiarity with Spanish, although the 
treatment was primarily conducted in English, Nadia frequently cited exact 
Spanish wording, idiomatic expressions and aspects of expressions that got lost 
in translation, and things that were said in Spanish in her family household.  
During the treatment Nadia worked part time in retail and then began nursing 
school.  She was single, identified as bisexual, and at the beginning of the 
treatment was dating Luis, a man who she later told me had sexually assaulted 
her earlier in their relationship.  Nadia described herself as never having been 
wanted by her parents—she had no place within the Other’s desire.  She 
described her father as a passive figure who did not have much of a role in her 
life during her childhood.  Her mother was quite ill psychologically:  she was 
extremely paranoid, had auditory and visual hallucinations, almost never left the 
house (due to her extreme anxiety and paranoia), and insisted on keeping Nadia 
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away from all men throughout her upbringing.  Nadia said that her mother gave 
her the impression that men would rape or murder her.  Nadia has one sibling, a 
brother a few years older than her, who maintained a semi-incestuous 
relationship with their mother and was idealized by her.  For most of the sessions 
during the early phase of our work Nadia was quite paranoid, frequently edgy, 
and overwhelmingly anxious.  Although the majority of the treatment that I 
carried out with Nadia was conducted at a frequency of three sessions per week, 
for a period of several months we met four to five times per week.   
Nadia was referred to me after having had a negative experience with 
another therapist whom she saw for four sessions, which may have contributed 
to Nadia coming to therapy in the midst of a psychotic break.  In short, Nadia’s 
previous therapist became a very invasive figure to Nadia and also presented 
herself as the same as Nadia (both amounted to what Nadia referred to as 
“boundary-violating” maneuvers).  My working hypothesis was that this 
experience may have led to a collapse for Nadia on the level of the imaginary.  
That is, rather than having a relation to an other (let alone an Other, in the 
Lacanian sense), Nadia began experiencing her previous therapist as the same as 
her.  Rather than having a relation of self to other (and the gap and breathing 
room that comes with that relation of difference and separateness), Nadia 
experienced her relationship with her previous therapist as self to self and 
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experienced that as an invasion (on a very primitive level) and a collapse of the 
separateness of the self.  This became clear through Nadia’s discourse in the 
beginning of therapy with me.    
During my first meeting with Nadia, she told me that she felt she was 
“losing her mind.”  She reported frequently “blanking out,” which was her way 
of describing dissociative episodes in which she lost stretches of time and could 
not account for how she wound up in various places (e.g., taking a bus and 
winding up in the wrong town, not remembering how she got there).  Nadia also 
reported experiencing diffuse “panic” which she felt she could not articulate and 
having the sense that she was “losing [her] grip on reality.”  She also had what 
seemed to be sporadic visual hallucinations that were unrecognized as such by 
her.   
Nadia indicated that these symptoms began to emerge after a couple of 
sessions with her previous therapist.  She eventually told me that she had begun 
to feel “unsafe” being in the room with her previous therapist, which had 
contributed to her deciding to not leave her apartment for a couple of months.  
During sessions, her previous therapist supposedly spent a significant amount of 
time talking to her about the time when she herself lived in Mexico (perhaps 
trying to develop a rapport with Nadia, who grew up in a section of Texas close 
to Mexico), and always pronounced Nadia’s name with an accent, even though 
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Nadia herself did not do so.  Nadia quickly began cancelling or simply not 
showing up for sessions, and she began to feel unable to leave her apartment.  
The last contact Nadia’s previous therapist had with her was a phone call in 
which, while trying to get Nadia to return to sessions, she yelled at Nadia and 
told her that if she kept refusing to leave her apartment, she would lose touch 
with reality, be fired from her job, and lose her friends and boyfriend.  Nadia 
later called the clinic and asked to be transferred to a different therapist.   
The fact that Nadia had a breakdown in the course of those few sessions 
already sheds light on some things that will become clearer as more details of the 
case unfold.  For now, it will suffice to note the relevance of the fact that Nadia 
seemed to have experienced her previous therapist’s maneuvers, well-
intentioned though they may have been, as an attempt at fusion (invading her, 
by presenting herself as the same as Nadia, which Nadia experienced as a 
destabilizing primitive violation of the boundaries of self and other).  That 
seemed to trigger Nadia’s flight response—locking herself in her apartment and 
terminating that therapy.  This seems to have been her way of responding to an 
experience of erasure in the face of an invasive presence:  more specifically, 
someone attempting to present herself as being the same as Nadia.   
We will see that during Nadia’s childhood, the conditions for the 
development of a psychotic structure were clearly in place for her, which 
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resulted in the construction of a fragile ego and a predisposition to coming 
undone.  As I discussed in the previous chapter, the psychotic often does not 
develop sturdy boundaries (between self and other, self and world).  I believe 
this element of her psychotic structure, on top of other experiences of feeling 
invaded by others (which we will address as we proceed with the case), accounts 
for why she decompensated when her previous therapist presented herself as 
being the same as Nadia.  Her already fragile imaginary became punctured and 
began to crumble.  The moment of triggering was due to a rupture of the 
imaginary axis. 
For Nadia the three orders—imaginary, symbolic, and real—were not 
securely knotted together.  This resulted in a generalized fragility and sense that 
very little was cohesive or stable for her, like a patchwork quilt that kept 
unraveling and coming undone in different places.  The treatment largely 
focused on trying to put the pieces back together. 
 
Family History 
No place. 
 Let us now address how Nadia came to develop a psychotic structure.  
Recall first that the psychotic experiences a lack of place within the Other’s 
desire, which I addressed in the previous chapter.  When I asked Nadia to tell me 
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about any stories she was told about her conception, she told me that her mother 
stated, on quite a few occasions, that she was not wanted.  Since Spanish was the 
primary language spoken in the home, I asked Nadia what, exactly, her mother 
had said.  She told me that her mother said “Nunca le deseamos,” and I noticed 
that the verb conjugation suggested she was not wanted by more than one 
person (“we never wanted you”).  Nadia told me that she never heard any stories 
from her father about whether or not she was wanted by him, but the 
connotation of her mother’s oft repeated statement also implicated him as not 
having wanted her.  What is more, her mother also made it quite public that she 
felt having Nadia was one of the worst mistakes of her life (although there 
seemed to be no further explanation of the reasoning behind this).  Other family 
members had also told Nadia that when her mother became pregnant with her 
she entered a deep depression, which seemed never to have lifted. 
 From the very start, Nadia was not wanted by her parents, and she thus 
had no place within their desire.  As is characteristic of psychosis, the paternal 
metaphor was never instated and there was no explanatory principle—no way of 
having a place within her parents’ desire and no articulation that could have 
provided her with a place in the world.  Her brother (Paco, a few years her 
senior), on the other hand, was something of a golden child—wanted and 
idealized.  As the story goes, when he was born her mother wanted to have a 
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child, but had to go through several years of difficult and expensive fertility 
treatments before Paco was finally conceived.  Nadia has described the 
relationship between her mother and her brother as being “creepy-weird” in that 
they are so close that his mother would often get into the shower with him to 
wash him and he would sometimes sleep alone with her up until he was fifteen.  
Paco seems to have occupied something of a husband role for her mother, and he 
was indeed the center of her world.   
 
“La unidad” without Dad. 
 While Nadia’s mother maintained a very intimate relationship with her 
brother, her mother also insisted that the three of them (mother, brother, and 
Nadia) create at least the illusion of a united front against the father.  That is, her 
mother always enjoined Nadia and her brother, “We have to show your father 
that we are a unity.  There can’t be any tension.”  (“Tenemos que demostrar a tu 
padre que somos una unidad. No puede haber ninguna tensión.”)  The implication of 
this was that the unity of their little family of three had to be preserved at all 
costs, and Nadia said this often meant that her mother wanted the children to be 
“against” their father.  Nadia said her mother would try, for instance, to 
orchestrate things so that the children listened to her and not their father.  What 
is more, she said that her brother would give the silent treatment to anyone who 
dared to speak against their mother.  Nadia noted that both she and her father 
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had sometimes been subjected to her brother cutting them off in this radical 
way—Nadia’s brother didn’t speak to her at all for an entire year, in one 
instance.  While Nadia originally believed her brother to have been the sole cause 
of this silent treatment, she later found out that her mother had orchestrated it all 
along.  To speak against the mother was to violate “the unity,” which would not 
be tolerated.  Nadia faced something of a forced choice:  be a part of the unity or 
essentially have no existence at all.  Either way, the status and nature of her 
existence was certainly precarious from early in her childhood. 
 Not only did her mother insist on turning Nadia against her father and 
maintaining a unity (a united front) with her, but she also insisted on keeping 
Nadia away from all men.  For instance, Nadia once told me that when she was 
younger (she couldn’t recall how old, but she said she might have been 
approximately seven years old) her mother saw that the only two empty chairs at 
a table of family members were between two men, and she refused to allow 
Nadia to sit next to either man.  She then pulled one of the empty chairs towards 
a corner of the room, away from the table, and sat there with Nadia on her lap.  
Nadia said she always got the impression that her mother thought men would 
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rape or murder them, because her mother often spoke about that as something 
that would almost certainly occur.1   
To suggest a connection between Nadia’s experience of the drive—as 
some jouissance that invaded and from which she had little protection—and the 
Other’s demand:  It is possible that Nadia took her mother’s comments about 
men being dangerous as a kind of demand, such that she interpreted her mother 
to be saying something like “You will get yourself raped or murdered by men.”  
This could suggest a way of understanding how, as I suggested in Chapter 5 and 
will describe a bit further on in this chapter, the psychotic’s experience of the 
drive is, like the neurotic’s, still structured by the Other’s demand, though 
Nadia, given her psychotic structure and the failure of the Name-of-the-Father to 
be instated, lacked protection or defense against the drive. 
 The severity of Nadia’s mother’s own pathology was likely a significant 
contributor towards not only the sense of fragility that characterized Nadia’s 
childhood world but also the fragile sense of self that Nadia came to develop.  
Her mother’s paranoia and anxiety created an environment saturated by a sense 
that the world was a very dangerous and scary place, and that one had better 
brace oneself against all sorts of imagined dangers.  What is more, separation 
                                                 
1
 Nadia’s mother apparently made a habit of locking herself in her house, fearing that people were trying to 
come to rape or murder her.  The connection that also suggests itself between this general fantasy of her 
mother’s and Nadia’s own reaction of locking herself in her apartment, described at the beginning of this 
chapter, is also noteworthy.  
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from the mother thus took on the value of being raped or murdered.2  We can see 
how Nadia got the impression that there was very little protection against threats 
of danger in the outside world.   
Nevertheless, unity or togetherness with the mother was also unsafe.  
Nadia described childhood memories in which her mother allowed for no 
pleasure and also no separateness for Nadia.  For instance, Nadia described how 
her mother would suddenly take away all of her toys, leaving Nadia crying and 
confused.  Nadia reported that her mother seemed to do this for no apparent 
reason, out of the blue, and Nadia also recalled her mother often saying 
something about how she herself had no toys when she was a child and saw no 
need for Nadia to have any.  Nadia described how her mother did these things to 
stifle Nadia’s personal interests and to keep her yoked to her mother’s side.  She 
was relegated to staying with her mother and being berated by her rather than 
playing outside by herself or with her brother.  Being with her mother meant not 
having pleasure and not having an autonomous sense of self, as with her 
previous therapist, who collapsed her identity into Nadia’s.  But being apart 
from her mother meant facing the threat of being raped or murdered by men.  
There was no safe place for Nadia to come to be.  Furthermore, Nadia’s 
                                                 
2
 Note that this will become relevant later in this case study, when I discuss Nadia’s abusive relationship 
with Luis. 
 213
experience of nothing being safe had deeper layers, and we can consider these 
other layers of meaning by way of a primal scene. 
 
A primal scene. 
 Nadia had a hard time sorting out when a particular event took place.  
During one session she said this event happened when she was nine, but during 
another session she said she was approximately twelve years old when it took 
place.  She told me that during her childhood, all four family members (mother, 
father, brother, and Nadia) slept in the same bed.  She said one night her father 
tried to get her to stay in the bedroom, alone in the dark room with her brother.  
She said she became frightened of being alone in the dark and walked out 
towards the living room.  Nadia said that she saw her father “fondling or trying 
to have sex with” her mother on the living room couch, and that her mother 
appeared to be crying or in pain.   
One possible interpretation could be that this scene was taken up by 
Nadia as a representation of the consequences that might result from a lack of 
unity.  That is, if there is separation between Nadia and her mother, even here in 
the scene involving sleeping arrangements, then sex that seems like rape might 
be the consequence.  Another possible interpretation could be that if Nadia and 
her mother were identified with one another, Nadia lacking an identity separate 
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from her mother, then whatever happens to her mother metaphorically also 
happens to her.  Recall also her mother’s fantasy that men were out to rape 
and/or kill both of them.  This scene, combined with her mother’s keeping Nadia 
from men according to her explanations as detailed previously, may have also 
contributed to Nadia coming to identify as bisexual, turning to women for most 
of her relationships.  Nadia had only one relationship with a man, which was 
quite violent.  I will now address Nadia’s relationship history, paying attention 
to how her particular relationship patterns resulted from the conditions of her 
upbringing and difficulties on the level of ego development.   
 
Relationships 
 One attempt at building a fragile imaginary:  “I’ll never allow myself to 
get like that.” 
 At the time of treatment, Nadia had had two relationships with women.  
She did not tell me much about the first one, but she mentioned quite a bit about 
Natalia, the second woman she dated.  It is important to note that she described 
both women as being extremely similar to her.  (I have also tried to create a close 
similarity between their pseudonyms here to replicate the extent of similarity 
between their actual names as well, distinct by a mere syllable.)  When Nadia 
was in her early twenties, she dated Natalia for three and a half years.  Nadia 
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described that relationship as her “only certainty in life.”  She said Natalia was 
the only person she had ever really trusted, and that she had found great 
“support” in Natalia.  I think we can interpret this as imaginary support—that is, 
a shoring up of Nadia’s fragile imaginary. 
The one thing Nadia continuously emphasized about their relationship 
was that being with Natalia kept her own eating disorder in check.  Nadia had 
struggled with bulimia since she was somewhere between ten and twelve years 
old (see the section on symptoms a few pages further on).  Natalia apparently 
struggled with a fairly severe anorexia throughout their relationship, even to the 
extent of having to be hospitalized on several occasions.  Nadia remarked that 
she was always keenly aware of how serious Natalia’s anorexia was, and that she 
always told herself she would never allow her own binging and purging to reach 
the extremes of Natalia’s eating disordered behavior.  Nadia often commented 
during sessions about how startling it was to see Natalia’s bones pressing against 
her skin and to see her throw up blood.3 On these occasions she thought to 
herself, “I might have problems but I’ll never allow myself to get like that.”   
Nadia’s relationship with Natalia, clearly embedded in the imaginary 
order (they were very much like each other, semblable to semblable,4 or ego to 
ego, along the imaginary axis), may have served as an attempt at shoring up the 
                                                 
3
 Note the references to the real of the body and her horror at that. 
4
 A “semblable” is an imaginary other—someone seen as similar to oneself.  The term is also meant to 
allude to Lacan’s work on the mirror stage.  
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imaginary for Nadia.  (Recall my previous explanation of how the imaginary is 
often weak and fragile in psychosis, which we also saw illustrated through the 
descriptions of Nadia’s early development.)  In Nadia’s relationship with 
Natalia, Natalia served as a sort of imaginary prop, shoring up Nadia’s sense of 
self by way of this mirroring relation (a to a’).  Fundamentally, their relationship 
also had within it a limit, a “not me,” against which Nadia’s sense of self could 
hold steady.  The death drive inherent in Nadia’s binging and purging was 
limited by making sure she did not reach the morbid limit/excess embodied in 
Natalia.  Nadia’s relationship with Natalia, thanks to the imaginary stabilization 
inherent in it, served as one way in which Nadia may have formed a protection 
against the real (here as in the real of the body) albeit a tenuous one.  Recall how 
in psychosis the imaginary is often continually vulnerable to crumbling and the 
psychotic subject risks then being faced with an overwhelming real.  That is, in 
psychosis the symbolic does not fully overwrite the real, leaving the psychotic 
subject needing other means of protection against the real.  Here we see how 
Nadia turned to one such attempt to form a barrier against the real by way of the 
imaginary.   
Natalia thus seemed to serve a stabilizing, mirror function for Nadia, but 
she also served a limiting function, embodying a dangerous limit Nadia would 
never allow herself to reach.  In this sense, to put a slightly different spin on the 
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relationship and to situate it within the context of something from her early 
development, their relationship was a kind of unity, but with an element of 
tension.  That is, they were a unity—like one another, along the imaginary axis—
but there was also a slight difference or tension, in that Natalia also embodied a 
limit for Nadia.  This is in some ways similar to Nadia’s relationship with her 
mother.  They were similar, or something of a unity, but her mother also 
represented a limit in that Nadia knew that her mother had auditory and visual 
hallucinations, to which Nadia responded just as she responded to the extremity 
of Natalia’s anorexia:  “I might be like her, but I’ll never allow myself to become 
that crazy.”  Recalling her mother’s oft repeated injunction about forming a unity 
and not showing any tension, we can further understand the structure of the 
relationship between Nadia and Natalia as both repetition (unity) and wish 
(tension).   
 
A man who raped her. 
Aspects of these dynamics were also at work in Nadia’s relationship with 
Luis, the only man she had ever dated.  Luis and Nadia began dating just a few 
months after her relationship with Natalia ended (about a year and a half prior to 
the beginning of treatment).  She said that although she didn’t have particularly 
strong feelings for Luis during the first few months of their relationship, at a 
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certain point things shifted and she began to believe she wouldn’t be able to 
“breathe or exist at all” without him.  Coinciding with this shift, their 
relationship began to include physical and verbal abuse by Luis, and Nadia 
began to “lose [her]self” as she adopted many of his viewpoints, mannerisms, 
and phraseology.  When Luis would sometimes become verbally and/or 
physically abusive towards Nadia, she would become overwhelmed and tell him 
she needed five minutes to get away from him so that she could “collect 
[her]self”—which was an attempt to establish a boundary, a form of defending 
against what felt like an invasion.  However, Luis would refuse to allow her to 
do so, and on several occasions he would even continue yelling at her and follow 
her into the shower, where she would go in an attempt to get away from him.  In 
this manner, Luis refused to allow Nadia to have a separate existence, an 
autonomous sense of self.  Accordingly, they became a “unity” (unidad).   
A different way to look at this is that being with Luis seemed to have 
provided her with a perspective with which to identify, a way of supplementing 
her fragile sense of self and thus guaranteeing a certain (albeit tenuous) kind of 
existence and point of identification.  Nevertheless, the presence of abuse in their 
relationship can be understood as an introduction of tension within the unity, 
and another form of limit—a violent one.  Here again the relationship as carrying 
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both repetition and wish (as relevant to her mother’s statement about being a 
unity and not showing any tension) is evident in these dynamics.   
Another way to understand the structure of Nadia’s relationship with 
Luis is in terms of her relationship with her father.  Nadia’s father was generally 
a distant and absent figure, literally and metaphorically.  He hadn’t wanted 
Nadia, had spent little time with the family, and didn’t have much of a role there 
in any other capacities (he did not intervene to break the “unity” she supposedly 
formed with her mother and brother).  Similarly, Luis didn’t acknowledge Nadia 
as a girlfriend for the first six months of their relationship.  Unlike her father, 
however, Luis had violent limits, which might suggest a wish on her part.   
In addition to the sporadic verbal abuse from Luis, there was an incident 
of sexual violence.  Several months prior to the beginning of treatment, Luis had 
beaten and then anally raped Nadia with a painful object in a manner that she 
described as very humiliating.  Although this experience was very distressing for 
Nadia, a second, later incident seemed to have even more of an impact on her.  
Some time after Luis had sexually assaulted Nadia, there was an incident in 
which he beat her quite badly and took her laptop and erased everything from it, 
including all of her writing, which was extremely important to her.  This erasure 
of Nadia’s writing caused her acute distress because it was tantamount to an 
erasure of her self.   
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What is particularly noteworthy is that Nadia remained in a relationship 
with Luis for quite some time in spite of these incidents and also that she then 
became plagued by the fact that she stayed with him for so long.  We might 
speculate that one reason why she stayed with him was that he provided her 
with a phallic signifier.  Let’s recall Lacan’s work on the failure of the paternal 
metaphor in psychosis, which results in a lack of phallic signification.  In light of 
that, perhaps we can say that for Nadia, Luis both gave her a perspective with 
which to identify and also represented a desire for her—he wanted her and gave 
her a place, so to speak.  Nevertheless, Nadia beat herself up over staying with 
someone who was a rapist.   
We can also connect the question of why Nadia stayed with Luis for so 
long, even after he raped her, with the connection between the drive and the 
Other’s demand, which I mentioned previously. In light of her mother’s 
prediction that she was sure she and Nadia would be raped or murdered by 
men, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Nadia remained in a relationship with a 
man who did rape her.  This certainly does not absolve Luis or in any way 
suggest that he was not at fault for what he did.  What I am emphasizing is a 
way of understanding, from a psychoanalytic perspective, what keeps some 
people in such horrifying situations, and what leads them to continue making 
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themselves suffer.  Nadia felt unable to leave Luis, which speaks to her inability 
to separate from her position as the object for the Other’s jouissance. 
Even after her relationship with Luis ended, Nadia began to have visual 
hallucinations that were very closely related to Luis.  In fact, he continued to be 
characterized as a persecutor through the hallucinations and she thus continued 
to experience him as causing in her a suffering (abuse/invasion) from which she 
could not separate.  The visual hallucinations were ways in which she continued 
to make him present to her and evidence of how she continued to be stuck in her 
position as the object for the Other’s jouissance.    The hallucinations were like 
continuations of her experience of the drive in relation to the Other’s demand—
living out and fulfilling a sort of demand for ongoing and seemingly limitless 
abuse and suffering.   
Indeed, Nadia had a larger pattern of flirting with death and dangerous or 
bad situations in various forms, and one way of making sense of why she got 
caught up in such cycles is that this pattern fits in with her psychotic structure in 
which she had little sense of barrier against the lethal pull of the death drive.  
Let’s now examine how this might be the case through her various presenting 
issues. 
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Overview of Presenting Issues 
Holes, cuts, and the body. 
 Many elements of Nadia’s symptoms suggest a lack of control over 
unregulated drives and/or an attempt to bring herself back to her body.5   
 When she was younger, Nadia would “make holes” by digging her nails 
into the skin around the tops of her cheeks under her eyes.  “People thought I 
had a weeping disease,” she said, as she described how she would pick the scabs 
off and let them become suffused with blood and pus.  While this may be related 
to how her mother used to talk about preferring lighter skin (Nadia’s skin was 
darker than her mother’s but a bit lighter than her father’s), I believe it also 
stands as an example of how she repeated behaviors that put her in painful 
contact with her body, perhaps a reaction to the psychotic’s characteristic sense 
of detachment from the body.  Similarly, Nadia also reported that during 
upsetting or traumatic incidents, she would often dig her nails down hard into 
her palms or even smack herself.  I believe this—as well as her other forms of 
cutting herself and her bulimia—can be likened to attempts to make cuts or holes 
in the body.  Linked to that, they are also ways of trying to make cuts or holes in 
jouissance, as I explained previously.   
                                                 
5
 Psychotics often report strange bodily experiences, ranging from the electric sensations that Schreber 
reported to a sense of being disconnected from the body.  For more on Schreber’s bodily phenomena, see 
Freud’s “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Schreber],” SE XII, 
9-82, and Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1988).   
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 Nadia’s struggles with bulimia had a similar character.  Her bulimic 
behavior began by way of an imaginary identification when one of her female 
cousins talked to Nadia about her eating disorder when Nadia was between ten 
and twelve years old.  This mimicking of symptoms is often found in cases of 
psychosis.6  Regardless of the specific details of how her bulimic behaviors 
started, it is noteworthy that, just as with her making holes in her skin and 
smacking herself, she experienced her bulimic activity as something that brought 
her back in contact with her body and brought some kind of relief.   
That is, Nadia also talked about how vomiting felt like “draining 
something” from her body.  She told me that sometimes she would vomit and 
suddenly realize, due to the feelings that accompanied that activity for her, that 
she had been “taking [her] body for granted.”  She also talked about how she 
sometimes would binge and purge in reaction to some “overwhelming feeling” 
that she had not been able to say much about, but that she felt was diffuse, 
inarticulable, and absolutely overwhelming.  Her way of responding to that 
feeling by vomiting and “draining something” seemed to be one way in which 
Nadia attempted to drain off an overwhelming invasion of jouissance—and a 
confrontation with the real—against which she had no protection and for which 
she could find no symbolic mediation.  She thus turned to the real of the body 
                                                 
6
 And sometimes in cases of hysteria.   
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through her binging and purging, to try to drain off some jouissance by way of 
vomiting.   
What is more, her binging and purging can also be interpreted as a way in 
which she tried to create lack.  That is, by devouring something and then 
vomiting it up, she created an absence or hole—through the repetitive act of 
filling and voiding.  Nadia’s bulimia was a way of creating lack by creating a 
hole (void/emptiness) in her stomach, so to speak.  She was creating lack through 
her bulimia as a way of defending against her experience of the real and a form 
of Other jouissance that invaded, felt overwhelming, and lacked symbolic 
inscription.  As such, her bulimia can be seen as something like a replacement for 
the function of the Name-of-the-Father, in the wake of its failure, as that which 
would have installed a structural lack, protected against the real, and delimited 
Other jouissance.   
 Another behavior that functioned for Nadia as a way of bridging a gap 
between herself and her body was through cutting her body with razors.  As I 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, Nadia’s cutting was also a way in 
which she attempted to create holes (by making literal holes or cuts in her body) 
and delimiting jouissance.  Nadia told me that she had no idea when or how her 
cutting behaviors began.  She said she cut alone and also with partners during 
sex.  In both situations, she would make incisions only on areas of her body that 
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already had pre-existing scars or cuts.  She had mentioned that her entire body 
was covered with scars, many of which she couldn’t account for.  Nadia did offer 
two specific examples of how she injured herself in the past.  She said she 
recalled falling into a sort of garbage pit once during her childhood and that she 
had to pull bits of broken glass from her body.  The other memory she recalled 
was of having tried to get her father’s attention as he was driving away, and of 
having her entire body dragged along the pavement as she held on to the back of 
his car, which she said resulted in her having scars all over her body.   
This certainly suggests an interesting possible connection between Nadia’s 
father and her cutting behavior.  In Lacanian terms, the idea of the absence of her 
father was also about the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father.  The signifier 
did not intervene and set limits, so Nadia used cutting as one attempt at 
replacing that function.  In the absence of the cut of the Name-of-the-Father, 
cutting itself may have been one way she tried to set limits for herself. 
Nadia also had partners cut her during sex, and we might speculate about 
whether this is a way of putting herself in touch with her body and trying to set 
limits to a possible invasion of Other jouissance.  While Nadia did not say 
enough about these behaviors for me to speculate further, she mentioned that the 
cutting during sex was always at four points around her lower abdomen.  This 
raises questions about the status of her jouissance during sex.  For instance, it is 
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possible that she experienced a kind of invasion of jouissance that she tried to 
limit by cutting herself.  It is also possible that she did not experience genital 
pleasure during sex and cutting herself was figuratively an attempt to cut space 
for that enjoyment to come to be.  Given the location of these cuts, near her 
uterus, it also calls to mind the idea that her mother never wanted her.  Cutting 
for Nadia seemed generally to take on the value of setting limits, dividing, and 
regulating, and we can see how in her history there was a fundamental absence 
of that in various ways. 
 
Alcohol and writing:   “a (w)hole feeling.”  
 Another important symptomatic behavior of Nadia’s, and one that relates 
to her experience of the drive, involved her high levels of alcohol consumption.  
Nadia said that she never kept track of how much she drank (often mixed drinks 
or different kinds of hard alcohol) but that she drank quite a bit and had 
developed a very high tolerance for it.  At times she would drink so much that 
she would black out.  Her drinking patterns tended to echo the patterns of her 
other symptomatic behaviors, particularly as a way she attempted to regulate 
some sort of overwhelming jouissance invasion.  Indeed, there seemed to be 
numerous instances in which Nadia felt overwhelmed by something she found 
diffuse and inarticulable, and she then turned to alcohol as a way to try to 
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regulate and/or stave off that experience.  What is more, the purpose of her 
drinking always seemed to be that it led to her writing.  This seemed to be the 
primary medium through which she then attempted to symbolize and thus set 
limits to some aspect of the real that would invade her.7   
 At times, Nadia’s drinking followed experiences of being overwhelmed 
and feeling overtaken by something and having no words for the experience—
she lacked a signifier to name it and to limit it.  For instance, Nadia described 
several times when, in the middle of other situations or activities, such as being 
in class or in a store running an errand, she would suddenly become 
“overwhelmed” by “something rushing in.”  She would describe a sense of being 
overtaken by a jumble of incoherent thoughts, emotions, and sensations.  She 
would describe how at such times she could not find words for her experience, 
noting, “words slip off; nothing sticks.”8  Her response would be to go home, 
drink a lot, and write.  Her drinking and writing thus seemed to be an attempt at 
staving off or limiting some sort of jouissance invasion, and an attempt at finding 
symbolic mediation. 
 After her relationship with Luis had ended, Nadia would drink in 
response to feeling consumed by thoughts about their relationship.  She 
                                                 
7
 The important role writing played for Nadia further underscores how devastating it was when Luis erased 
all of her writing.   
8
 Note the example here of how words are often thought of as things for the psychotic—here in Nadia’s 
description of words as things that can slip off of something.   
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described in particular being preoccupied and very distressed by not knowing 
why she stayed with him at all, not to mention for so long.  Even after they were 
no longer together, she felt a lack of “closure,” as she put it.  “It’s not over,” was 
her frequent complaint.  She would then drink and write in an attempt to come 
up with an explanation as to why she had stayed with him.  Nadia perseverated 
about her remaining stuck in a position of the object for the Other‘s jouissance.  
Every time she became wrapped up in the enigma of why she stayed with him, 
she would confront a void, a lack of an explanation, a hole.  She would drink and 
then do what she described as journaling or free writing in an attempt to try to 
come up with an explanation.  Lacan reminds us that for the psychotic “there is 
nothing more dangerous than approaching a void” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 
201).  A question for which there is no answer is a kind of void or hole. 
 What is more, Nadia told me that what she sought to reach during her 
episodes of drinking and writing was what she described as a “whole feeling.”  I 
think we can hear this in two ways, as in both whole and hole.  She described 
drinking and writing in an attempt to regulate what she was experiencing, 
including a mix of thoughts and feelings as well as an absence of something.  
What she experienced was both whole, in that she was overwhelmed and 
overtaken by something (overfilled by something that resisted signification), and 
also hole, in that she felt an absence or lack of something, such as an explanation 
 229
as to why she stayed with Luis.  Perhaps we can in some respects connect this 
with what Lacan describes as the lack of phallic signification that results from the 
failure of the paternal metaphor in psychosis.  Through Nadia’s drinking and 
writing she was trying to find an explanation, trying to find a signifier that 
wasn’t there, and she kept coming up against a hole.  Perhaps we might also say 
that she was trying to find a signifier to name and set limits to her jouissance 
(associated with staying with someone cruel and abusive), but that this signifier 
was absent.   
 In psychosis, of course, it is fundamentally the Name-of-the-Father that is 
the missing and foreclosed signifier, which leads to consequences for the status 
of the symbolic order in psychosis.  When the Name-of-the-Father fails to be 
instated, something is forever irrevocably missing.  There is always a structural 
lack.  We can see an extension of this in Nadia’s search through her writing 
(mainly in her creative writing but also in her free writing) for “the perfect 
word.”  Nadia would describe becoming very frustrated by her inability to 
convey her thoughts through her writing.  On a phenomenological level, she felt 
there was a word she could not find or access.  She imagined that if she could 
only come up with that word, she would “finally be okay” and finally reach that 
“whole feeling.”  Nadia felt unable to get there.   
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There were also times when her writing functioned as her way of keeping 
track of things that seemed evanescent and fragile to her, as a way of installing 
symbolic markers.  For instance, after Luis had beaten Nadia and erased her 
writing, she was very distraught that she became confused and unable to recall 
all of the details of what had happened in that scene.  Without her laptop, she felt 
herself to be lacking the instrument she had been relying on to keep track of 
things—not only the incident with Luis but also a host of other things, as she 
often used her writing to simply document things that had been going on in her 
life (and make them feel more real to her).  (It had not occurred to her to 
handwrite her thoughts until I pointed that possibility out to her.)   As she felt 
the memory of what had happened during the scene with Luis slipping away, 
she lamented, “I couldn’t write it down, and now it’s all gone.”  Her drinking 
and writing were thus also often attempts to simply find or install symbolic 
markers, the absence of which left things continually coming apart.9     
For Lacan the circuit of the drive in neurosis revolves around object a 
which stands in the place of holes created by way of the imposition of the Name-
of-the-Father.  Perhaps Nadia’s case offers an example of how in psychosis the 
hole left by the absence of the Name-of-the-Father—due to its failure to be 
                                                 
9
 For Lacan the absence of sufficient quilting points (owing to the failure of the Name-of-the-Father to be 
instated as the initial quilting point or point de caption) leaves the psychotic without a consistent symbolic, 
leaving things continually vulnerable to unraveling and coming undone. For a fuller discussion of the 
Name-of-the-Father as a quilting point, see Lacan’s Seminar III, pp. 258-270. 
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instated—is tantamount to the psychotic lacking a means of regulating or 
defending against some experience of Other jouissance—something like a 
jouissance prior to castration.   
 
When the self drains. 
 Beyond the instances I outlined in the preceding sections to address how 
Nadia’s symptoms often involved reconnecting with her body and/or attempting 
to regulate an invasion of the real, there were also situations in which the 
security of her very being was challenged.  That is, she often experienced 
moments of ontological insecurity, moments when her very self began to drain 
away. 
For instance, Nadia reported that during the couple of years prior to the 
beginning of treatment she had developed an intense fear of needles, a fear of 
having blood drawn.  By way of example, she described how, when she went to 
have some blood tests done a few months into the treatment, she almost 
“blanked out” as she “panicked” when the doctor began drawing blood from her 
upper arm.  She described feeling “an overwhelming rush” and a “weird 
sensation all over [her] body” as the blood was being drawn, and said she could 
feel a tremendous vacuum sensation throughout her entire body as this 
happened.  She said that at that moment she “felt [her] self drain” and had to 
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snap herself out of it.  Further layers of meaning attached to this experience are 
suggested by the fact that her father was a phlebotomist, and that her mother 
never showed any physical signs of affection to Nadia except when she would 
occasionally touch her on her upper arm.  Nadia found these maternal touches 
“horrible” and an overwhelming hot rush throughout her body would 
accompany them, similar to the “weird sensation” she experienced when she had 
her blood drawn.  One might further speculate about the extent to which her 
mother represented the threat of being sucked into something, like a vacuum or a 
kind of void into which one might get absorbed, the effect of which was that 
Nadia had no separate sense of self.  Against this her father (who did not 
embody or represent the paternal function) had no mediating effect.   
 I asked Nadia for other examples of times when she felt her self beginning 
to drain away.  She mentioned the times when she was overwhelmed by Luis 
and asked him to give her five minutes alone to collect herself during their 
heated arguments.  When he would refuse, even following her into the shower 
(where she would go to try to get away from him), she said, it was like that 
vacuum feeling associated with needles drawing blood, like her self draining.  
She went on to describe that feeling as being like a stopper having been pulled 
from a sink full of water, releasing the water to drain away.   
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This led her to offer another example of times when she felt herself drain 
away, which was when she used to have “kitchen sink arguments” with Natalia.  
She said they would start out fighting about one thing, and then she would 
become overwhelmed as Natalia would “throw everything into the kitchen 
sink,” bringing in lots of different topics that were upsetting her.  Note also the 
curious modification of the more conventional wording of “everything but the 
kitchen sink.”  This modification may reflect the psychotic’s penchant for 
concrete thinking, here as in the idea of dumping ideas into a concrete object:  
“everything into the kitchen sink.”   Regardless, the idea here seemed to be that 
there was no symbolic thread or coherence for Nadia to follow, and that this is 
what she found overwhelming.   
 In addition to these experiences of feeling her self drain in response to an 
overwhelming invasion, there were other times when Nadia had a reaction to 
situations that involved her not receiving a certain kind of recognition on a 
fundamental, ontological level.  Nadia offered the example of how Natalia used 
to lie to her about having eaten (when she had not eaten for some time during 
the heights of her struggles with anorexia) or how she used to go to the hospital 
to have her weight monitored and she would make herself seem heavier than she 
actually was by putting rolls of quarters in her underwear.  Being lied to by 
someone who was her “only certainty” seemed to challenge Nadia’s sense of 
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ontological security, her fundamental grasp on what she could count on and find 
security in being sure of.  Other examples of situations in which Nadia felt 
herself drain were when her relationship with Natalia wasn’t recognized by 
certain members of Natalia’s family (because of their religious beliefs about 
homosexuality); and when her boyfriend Luis had forgotten some important 
things she had said to him—she exclaimed during the session, as she described 
this, “what, do I not exist?”   
Overall, Nadia’s world and her very sense of self were always quite 
fragile, constantly vulnerable to unraveling.  The treatment aimed at stabilizing 
and shoring up her sense of self to whatever extent possible.   
 
Treatment Interventions 
Intervening with a metaphorical thread. 
Midway through the treatment, Nadia came to session and sat on the 
couch very gingerly, while holding her button-down shirt closed with one hand.  
She began the session by saying to me, “I lost a button.  Do you have anything to 
fix this?”  I got her a safety pin, she pinned her shirt closed, thanked me, seeming 
relieved, and we continued with the session.  This marked the beginning of a 
phase of the treatment in which the work focused on suturing.   
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 Given the extent to which Nadia was prone to ontological instability, 
times when her very being could potentially slip away, I was particularly careful 
throughout the course of the treatment to provide recognition of her existence.  
For instance, when she would tell me that she had “blanked out” recently and 
couldn’t account for the lost time, I would try to help her piece things back 
together again, which often also involved my reminding her of the things we had 
been talking about in recent sessions, returning her words to her when they had 
been lost.  My hope in doing so was that this would help to install markers of 
recent history where they might have been erased—by reinscribing details about 
sessions, things she had told me had been going on or had been on her mind 
recently, and so on.  This was a procedure similar to stitching rent fabric back 
together.   
 Another particularly important time when I made it a focus of the 
treatment to try to help Nadia put some of the pieces back together again, so to 
speak, centered on her violent sexual assault by Luis.  The loss of her writing was 
actually one of the most traumatic aspects of that experience for her.  Her 
reaction is understandable when we consider the extent to which she 
experienced her writing as coextensive with her self:  it was a piece of her.  What 
was important was not so much the content of her writing, but rather the fact 
that for her it served as documentation of her existence.  She often read through 
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her writing or IM’s—Instant Messages—after she “blanked out” or dissociated, 
to try to fill in the blanks, and to reconstruct and trace the simple fact of her 
having continued to exist in spite of experiencing a dissociative episode.  Nadia 
and I worked to stitch together little bits of her experience that seemed lost to 
her, and this was part of the larger task of helping her to stitch together a more 
cohesive sense of self (helping her to build a more cohesive imaginary and 
helping her to build a more stable ego).   
 
Nada en el rio. 
An incident that was perhaps similar to Nadia’s confrontation of holes 
through her patterns of drinking and writing occurred when she went to a pool, 
got in, and suddenly discovered she had “forgotten” how to swim and almost 
drowned.  For Nadia it was an experience of being almost overtaken or devoured 
by a void.  My attunement to Spanish homophones enabled me to make sense of 
and have a transformative impact on her suddenly losing her ability to swim.  As 
we discussed this incident in session, her memories and associations included 
recalling her childhood fear that there was someone or something in the river 
that might pull her under.  Being unable to see the bottom of the river frightened 
her, because she felt the river was a “place of nothingness.”  (She used to swim 
quite often in a certain river during her childhood because of all the day-trips her 
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family took there, close to her hometown.)  When Nadia got into the pool and 
felt she had forgotten how to swim, it is also possible that she lost track of the 
outlines of her body and panicked, furthering the sense of her being detached 
from her body and dissolving, as it were.  I then offered an intervention by 
saying to Nadia, “nada en el rio…,” which can mean both “nothing in the river” 
and “she10 swims in the river” (depending on how the accent is placed on the 
word nada).11    
Utilizing this homophony of signifiers of her native tongue 
simultaneously drew together material from recent sessions and opened up new 
meanings.  For instance, Nadia’s brother had announced that if she continued 
dating women he would disown her and she would be “nothing” to him.  Nadia 
also described Luis’s efforts to brainwash her into thinking that the abuse didn’t 
happen.  She would feel so invaded by his attempts to brainwash her that she 
would hide in the shower, as noted previously, running the water to try to 
drown out the sound of him yelling at her and trying to twist her perceptions.  
She felt like nothing as he undid her perspective—her very self was washed 
away by him.  Something like “rio” (Spanish for “river”) also resonates with  
                                                 
10
 Considering the deliberately ambiguous form of this construction, “she” could have been heard as 
referring either to Nadia or to her mother 
11
 Nada means “nothing,” but nadá means “she swims.”   
 238
Nadia’s mother’s name,12 and recent sessions had also focused on how her 
mother never wanted her.  Nadia experienced herself as “nada,” nothing, in 
relation to her mother, “rio.”  After the work of these sessions, Nadia returned to 
the pool and was able to swim again.   
We can see how my intervention simultaneously drew together several 
layers of meaning while also not tying things down to any one meaning in 
particular.  It is possible that the polyvalence reverberated and had its effects in 
that fashion, in conjunction with the variety of related material having been 
worked with over the course of several sessions.  This would be consistent with 
Lacan’s claim in Seminar 23 that in the end equivocation is the only weapon we 
have against the symptom.  Even so, it is debatable whether much equivocation 
is possible when working with psychotic patients, given their concreteness of 
language as well as the way in which, as Lacan puts it, the unconscious is present 
but not functioning for psychotics.   
Nevertheless, there might be another way to consider the impact of this 
intervention and another layer of meaning to be heard in it.  That is, nada en el rio 
could also have the sense of “nothing in the mother,” recalling the connection 
between something about the word rio and something about Nadia’s mother’s 
name.  Considered thusly the focus is then placed on the idea of a hole or lack in 
                                                 
12
 I have used pseudonyms and disguised other identifying details throughout this paper in order to protect 
confidentiality while also attempting to preserve something of the flavor of the multiple levels of meaning 
that were at work in the case.   
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the mother.  Since the Other is considered complete for the psychotic, perhaps 
this intervention, carrying the idea of the decompletion of the Other, introducing 
the notion of a lack in the Other,13 contributed to some elements of progress for 
Nadia during the treatment.  That is, we might situate this intervention not just 
in terms of the short-term effect of her being able to swim again, but also in terms 
of longer-term effects.  This intervention, along with several others, some more 
directly related to her mother and family history, may have contributed to Nadia 
beginning to have more breathing room and to be less vulnerable to being 
overtaken or sucked in by different kinds of perceived voids or holes.  The idea 
here might be that if there is a lack within the mother, then the mother is less 
aligned with a devouring hole, like a river that sucks one in.  When there is a lack 
in the Other, there is space for the subject to come to be (or swim, as the case may 
be). 
The intervention involving the multiple layers of meaning of “nada en el 
rio” is an example of an intervention that may have simultaneously introduced 
the idea of a hole in the Other and also protected Nadia against a hole.  That is, it 
helped Nadia to not fall into a hole (to refind her ability to swim and thus not get 
sucked into the hole of the water/rio).  Indeed, much of the treatment focused on 
                                                 
13
 Note that I am not at all suggesting that Nadia shifted from having a psychotic structure to a neurotic 
structure, for instance, but rather that there may have been modifications within her psychotic structure that 
were achieved over the course of treatment.  Fink (1997) notes that for Lacan, “once a psychotic, always a 
psychotic.”  
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helping her to form barriers against holes.  I believe this ultimately contributed 
not only to the reduction of her drinking but also to the reduction or 
disappearance of many of her other symptoms as well, since, as was the case 
with her drinking, she eventually accomplished in the treatment (through the 
medium of speech) the protection against holes that she had previously been 
attempting to achieve through things like her drinking. 
 
 Filling in holes. 
Recall that Nadia’s cycles of drinking and writing often functioned as 
ways she confronted holes (such as the enigma of why she stayed with Luis) and 
attempted to fill them.  Moreover, in light of the way in which she used her 
writing either as documentation of her existence or as a tool to defend against an 
invasion of the real, throughout the treatment I attempted to support and 
encourage certain aspects of her writing.  For instance, I would express interest in 
her creative writing when she brought it up, ask her questions about it, and 
demonstrate to her that I knew how important it was to her and that I saw it as 
valuable and meaningful.  However, I was also very mindful of another side of 
her writing (the free writing regarding the enigma of why she stayed with 
Luis)—that is, not only how much she was drinking while writing but also how 
distressing and dangerous it became in her mind when she encountered a hole.   
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Accordingly, I tried to help Nadia fill in some of the blanks in her writing 
that she found particularly distressing.  For instance, for some time in the 
treatment when she felt particularly overwhelmed by not knowing why she 
stayed with Luis for so long, given how horribly he treated her, she became quite 
wrapped up in her writing in a rather masochistic and self-punitive way.  She 
would beat herself up over staying with Luis, being very derogatory towards 
herself and causing herself a tremendous amount of suffering.  And although she 
attempted to journal about that so as to try to come up with an explanation for 
why she stayed with him she would always draw a blank, come up with no 
explanation at all, which horrified her.  I therefore tried to help invent or 
construct some explanations that could begin to function as sufficient plugs for 
those holes and to drain away some of her masochistic self-flagellation.   
I will summarize one of these.  During one session when Nadia was in 
distress about not knowing why she continued dating someone who was so 
abusive, I could see that she was becoming very worked up and seemed to be 
sinking into something dangerous and all-encompassing.  Sensing that I should 
try to intervene and try to put a stop-gap into what she seemed to be sinking 
into, I said to her:  “It’s like your family.”  (Of course, this could have been heard 
as “It’s like you’re family.”)  My intervention functioned to graft a pseudo-
Oedipal meaning onto her staying with a man who was abusive, violent, and 
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intrusive.  My comment was deliberately somewhat vague and meant to allude 
to several things, to see what Nadia would pick up on and make use of.  
Although I wanted to try to fill a hole with something, I also wanted to do so in 
such a way that Nadia could make it her own.   
Among the possible meanings, Nadia and I discussed her mother as an 
intrusive and abusive figure and her father staying with her for so long.  Nadia 
had a passing familiarity with Freud and was amenable to thinking about how 
one’s childhood impacts one’s later development, and so on.  This version of a 
semi-Oedipal meaning was one she was therefore prepared to consider.  
Additionally, this construction positioned her in an identification with her father, 
which I think was important in many ways, particularly given how susceptible 
Nadia was to feeling fused with her mother and experiencing that as identity-
annihilating.  My intervention propped up an imaginary-level way of seeing 
things, and can thus be considered an intervention that contributed to a larger 
process of helping Nadia to construct a more stable imaginary for herself.   
For a number of reasons, my intervention “It’s like your family” was one 
among others that contributed to the construction of an explanation that was 
satisfactory to Nadia.  It was, of course, just that:  a construction.  Nevertheless, 
the point was to alleviate her masochistic self-flagellation, and that was 
accomplished.  This construction or pseudo-explanation allowed her to stop 
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beating herself up over having stayed with Luis for so long, and to forgive 
herself and move on (to attain “closure” as she put it).  She gradually stopped 
drinking excessive amounts of alcohol and getting wrapped up in writing that 
perseverated on such holes.  Accordingly, filling in this hole (the enigma of why 
she stayed with Luis) with this construction also resulted in limits being set for 
her—limits against masochistic self-flagellation and against falling into a kind of 
hole.   
 
Niño capricioso:  a hole in Luis. 
Even as there were many interventions across the course of treatment that 
focused on helping to plug up holes for Nadia, I believe some of the 
interventions having to do with Luis and her relationship with him involved (or 
resulted in) the revelation of a kind of hole in him.   
Late in the treatment, as Nadia was rethinking her relationship with Luis, 
a shift occurred as she began to talk more about Luis’s own personal difficulties 
and how they may have contributed to some of the problems in their 
relationship.  That is, the treatment also shifted her from perseverating on 
beating herself up for staying with him to instead considering his contributions 
to the problems in their relationship.  This went hand-in-hand with other 
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therapeutic techniques that also focused on helping her to find the “closure” to 
their relationship that she so desperately sought.   
Nadia talked about how, whenever she would try to discuss her 
accomplishments with Luis, or to in some way demonstrate her intellect, he 
would “cut [her] down.”  I commented on how perhaps Luis felt insecure about 
his own level of intellect and lack of achievements.  Similarly, at another point in 
the treatment as Nadia described Luis’s invasiveness, his tendency to stifle and 
suffocate her, to cut her off from the outside world, and to refuse to give her five 
minutes alone to collect her thoughts, she began considering that he was 
incredibly lonely and needy.  Focus began shifting to Luis’s intense fear of being 
alone; this took the focus off of her a bit.  She began talking about Luis being very 
insecure in himself and about how all of this came from his history.  She began to 
shift from beating herself up for staying with him to considering why he might 
have done some of the things he did.   
Nadia then came up with a new way of referring to Luis, a new name for 
him, so to speak:  “niño capricioso.”  Nadia told me about how her mother used to 
talk about “niños capriciosos.”  She said these were children who were impulsive, 
unpredictable, and driven by whim, but also that the term carried the 
connotation of spoiled brats, children who were in some way negatively 
impacted by their upbringing, which caused them to be so impulsive, self-
 245
centered, ignorant, or dismissive of the needs of others.  This marked a notable 
transformation in how Nadia viewed Luis, as she began considering his childish 
neediness (a sense of tremendous emptiness in him) as something like a lack or 
flaw in his development, a hole14 that he was desperately trying to fill.   
Nadia came up with a new name for Luis (and one in her mother tongue).  
What followed was that instead of focusing exclusively on his cruel jouissance 
and her masochistic sense of being unable to do anything but submit herself to 
it—a jouissance from which she felt she could not separate—she began to 
consider flaws in his upbringing and a fundamental lack within him.  I believe 
this marked an important shift from seeing him solely as a persecutor to making 
room for also seeing him as a “niño capriccioso,” which contributed to giving her 
space to separate from him and from the seemingly all-encompassing jouissance 
of the relationship against which she seemed to lack protection.  It is important to 
emphasize that this shift in her perspective still involved recognizing the severity 
and transgressive nature of many of the things he did (most notably, sexually 
assaulting her)—in fact, it somehow made it much easier for her to do so.   
Following these interventions and shifts, Nadia’s visual hallucinations 
relating to Luis no longer recurred, which was perhaps owing to the fact that she 
                                                 
14
 There is a similarity to these interventions resulting in pointing to a hole in Luis and the intervention 
about “nada en el rio,” discussed in the previous section, involving the intimation of a hole in the mother.  
Could this have to do with an effect of decompleting the Other (perhaps just the imaginary Other), showing 
that the Other is lacking in some way? 
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stopped seeing him as a persecutor from whom she could not separate.  
Fundamentally, Nadia came to separate from her position as the object of the 
Other’s jouissance. 
 
Finding “closure” and piecing together a sense of self. 
In working to help Nadia find “closure” to her relationship with Luis, the 
lack of which she had found incredibly distressing, I was essentially trying to 
help her to identify the ideas that Luis had instilled in her and then to assess 
whether those were ideas or viewpoints that she really wanted to espouse, or 
whether those were mere products of Luis (and his own thinking) in her, which 
felt to her like a kind of invasion.  For instance, Luis had essentially brainwashed 
her in several ways, such as by hitting her and then convincing her that he 
actually had not hit her and that her grasp on reality was tenuous.  In reporting 
these things to me, it seemed clear enough that that these beatings were not 
fantasies or figments of her imagination and that these events actually did occur 
in reality.   
Nadia established a goal of wanting to undo the “brainwashing” that she 
felt had occurred through Luis’s efforts to twist her perceptions.  What he did felt 
to her like an erasure of her very identity or self.  In a dream she told me, 
someone’s face kept melting off.  The dream also contained references to similar 
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phenomena in her waking life:  experiences in which an identity—hers or 
someone else’s—seemed to melt away.  In terms of technical interventions to 
help Nadia reestablish her sense of self (a self that no longer felt invaded by 
Luis), at times I pointed things out to her—ideas she discussed or comments she 
made—that sounded like they might have come from Luis and asked her where 
she got that idea or where she might have heard it (to help her begin separating 
Luis’s perspective from her own).  At other times, later in the process, she was 
able to spontaneously catch herself saying something that he used to say and 
then undo it for herself.   
For example, she described how Luis used to tell her that he could sleep 
with other women but that she could not have other sexual partners.  She was 
convinced he was right.  Nadia then came to realize that he had been 
manipulating her for his own gain, and that she herself did not believe that one 
person in a relationship should be faithful while the other was “allowed” not to 
be faithful.  This is just one example of how Nadia began to refind her own 
perspective, to begin thinking for herself again.  She described this as shifting 
from what she called “Luis thinking” to “Nadia thinking.”  Another result of this 
process was that Nadia began to report no longer using what she labeled “crutch 
words”:  elements of the way Luis used to talk about things and particular turns 
of phrase that he would often use that had slipped into her discourse (which felt 
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to her like another way he had invaded her).  Nadia began finding her own 
words, her own voice, and thus was essentially refinding pieces of herself.   
In helping to facilitate this process for Nadia, I tried to offer her more of a 
space of her own within which she could come to be.  In doing so I was 
particularly careful to avoid leaving room for her to simply remove a perspective 
she received from Luis and replace it with one from me.  The primary purpose 
behind interventions described in this section was to help Nadia begin piecing 
together, on a very fundamental level, a sense of herself. 
 
 Setting limits, establishing difference. 
 Overall, an important function of the treatment had to do with helping to 
set limits for Nadia against various jouissance invasions.  This involved not only 
helping Nadia separate from what she experienced as Luis invading her, but also 
helping her establish a sense of difference between herself and her mother; a 
form of “separation”15 thus came about through those limits/boundaries being 
established.   
For instance, one time Nadia told me that a few days before our session 
she had the sense that she was literally going to explode as she was waiting at 
the bus stop.  She said she had no idea where she went after that or how she had 
                                                 
15
 Not separation in the Lacanian sense of the term. 
 249
spent her time (more “blanks”).  Nadia said she just knew that she wound up in 
her bed the next morning but that since that time at the bus stop she had been 
plagued by an uncontrollable and incessant itchiness all over her body, from her 
scalp to her toes (with a corresponding rash in some places).  She told me that 
she had hardly gotten any sleep in the past two or three days because of it, and 
that she felt there was nothing she could do to stop it.  As she sat in front of me 
with a distressed, wincing expression on her face, she kept scratching herself all 
over her body throughout the session.  I encouraged her to tell me more about 
her recent thoughts and feelings preceding the outbreak of itchiness.  Nadia told 
me several things, including her recent thought just prior to the outbreak of 
itchiness that she had been unwittingly repeating something her mother had 
always done, in keeping a very messy home.  Hearing this I decided to test out a 
hypothesis that she might have felt a sort of conflation of herself and her mother, 
accompanied by a kind of maternal ravage,16 an embodied jouissance invasion.  I 
therefore said to her, “Nadia, even if you might have repeated some aspect of 
your mother’s behavior, that doesn’t mean that you are your mother.”  She 
immediately calmed down, stopped scratching herself, and that uncontrollable 
itchy sensation throughout her body never returned.  By naming Nadia and 
introducing difference between her and her mother, I sought to thwart what 
                                                 
16
 Something like being invaded by the mother, overtaken by her. 
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seemed to be an experience of her self draining or of being fused with the 
mother.   
Keeping this in mind, in subsequent sessions I also tried to highlight and 
name any differences between Nadia and her mother that she herself articulated 
in talking about something, or if I myself happened to notice them.  In this 
manner, my interventions were forms of naming in the wake of the failure of the 
paternal function for her—that is, attempts after the fact to establish limits and 
separation.   
 
Nursing. 
 Central to this task, and part of the trajectory of the long-term work of 
treatment, was helping Nadia to organize a life project for herself:  some sort of 
purpose or activity that could be meaningful to her and around which she could 
organize her life.  Indeed, this is crucial because, as Fink explains, “with the 
psychotic, . . . the ego is all one can work with:  the therapist must build up a 
sense of self in the psychotic that defines who the psychotic is and what his or 
her place is in the world” (Fink, 1997, p. 109).  During the course of the 
therapeutic work Nadia began to pursue a career in nursing, which may have 
been something productive to stand in for that absence of an articulated place in 
the world or explanatory metaphor.  For instance, she might see an altruistic 
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mission in trying to help others access quality health care, given the difficulties 
both she and her mother had in being taken seriously by doctors and finding 
adequate health services in their non-affluent area of the country.  Her decision 
to enter the nursing field could also take on the value of nursing herself in some 
way. 17   I’m reminded of what she reported as her earliest memory:  a description 
of pulling pieces of broken glass out of her flesh after having fallen in a garbage 
pile.  Perhaps a career in nursing could offer her a way to rid herself 
metaphorically of broken bits that invade and hurt her and take steps towards 
suturing, in all senses of the term.  In light of her comment towards the end of 
treatment that therapy felt to her like a process of sewing, this task seemed 
already to be well on its way. 
 
Treatment Results 
Constructing a life project for herself, as in pursuing a career in nursing, 
had a very organizing and stabilizing function for Nadia.  It was an essential 
piece of the overall task of building a more cohesive ego for her and, more 
broadly, building a more stable imaginary for her.  We saw, when we explored 
how given various aspects of her development she had come to develop a very 
fragile imaginary, that the work of shoring up the imaginary was necessary.  This 
                                                 
17
 Other ways of understanding “nursing” are also obvious. 
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was especially the case in that her fragile ego and imaginary were substantial 
factors in her being vulnerable to feeling overtaken and invaded, which led her 
to often turn to her cycles of drinking and writing.  The latter were thus her 
attempts at defending against the drive and establishing a barrier against the 
real.  Modifying these aspects of her ego and making her more stable thus carried 
over into modifying her patterns of drinking and writing, as well as other things.   
Over the course of the treatment, Nadia’s position in relation to her 
pattern of drinking and writing fundamentally transformed.  Although by the 
end of treatment she sometimes drank recreationally with friends, she had just a 
few drinks from time to time, which was in stark contrast to the excessive 
amounts of alcohol she would regularly take in.  Her experience of drinking was 
also completely different:  No longer did she drink and then write in an attempt 
to regulate or stave off a jouissance invasion, in an attempt to try to fill in a hole 
that she confronted.   
I would argue that this shift was accomplished in large measure through 
treatment interventions that focused on filling in holes and establishing 
mechanisms whereby Nadia was more protected from feeling sucked in, 
overtaken, and invaded.  Notable among these interventions was “It’s like your 
family.”  This construction provided a semi-Oedipal meaning and plugged up a 
hole.  This was also part of shoring up an imaginary way of seeing things, of 
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course (and thus part of the larger task of building a more stable imaginary for 
her).  This and other interventions that involved helping to install boundaries for 
Nadia and facilitating separation from and protection against figures such as 
Luis and her mother, resulted in a modification of jouissance for Nadia.  She was 
no longer in the position of the object for the Other’s jouissance.  Through the 
treatment Nadia became far less vulnerable to feeling invaded, overwhelmed, 
and overtaken—that is, to experiencing an Other jouissance.  Instead of this, and 
instead of the kind of drinking and writing patterns she had been getting so 
wrapped up in, she enjoyed in a more ordinary and far less painful way.   
It is also important to note that my interventions about her alcohol use 
were somewhat indirect.  That is, I did not directly encourage her to stop or 
reduce her drinking.  I gave her no exercises or homework assignments; I gave 
her no behavior plans.  Instead, I worked to ascertain why she was drinking, 
how the pattern of drinking and writing functioned for her, and then worked to 
modify things on that level.  I worked to help her find other ways to modify 
what she was trying to regulate through her cycles of drinking and writing, as I 
explained earlier.  Accordingly, I believe the therapy resulted in a modification of 
Nadia’s jouissance, and fundamentally did so by helping her to fill in the holes 
she was confronting and previously trying to fill in through her patterns of 
drinking and writing as attempts at defending against the drive.  Filling in those 
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holes gave her—in a way other than through drinking and writing—distance 
from jouissance and more of a barrier against overwhelming experiences of the 
real or a kind of Other jouissance. 
Nadia’s drinking decreased over the course of the treatment, but her 
binging and purging stopped completely.  She had begun binging and purging 
in response to encountering some “overwhelming feeling”18 that we can align 
with a kind of unlimited and unmediated jouissance invasion (unmediated by 
the symbolic, as she felt she could not find words for the feeling).  She turned to 
the real of the body by binging and purging in an attempt to drain off some of 
this overwhelming jouissance against which she felt she had no protection or 
barrier and to create a kind of hole or lack.   
Moreover, Nadia’s binging and purging can also be understood as 
symbolically devouring the threatening Other, or persecutor (and thus 
responding to an overwhelming experience of the drive) and then vomiting 
him/her out.  Though the accent is slightly different in that way of formulating 
her bulimia, it is still consistent with the idea that she was trying to create a hole 
or lack through her binging and purging.  This way of formulating her bulimia 
even resonates with the idea of it being a response to the Name-of-the-Father’s 
failure.  That is, her binging and purging functioned as an attempt to lose 
                                                 
18
 Another version of a “(w)hole feeling”? 
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something (somewhat analogous to the subject losing das Ding through 
castration) and thus regulate the drive—limit some Other jouissance.   
Her drive-related activity of binging and purging seemed to shift when, as 
I described, holes were made in the Other.  That is, it may have shifted as a result 
of things like the “nada en el rio” intervention, which perhaps had an impact with 
regard to imagining a kind of a void or hole in the mOther, and interventions 
involving locating a hole or lack in Luis.  Perhaps the work of treatment also 
resulted in Nadia’s drive-related position in relation to the Other’s demand being 
rendered contingent—that is, no longer seeing herself as being in a necessary and 
fixed position as the object for the Other’s jouissance, demanding that she suffer 
and be abused or raped.   
The treatment modified and set limits to the kinds of floods or invasions 
of jouissance, or overwhelming experiences of the drive, and made Nadia 
fundamentally and structurally less vulnerable to them.  Accordingly, she no 
longer needed to turn to things like binging and purging to control them.  A 
transformation within the structure of her addictions thus naturally followed 
from the work being oriented around modifying their cause. 
The transformation of the drive—including her no longer positioning 
herself as the object for the Other’s jouissance—not only impacted symptomatic 
behaviors such as these, but also carried over into an overall change in Nadia’s 
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demeanor and even her way of speaking.  For instance, towards the end of the 
treatment she became more lighthearted and would even joke around a little bit.  
Her way of joking about things implied some distance from her problems, taking 
a different position in relation to them, and not suffering from them as much.  
She also had a much freer use of language in general.  She engaged in more 
creative writing and poetry, and this writing no longer bore traces of the kind of 
distressed writing and perseverating on things as it had before.  Moreover, Nadia 
generally seemed much more alive and vibrant, not only in terms of her 
comportment and way of speaking but also in terms of her not being drawn to 
dangerous situations, and so on, whereas earlier she had been almost 
magnetically drawn to them.  That may have been attributable to her experience 
of the drive being structured in relation to the Other’s demand (prediction about 
being raped or murdered by men) and thus to her inability to separate from a 
position of the object for the Other’s jouissance. 
She also began identifying with her father a bit more, in that she saw 
herself as more reasonable like her father, and not just “crazy” like her mother, 
and as someone who, like her father, pursued goals and achieved them.  While 
she was originally distressed by her certitude that her mother not only didn’t 
want her but also hated her, by the end of treatment she changed position.  
Speaking about her mother, Nadia said: “It wasn’t about me at all.  She’s just a 
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miserable person.”  Nadia achieved some separation from her mother and made 
something of herself.  After a couple of years of treatment, Nadia developed a 
more autonomous existence, a more cohesive sense of self, and became liberated 
from her identification with “nada en el rio.”  Rather than being identified with 
nothing, she made something of herself.  
She was no longer nada en el rio.  
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Chapter 8 
ADDICTION AND PSYCHOSIS 
Working Within and Reorganizing a Delusional Structure:  The Case of the 
Woman Who Believed she was Jesus Christ 
 
Case History:  Janice 
Introduction. 
 The following is a discussion of a case of psychosis in which a clear and 
full-blown delusional structure was already operative at the outset of treatment.  
The patient, whom I will refer to as “Janice,” believed that she was Jesus Christ1 
and that she had a mission that she sought to carry out through her writing:  to 
“save all of the African-American children.”  What I will focus on is the way in 
which her alcohol addiction and writing were intertwined in her delusional 
structure and were ways in which she attempted to regulate, translate, and 
defend against jouissance.  That is, Janice felt invaded by command auditory 
hallucinations—voices telling her to hurt or kill her daughter—and, not feeling 
very capable of resisting those commands, she would drink and write as a way 
                                                 
1
 In my experience, although male psychotic patients who believe they are Jesus Christ are hardly unheard 
of, it is highly unusual to find a female who believes she is Jesus.   
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of at once fleeing into delusion and defending against the drive manifested 
through the demands of the voices.   
I believe this also exemplifies something I will discuss in more detail 
further on, which I began to introduce in Chapter 5, about the relation between 
delusion, drive, and the Other’s demand in psychosis.  I propose that 
hallucinated voices constitute a kind of demand.  The drive is always a relation 
to demand and the difference between neurosis and psychosis would seem to be 
where the demand comes from—outside or inside.   
Janice had a long history of alcohol addiction and mixed substance abuse, 
the different functions of which will be described in detail throughout this 
chapter.  Janice was a teenager when she first began experimenting with drugs 
and alcohol, which was her attempt at regulating jouissance and forming 
imaginary identifications with peers who were also using drugs and alcohol.  
Although the substance use of Janice’s teen years was both excessive and 
pervasive in her life, her most notable addiction—to alcohol—first emerged and 
spiked most seriously as a major problem when she had a psychotic break at the 
age of twenty-four.  That is, the problem was there all along but became 
exacerbated and only emerged most fully in its severity—like the process of yeast 
blooming in water—when she had a psychotic break later in life.  Janice’s alcohol 
addiction reached the peak of its severity during the year prior to her seeking 
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therapy.  She felt invaded by command hallucinations; she had a hard time 
resisting their demands that she hurt or kill her daughter; and her delusional 
structure became full-blown.   
Janice’s alcohol addiction was obviously very problematic, in that it led 
her to neglect and abandon her daughter, went hand-in-hand with her flight into 
delusion, and resulted in major damage to her body (e.g., her doctor told her that 
her liver was seriously compromised).  Nevertheless, what I hope will also 
become clear by the end of this chapter is that the patient’s alcohol addiction was 
not the main problem.  That is, her alcohol addiction was a symptom of a much 
more all-encompassing problem:  her difficulty regulating and defending against 
the drive.  This case illustrates how to have an impact on a patient’s addiction by 
working within and reorganizing the delusional structure in which it is operative 
by modifying the patient’s position in relation to the drive, the latter being 
precisely the problem.    
 
Clinical background. 
At the time of treatment, Janice, a single African-American woman, was in 
her late twenties and had a four-year-old daughter, Tamika.  She was not in a 
relationship with a man but maintained contact with her daughter’s father.  
Janice had sophomore status at a college for women and aspired to become a 
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professional writer.  Janice initially approached the counseling center at her 
women’s college for treatment, but she was instead referred to me at the clinic 
where I was working because their facility did not take on psychotic clients.  I 
worked with Janice for approximately six months, at a frequency of twice-weekly 
sessions.  Although most of us would see this as a brief course of treatment, this 
was fairly substantial for Janice, for although she had been hospitalized several 
times in the past and had been in and out of various forms of inpatient and 
outpatient treatment since she was eighteen years old, those brief stints of 
therapy never lasted for more than a mere few sessions each.   
Janice was somewhat overweight, dressed plainly and in a fairly gender-
neutral style, and went through several different pairs of eyeglasses (in a range 
of very different styles) over the course of our six months of work.  During 
sessions she would either stare off aimlessly, gazing rather blankly at a fixed 
point and not at me, or she would stare at me—even seeming to stare through 
me—with a piercing gaze.  She kept her coat on during most of our sessions that 
occurred during the colder weather months and during every session always 
kept her bag nestled right by her side as she sat on the couch.  Indications of her 
paranoia, though evident early in the therapy, became increasingly apparent as 
the sessions unfolded.   
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The “meltdown.” 
During my initial consultation with Janice, she told me that she was 
seeking therapy because she felt she was “having a meltdown.”  She reported 
that over the course of the week prior to our first meeting she had been becoming 
more and more “frazzled” and finally felt she could no longer “cope with 
anything.”  She said she was having trouble at her part-time job at a department 
store and was in danger of failing out of school, which she felt was due to the fact 
that she was neglecting her school work in favor of spending all of her free time 
working on her own writing.  She also noted that she was having trouble 
maintaining her home and taking adequate care of both herself and her 
daughter.  She said she had been feeling “extremely moody” and had been 
having indescribable “overwhelming feelings,” which often caused her to have 
difficulty concentrating and to have to excuse herself from the classroom several 
times during class periods.  She reported sporadic instances of suddenly 
becoming very “panicky,” both during the day in her home or neighborhood, 
and also when she was home alone at night with her daughter.  Janice’s 
psychotic anxieties had become very distressing for her, perhaps all the more so 
because she could not put words to those experiences and was unsure of their 
source.   
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For the week prior to the initial interview she had been getting just a 
couple of hours of sleep per night and had been drinking at least one bottle of 
hard liquor per night.  Although she had been drinking excessively for 
approximately one year prior to her first seeking treatment, her alcohol 
consumption had increased in frequency and quantity a few months prior to our 
first appointment.  It is likely that the sharp increase in her drinking coincided 
with a triggering or worsening of her psychosis (a destabilization of her already 
existing psychotic structure) and her flight into delusion.  In subsequent sections 
of this chapter I will discuss in more detail the particularities of her alcohol use 
as it related to her psychotic symptoms.  Note here, though, that it is important, 
whenever a patient reports alcohol or drug use, to listen closely for how their 
substance use is functioning.  For Janice the problem was not the alcohol use but 
rather the psychotic symptoms and intrusion of jouissance that she was trying to 
regulate through her drinking. 
During the first few sessions Janice reported having had an increase in 
what she described as “flashbacks,” but which seemed more accurately to be 
visual hallucinations.  She said she felt these so called “flashbacks” had “always 
been there” but usually became more prevalent when she was stressed.  She told 
me there was no way for her to describe the flashbacks or to communicate them 
to me.  She also displayed high levels of paranoia from the very beginning of the 
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treatment, and she spoke of having the sense that most people were “out to get 
her” or out to “teach her a lesson.”  She told me she had only one friend at 
school, Mary, and that everyone else talked about her daily.  I eventually 
deduced that Mary was either a visual hallucination or simply imagined.  Janice 
said that the other students and professors were making derogatory comments 
about race and drugs behind her back and also to her face, but that when they 
did she would “turn the other cheek.”  I understood those to be paranoid 
projections—Janice’s assumption that others were talking about her and 
criticizing her for her substance use indicated that she was the one who was 
critical of her own substance use.   
During the first few sessions with Janice I took note of the religious 
resonances of her statement that “Mary” was her only friend at school and that 
when people made fun of her she would “turn the other cheek” (as Jesus said, 
according to the Bible).  She also told me that she frequently talked with a friend 
named “Angel,” who, I surmised, might have been a hallucination.  After a few 
sessions Janice told me directly that she was Jesus reincarnated, the second 
coming of Jesus.  She added that she would not tell that to people on the street, 
because she felt that if she did, she would get locked up in a hospital.  (As I will 
explain later, this is in fact what had happened to her in the past.) 
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Nevertheless, a few days prior to the first session, Janice felt overwhelmed 
by all of this and felt she needed to take a break from her daughter, whom she 
characterized as extremely needy and a burden to her.  They both stayed at 
Janice’s parents’ house, where Janice began to accuse her mother of things like 
stealing Tamika’s underwear.  Janice told me she became enraged and accusatory 
because she was sure her mother was abusing her daughter, which Janice felt 
meant that her mother had also abused her when she was a child (though she 
was never able to explain how she came to that conclusion).  Janice also reported 
having seen a woman standing in the middle of the street in front of her 
apartment building around this time; she said the woman had blood dripping 
down the back of her neck and wasn’t wearing any pants or underwear.  While 
Janice described this woman as having been real, it seemed to me to have been a 
hallucination, particularly given the way it echoed her idea that her mother stole 
her daughter’s underwear.  It was clear that Janice was seeking treatment in the 
midst of a psychotic break. 
 
Precipitating events. 
While Janice could not pinpoint a particular aggravating event that might 
have triggered her recent “meltdown,” the break seemed to have been triggered 
by an event that occurred about a week prior to the initial interview.  Janice told 
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me that she was extremely upset when the professor of her creative writing class, 
whom she described as “a pain in the neck,” critiqued a piece of her writing and 
asked her to delete sections of it.  The professor also supposedly denigrated 
Janice for having a weak vocabulary and for writing chaotically.  Janice was 
greatly offended, as she prided herself on her writing skills.  Moreover, from a 
theoretical perspective we can see that Janice’s reaction also stemmed from the 
fact that her ego was so identified with her writing.  She became quite agitated 
and aggressive as she insisted that the professor did not “understand where [she] 
was coming from.”  
This encounter with the writing professor who asked her to delete sections 
of her writing led Janice to feel “attacked,” as she put it—an erasure of her 
writing being tantamount to an erasure of her self.  The writing professor took on 
the role of persecutor and was a castrating figure to Janice.  Here, an Other was 
making a demand on her, and perhaps also demonstrating that she herself was 
lacking (was wanting more or something else from Janice, other than what she 
had offered with her paper).  This encounter with a castrating Other (recall that 
for the psychotic, the Other is perceived as absolute) had no precedent and was a 
central feature of the triggering of her break.  Further, the cut in her writing felt 
to her like an almost literal cut to her very flesh.   
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As such, something of Janice’s experience with her writing professor was 
rejected (foreclosed) but returned in the real in the form of the hallucination of 
the woman in the street who had blood dripping down her neck and wasn’t 
wearing pants or underwear.  We might also say that the castration that was not 
operative for her in her course of development made her more susceptible to 
experiencing others as persecutors or castrating figures (as was the case with her 
writing professor).  Castration thus returned in the real in the form of 
hallucinations such as the one of the woman whose neck had been cut.  As I 
explained in Chapter 5, in psychosis castration is not operative because the 
Name-of-the-Father is foreclosed.  Lacan emphasizes that it is thus a signifier that 
is foreclosed in psychosis, and rather than castration as a symbolic function 
having been operative, through the cut of the signifier, elementary phenomena in 
psychosis often involve more concrete kinds of cuts.  That is, it is common for 
psychotics to have hallucinations bearing affinity with images of more literal or 
concrete forms of castration, such as bodies having been literally cut or mutilated 
in some way.   
Lacan links this phenomenon of hallucinations in psychosis (particularly 
hallucinations carrying castration imagery) with the mechanism of foreclosure 
and clearly differentiates it from the neurotic mechanism of repression:   
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What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression and the 
return of the repressed are just two sides of the same coin.  The repressed 
is always there, expressed in a perfectly articulate manner in symptoms 
and a host of other phenomena.  By contrast, what falls under the effect 
of Verwerfung has a completely different destiny. . . .  [W]hatever is 
refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in 
the real. (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 12-13)  
Lacan is essentially saying that the castration that did not occur (was “refused in 
the symbolic order”) for the psychotic returns in the real in the form of a 
hallucination.  Lacan goes on to further explain this point by connecting the Wolf 
Man’s childhood hallucination, related to having cut his finger with a knife, 
which left his finger hanging by a piece of skin, with the fact that symbolic 
castration had not been operative for him in his early history.  Again, castration 
having been rejected/foreclosed later generated a hallucination of a more 
concrete kind of castration, as in the Wolf Man’s hallucination of a severed 
finger.   
Janice’s hallucinated image of the woman whose neck had been cut thus 
exemplifies Lacan’s notion of the psychotic phenomenon of a hallucination being 
like an image of castration in the real, in which “what did not come to life in the 
symbolic appears in the real” (Lacan, 1956b/2006, p. 324).  Janice’s hallucinated 
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image can be read further as a conglomerate of fragments of her recent 
experiences surrounding her “meltdown”:  the hallucinated woman had no 
pants or underwear, just as Janice believed her mother to have stolen her 
daughter’s underwear and abused both her daughter and herself; and the 
woman had blood dripping from a cut on the back of her neck, calling to mind 
Janice’s comment that people were talking behind her back.  This idea or image 
of a cut on the back of one’s neck also resonates with Janice’s writing professor 
asking her to make cuts in her writing, the professor whom she referred to as “a 
pain in the neck.”  Her writing professor had become a persecutory, castrating, 
malevolent figure to her. 
I will now address some details of Janice’s history and her various 
presenting issues, and then I will turn to the course of treatment.  In doing so, a 
central issue I hope to expound upon is how one might work within and modify 
an already existing, but problematic, delusional structure so as to impact the 
drive. 
 
Early childhood:  Bubbles breaking, bees stinging. 
When I asked Janice about her childhood and her parents, she said that 
“no one ever really cared” about her, and that she often prayed for death.  Janice 
described her mother as “stuffy” and “lenient.”  She said her mother “never 
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cared” about what she did, and always let her do whatever she wanted.  (Indeed, 
formulations having to do with “not caring” came up very frequently as Janice 
spoke of her sense of how her parents felt about her.)  She said her relationship 
with her mother was “distant” and that her mother always kept her “at a 
distance on purpose.”  She felt her mother never knew how to relate to her and 
“didn’t care” to try.   
What is more, Janice said that no one ever told her stories about her birth, 
conception, or anything about whether or not she was wanted.  She did not ask 
but did feel certain that her mother neither loved nor wanted her.  “And your 
father?” I asked.  “I guess he didn’t want me either.  I never thought about it,” 
she replied.  She told me that her father was simply not around much while she 
was growing up and “never set down rules, or if he did, I didn’t bother following 
them,” she said.  We can see how these details of her upbringing and family 
constellation reflect the psychotic’s sense of not having a place within the Other’s 
desire (as was also the case for Nadia) and also the sense of castration or the law 
(or the Name-of-the-Father, and so on) never having been instated or accepted.2 
When I asked Janice for her earliest memory, she first told me that she 
could recall nothing prior to age twelve, but then she quickly reported two 
memories that were supposedly from her early childhood.  She said that when 
                                                 
2
 The question of whether psychosis results from the Name-of-the-Father never having been instated at all 
or from having been instated but not accepted by the psychotic is an interesting issue that is worthy of 
further exposition but is beyond the scope of this project. 
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she was around seven years old she was in a bathtub and heard the bath bubbles 
popping.  She said they made a “funny sound”3 that led her to become terrified, 
leap out of the tub, and begin screaming for her mother.  She said her mother 
came and told her that the bubbles were “melting” and then laughed at her.  
Janice did not describe her mother laughing with her about the bubbles; instead, 
it felt to her like she was being mocked by her mother for that.  (I will come back 
to this memory when I address more details about Janice’s “meltdown.”) 
The second memory dates back to when she was three years old.  Janice 
said she was stung by a bee while she was in her backyard picking dandelions 
for her mother.  She recalled that her mother watched this scene and said to her 
father, “I don’t know why she’s picking them, I’m allergic.”  She said her parents 
then both broke out in loud laughter.  Janice told me that this comment upset her 
in that while she was trying to show her mother that she loved her, her mother 
“made fun of [her].”  “It hurt like a mother-fucker,”4 Janice added.  Uncertain of 
whether she was referring to the bee sting, her mother’s comment, her parents’ 
laughter, or the sense of rejection, or perhaps some combination of these, I asked, 
“What hurt?”  “The bee sting,” she replied flatly.   
                                                 
3
 Indeed, as a child Janice seems to have had a high level of sensory sensitivity and a difficult time filtering 
out various sounds or sensations that would go unnoticed by most people.  This is very common in 
psychosis. 
4
 We might say that Janice experienced her mother’s mockery of her, and so on, as a kind of molestation, 
thus giving meaning to Janice’s fantasy that her mother had sexually abused her when she was a child.  
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A common element of these two memories is the idea of a surface—
bubbles or skin—being punctured, breached.  This is meaningful in terms of 
what it communicated about the status of Janice’s ego development.  For both 
Freud and Lacan the ego is a bodily ego, which implies, among other things, that 
ego formation is based on the role of the image of the body (and, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2, also the important role of language and the ratification from the Other 
in that process).  The ego is like a skin or layer encapsulating the self that both 
protects and contains and also serves as access point to the outside, receptor to 
stimuli that come from outside.  French psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu (1989) 
formulated something similar through his notion of the “skin-ego,”5 which, to 
summarize, refers to the manner in which the ego encloses the psychic apparatus 
like the skin encloses the body, the former being developed on the model of the 
latter.  For Janice—and I think we can also draw more general conclusions about 
the structure of psychosis itself—the integrity or consistency of her ego structure 
was flawed.  Janice’s description of the bee sting and the bubbles breaking spoke 
to the way in which her ego was punctured.  What should have been a layer of 
protection, the encapsulation of her self, was punctured, and had a hole in it.  
This is tantamount to the hole in the ego in psychosis.   
 
                                                 
5
 See Anzieu’s book, The Skin Ego.  
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Voices, the Other’s demand, and the drive.  
In spite of Janice’s penchant for the concrete, her comment that “it hurt 
like a mother-fucker” (when discussing the memory of the bee sting) seemed also 
to suggest that the mockery and rejection inherent in her experience of the scene 
involving the bee sting and being made fun of by her mother (and, by extension, 
her experience of much of her childhood) felt to her like a painful assault.  More 
specifically, it felt like being the object of a maternal ravage.6  Janice was 
positioned as the object of the Other’s7 jouissance:  there was the mother’s 
jouissance without paternal mediation, like a bee sting, and without phallic 
signification.  Freud taught us that early memories are incredibly telling, of 
course, and it was clear that a lot was being communicated through what Janice 
reported as her earliest memories.   
The laughter is central.  Janice experienced her mother’s laughter during 
the scene of the bath bubbles and her parents’ laughter during the scene of the 
flower picking as signs of their mockery of her.  She experienced their laughter as 
a manifestation of the jouissance of the Other.  She felt they were enjoying her 
distress, cruelly mocking her.  Further, she experienced the laughter as invasive, 
she being the object of the Other’s jouissance.  That is clearly not much of a place 
at all.   
                                                 
6
 Something like being invaded by the mother, overtaken and almost “assaulted” by her. 
7
 We should keep in mind that Janice’s parents both laughed.   
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Janice’s position as object also relates to her auditory hallucinations in that 
they are, I am suggesting, a version of the demand of the Other.  Further, her 
hallucinations positioned her as the object of the Other’s jouissance, against 
which she felt she had little protection.  An auditory hallucination is a kind of 
speech directed at the subject—like the Other’s demand in neurosis coming by 
way of the subject’s interpretation of the speech from the Other—but as coming 
from a different place, a different register.  This relates to the point I raised at the 
beginning of this chapter, that drive is always a relation to demand, and that the 
difference between neurosis and psychosis is whether the demand comes from 
outside or inside.  For what Janice believed she heard was still the Other’s voice, 
though it was a voice “in the real” through the hallucination rather than an 
actual voice of a fellow human being.   
On the one hand she heard command auditory hallucinations, a voice 
enjoining her to do certain things.  But she also imagined that people were 
talking about her and laughing at her.  She imagined that her peers at school 
were laughing at her and mocking her, like her parents, her mother in particular.  
Her parents’ laughter during her childhood carried a libidinal charge, a 
traumatic excess of jouissance, which could not be assimilated or integrated, like 
an unregulated invasion of jouissance.  The Other’s jouissance then plagued her 
by way of hallucinations, or voices in the real, the auditory hallucinations that 
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invaded her and carried within them the same kind of unregulated experience of 
the drive.   
More specifically, Janice’s command hallucinations told her to hurt or kill 
her daughter.  These voices conveyed a demand made by the Other, a demand 
that she make a sacrifice of her daughter.  Can we see that as a form of castration 
in the real, by way of the auditory hallucination?  Janice perceived the voices to 
be making demands of her, demanding that she essentially sacrifice her 
daughter.  Is this not a sacrifice of the source of her jouissance to the Other?  This 
illustrates the psychotic phenomenon of some aspect of castration being 
foreclosed but returning in the real.   
Is it possible to also understand Janice’s auditory hallucinations 
specifically with regard to Lacan’s partial drives—oral, anal, scopic, and 
invocatory?  Although I am suggesting that Janice generally experienced 
invasions of jouissance, like forms of an Other jouissance not delimited by 
castration, or unregulated drives, it is possible to also discuss the invocatory 
drive as a way in which that general experience of an invasion of jouissance 
sometimes manifested itself by way of the voice as object.   That is, I believe one 
way to understand Lacan’s work on the invocatory drive, and the voice as object 
of the drive, is in terms of the auditory hallucinations of psychotics.  A 
distinction between the register of demand and desire also suggests itself here as 
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it is connected to the distinction between psychosis and neurosis regarding the 
drive.  That is, whereas the voice might be situated as object cause of desire in 
neurosis, the role of the voice in psychosis is very different and as in the case of 
Janice can be situated on the level of demand.  Neurotic subjects, who are 
“subjects of castration,” would not be susceptible to voices8 in the real such as the 
auditory hallucinations of psychosis.  Undergoing castration or not undergoing 
castration determines one’s position in relation to desire and drive.  Lacan’s 
addition of the voice and gaze as objects, added to Freud’s list of the oral and 
anal objects of the drive, are particularly relevant to considerations of the role of 
the drive in psychosis—for the level of psychotic phenomena such as auditory 
hallucinations (voice) and the paranoia of being watched (gaze). 
Additionally, just as Janice’s mother’s supposed aggression against her 
could not be assimilated by Janice, so too was her own aggression towards her 
daughter not assimilated by her.  In this manner, the voices Janice heard also 
spoke that which she could not—that which was unthinkable to her.  Janice 
imagined her mother to be a persecutor and took her place in the fantasy 
structure, just as her own daughter took her place as the child who falls victim to 
a maternal ravage.   
                                                 
8
 This is not to say that neurotics do not or cannot hear voices.  However, those are more akin to the voice 
of conscience or, even more basically, thoughts or wish fulfillments.  The crucial diagnostic difference is 
that psychotic patients say that they do not know where the voices are coming from, they view them as 
coming from outside (not from within), and they have a sense of certainty about them, that they are real.   
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Janice was unable to filter and regulate the traumatic excess of jouissance 
that was inherent in the overdetermined nature of the voices. Janice experienced 
a lack of control over unregulated drives—she felt invaded by the command 
hallucinations and felt a minimal ability to resist their demand that she commit 
violent acts.  She turned to alcohol and writing as attempts to regulate the excess 
of jouissance and defend against the command hallucinations.  Her flight into 
delusion and addiction was an attempt at forming defenses against the drive.  
The stakes of this were very high, as her drinking was a last ditch attempt to 
avoid submitting to the commands to hurt or kill her daughter.  For several 
months she drank excessively in an attempt to drown out the voices, and to 
either drink and then work on her writing or simply drink so much that she 
would pass out—immobilize herself, paralyze herself into a state of being unable 
to act in accordance with the voice’s commands.  Both were ways in which she 
attempted to block out the voices.   
There was a crucial switch from Janice feeling herself to be victim of the 
voices, or the “imposed words” (paroles imposées),9 as Lacan describes the 
auditory hallucinations of psychosis, to choosing to write and to give expression 
to her own words.  These attempts also fundamentally involved her then giving 
                                                 
9
 Lacan refers to “imposed words” in his discussion of James Joyce and his writing in Seminar XXII.  
Lacan also takes up the issue of imposed words in “A Lacanian Psychosis:  Interview by Jacques Lacan” in 
How Lacan’s Ideas are Used in Clinical Practice. The latter is a fascinating text and a very rare gem given 
the almost complete absence of clinical cases or references by Lacan.  
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voice to her own desire not to destroy but rather save children, as she explained 
that her mission through her writing was to save African-American children.   
Another way in which Janice often responded to hearing the command 
hallucinations to hurt her daughter was to try to stave them off and not act on 
the commands—by either leaving the house completely, so as to ensure that she 
could not hurt Tamika, or by going into Tamika’s bedroom and waking her from 
her sleep.  Janice described needing to see Tamika and fundamentally needing to 
hear her speak, so as to remind herself that she was a living being.   
Perhaps we can also consider the role of the oral drive in Janice’s 
hallucinations and the circuits she got caught up in with them as described.  That 
is, she experienced something that felt like being devoured or invaded by the 
hallucinations and the corresponding feelings (overwhelmed, agitated, “charged 
up,” and feeling “not in control of anything—who I am, what I think, or what I 
do”), and feared that she then would devour and destroy her daughter.  Her 
writing and drinking were ways in which she tried to put a stop to that.  Recall 
also that Janice essentially felt devoured or overtaken by the Other’s jouissance 
manifested in her parents’ laughter.   
In the following sections I will examine ways in which in recent years 
Janice had been engaging in attempts to translate jouissance and also to find or 
make a place for herself, to give herself a name.  The effect of the signifier and 
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castration is to empty the body of jouissance, exteriorize jouissance, and give 
hierarchy and organization to the drives.  In psychosis, however, this does not 
occur.  We can see this in how for Janice she had not acceded to a position 
separated from the Other’s jouissance, which had not been drained off; instead, 
she experienced herself as being the object of the Other’s jouissance, and being 
fixed in that position. 
 
Making Herself:  Sex, Drugs, and a New Name 
 
 The Name-of-the-Father as a first name.   
According to Lacan, within the field of the Other, there is one signifier, the 
Name-of-the-Father, that has a privileged function.  The Name-of-the-Father is a 
signifier that one takes from the Other and that comes to organize and regulate 
one’s place in the Other.  The Name-of-the-Father thus both gives and names 
one’s place in the Other.  As I reviewed in Chapters 2 and 5, if the Name-of-the-
Father is missing, the signification of the subject is also missing, and the absence 
of phallic signification results from the failure of the paternal metaphor in 
psychosis.  In the absence of the Name-of-the-Father, the psychotic subject often 
attempts to find or make a name for him- or herself.  Lacan’s (1975-1976/2005) 
famous example of this was James Joyce, who made a name for himself through 
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his writing and thus managed to avoid a psychotic break for the entirety of his 
life.  Let us now turn to how Janice engaged in several different attempts to give 
herself a place and to find a name for herself.   
 
 Renaming herself. 
 As Janice felt she had not been wanted by her parents, and had no place 
within their desire, she was from the start rejected or cast out by the Other.  
Phallic signification was lacking.  Rather than becoming a being of desire, her 
position was more like an object.  Ironically, her given name even had something 
to do with a cut of meat.  When she was a teenager, though, she decided to adopt 
a different, more common name and has gone by that name ever since.  This 
renaming of herself coincided with her trying to become more like everyone else, 
or in her own words, “to be one of the girls.”  This overlapped with attempts to 
form imaginary identifications.  Her adoption of a more common name, a 
gendered name, also marked a shift away from her given name’s lack of gender 
association.   
Overall, Janice described her teen years as a time when she didn’t know 
who she was and engaged in attempts to “make herself,” as she put it.  She did 
this primarily by experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, experimentation 
which she believed had an enigmatic “purpose” for her that she felt she could 
 281
not articulate10 but believed held great importance.  There was almost a sacred 
quality to these attempts as she described them.  We can see them as attempts to 
find a place for herself and to regulate the drive.   
 
Imaginary identifications. 
Janice reported that when she was a teenager, especially between 
seventeen and eighteen years old, she “had no direction in life” and engaged in 
significant alcohol and drug abuse.  She said she smoked “tons” of marijuana 
daily and also drank heavily (hard liquor and/or beer) almost every day.  She 
said her parents had not been encouraging her to go on to college after 
graduating, and she felt that meant they “didn’t care” about her and gave her 
authorization to “do anything.”  In the absence of her parents expressing a desire 
for her to pursue college, and so on, she turned to self-destructive practices in 
which she supposedly was attempting to give herself a name or designation and 
“make herself.”  She nevertheless often came quite close to destroying herself.   
During the alcohol and drug abuse of those teen years, Janice sometimes 
engaged in substance use with a group of peers.  This constituted an attempt at 
an imaginary identification with the group.  She attempted to identify with peers 
who were supposedly like her:  a group of semblables, imaginary others that she 
                                                 
10
 In this regard, it was more than ordinary teenage rebelliousness and attempts to “find oneself.” 
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attempted to take as similar to her so that her ego would then be equated with 
theirs.  Her drug and alcohol use during her teenage years thus functioned as an 
attempt at forming an imaginary stabilization by way of an “imitation” of 
neurosis.  Nevertheless, these identifications were not sturdy enough and so this 
attempt at “making” herself ultimately did not succeed.   
Janice’s substance abuse continued in its severity but became less regular 
as time went on.  In her early twenties, for instance, she would sometimes engage 
in binge drinking alone when she wanted to “knock [her]self out” to get to sleep 
or when she simply “didn’t know what else to do with [her]self.”  She very often 
drank heavily before sitting down to write for several hours at a time, which she 
still sometimes did during the early portion of the therapy.  She told me that she 
felt she had something to communicate through her writing.  She felt her 
drinking was an attempt at facilitating that—at bringing out the words she 
struggled to find—and perhaps an attempt to symbolize some real.  We might 
understand that struggle as an attempt to find “the good word,” the exact words 
to symbolize something.  Her substance abuse continued during the early 
portion of her pregnancy with Tamika, which led to some pregnancy and birth 
complications.   
Janice also supposedly attempted to “make herself” (supposedly by 
making various attempts to find an identity for herself) by experimenting with a 
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myriad of sexual activities with different men.  Janice asserted that her parents 
never talked to her about sex, which she feels is why she “went crazy ballistic” 
with sex when she could.  She had her first sexual experience at the age of 
seventeen with someone she met at her high school.  Towards the end of high 
school, Janice dated another man, Lamar, on and off.  She said they rarely did 
anything other than drink, smoke marijuana, and have sex.  She said that Lamar 
“used [her]” for sex and money and then left her.  She said she was so drunk and 
high she “didn’t know what [she] thought of him.”  After her relationship with 
Lamar, she experimented sexually with quite a few other men, which she said 
usually happened while she was so drunk and high that she “didn’t even know 
their names.”  She then began a relationship with another man, Tyrone, whom 
she met when she was trying to purchase drugs; she quickly became pregnant 
with Tamika.  Although Tyrone remained in her life to some extent after she 
became pregnant with their child, their relationship supposedly ended when 
Janice found out he had lied to her and had been dealing drugs behind her back 
after he had promised not to do so.  She took that as an unforgivable betrayal.   
One way to understand Janice’s sexual experimentation is in terms of 
imaginary identifications.  That is, she might have been trying to identify with 
the things that within her community at the time were associated with what was 
run of the mill or “normal.”  She might have engaged in experimentation with 
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drugs, alcohol, and sex, in an attempt to be like others of her age and gender.  
However, she took these behaviors to an extreme, which could have been linked 
to her sense of not being present or fully in her own body during sexual 
encounters, and linked to the fact that these behaviors functioned for her as an  
attempt to organize unregulated drives.  The extremity of these behaviors for her 
suggest that their function went beyond that of most people (that is, they were 
not on a neurotic level, and not typical teenage behavior) and related to her 
psychotic structure and searching for a way to organize jouissance and reckon 
with the real.   
 The common denominator in these attempts to “make herself” seemed to 
be a repeated attempt to fundamentally find a place for herself, one outside of 
the Other’s jouissance: an attempt to give order to unregulated drives, to engage 
in an enigmatic “purpose,” and to find a name for herself.  Janice was attempting 
to do this, but her attempts at imaginary identifications and “making herself” did 
not fully take hold.  She then turned to a more radical attempt to find a place for 
herself, through the formation of a delusional structure. We might speculate that 
if her previous attempts had resulted in making a name for herself, she might 
never have developed a delusional structure at all.   
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The formation of the delusional structure:  in the name of the Father. 
The initial attempts during Janice’s late teenage years to “make herself” 
were drastically unhinged by a series of events that occurred when she was 
twenty-four years old.  Within less than one year, just after Janice gave birth to 
Tamika, Janice’s aunt and uncle died within three months of each other.  She 
then lost her job after accusing her co-workers of devising a plot to kill her, and 
had to go on welfare because of the ensuing financial difficulties.  Giving birth to 
Tamika seemed to have left Janice uncertain of her ability to occupy a maternal 
role.  Indeed, she once remarked that when Tamika was born, she simply “didn’t 
know what to do with it.”  She thus saw her baby as an object (an “it”) rather 
than a human being, and she didn’t know how to relate to her child.   
The death of Janice’s aunt and uncle also had quite an impact on her as 
they had been her closest relatives.  While she was growing up they had 
occupied a prominent role in her life and she told me that she had aspired to 
become like them.  When they both died suddenly, the imaginary-level support 
they had provided was shattered.  Losing her job also unmoored Janice, of 
course, and imaginary supports of her sense of self or any semblance of her 
having a place in the world became completely unglued, and she became quite 
unstable.  It was at this point that Janice’s delusional structure, in which she 
believed herself to be the reincarnation of Jesus Christ, took shape.   
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During the course of that year, Janice was involuntarily committed three 
times.  She said that she was hospitalized the first time because she was “being 
crazy”—she never told me specifically what had happened—and that she was 
hospitalized the second time, right around Christmastime, because she had 
become aggressive with her family and had threatened to kill herself or them.  
The third involuntary commitment took place one night just shortly after 
Christmas.  She drove her car up onto the church lawn and then crashed her car 
into the front of the church.  She said the police found her screaming in front of 
the church and breaking the church windows.  Janice told me that at first she had 
been running up and down the street in front of the church, shouting about how 
she was Jesus and wanted to “save” everyone.  She said she wanted to go speak 
with the pastor because no one believed her.  She said she first tried knocking on 
the doors and windows of the church, but when no one answered even though 
she thought she saw a light on somewhere in the church, she decided that the 
pastor was “tricking [her], hiding,” and refusing to answer, and she felt everyone 
must have been “out to get [her],” which was why she screamed and broke the 
windows.  Janice also noted that she had been feeling quite overwhelmed at the 
time and had not slept at all for four days straight.   
As all of her imaginary supports had shattered, she needed to find a new 
way to try to give herself a place and find a name for herself.  We can see how 
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through the development of her delusional system she aspired to a new name:  
Jesus Christ.  Through her delusional system, Janice identified as Jesus and 
viewed herself as the phallus of humanity, ready to “save” the children, the 
future generation.  Her identification as Jesus Christ allowed her to say that she 
had parents, and gave her a place within a system that for her had a defect, as 
she had had no place in the Other.  This identification as Jesus Christ was a way 
of naming herself and designating herself in relation to a Father, giving herself a 
very privileged place, indeed.  
 
The “mission.” 
Janice explained to me that around the same time when she had figured 
out that she was the second coming of Christ and that she was “chosen” by God, 
she also came to the conclusion that she had a “mission,” which she believed she 
was to carry out through her writing.  She told me that she wanted to write in all 
genres, but particularly African-American literature for children, to give them 
hope that there’s “something on the other side.”  She said she was “disgusted” 
by what she perceived to be the African-American community’s drug culture 
and lack of ambition.  Note that this was a distinct shift in attitude, from her 
earlier attempts to form imaginary identifications by emulating her peers’ drug 
and alcohol use and sexual experimentation.  Now she could no longer form 
 288
these imaginary identifications, and she saw herself as radically outside of her 
community—now her attitude was one of supposed superiority to them, and 
being “disgusted” with them.  Accordingly, with the advent of her “mission,” 
Janice hoped that by publishing her writing she could “save” the children on the 
street who didn’t believe in a future.  Janice said that although she was “always a 
writer,” she felt “blessed” knowing that God had chosen to use her writing as a 
vessel through which she could “save the children.”   
She said she often spent many hours (about nine or more) per night 
writing, a process she described as “frenzied” and “very exciting.”  Janice 
described her writing as a “chaotic mess of stuff” in her head and noted that she 
was in the process of writing several different things:  a fiction novel, a non-
fiction book, poetry, and several short stories for children.  Remarkably enough, 
although she had been working on the non-fiction book, her primary writing 
project, for a number of years already by the time the therapy started, often 
practically non-stop for several days at a time, she had produced a total of only 
twenty-four pages of writing. 
I believe we can begin making sense of this remarkable detail by 
considering the structural function Janice’s writing and delusional system served 
for her.  To review:  Janice had no place within her parents’ desire.  That is, she 
believed she was neither wanted nor loved, and in her report her parents never 
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told her that they wanted or expected anything of her:  they “didn’t care.”  The 
absence of a cohesive sense of self and place within her parents’ desire 
contributed, for instance, to Janice engaging in heavy substance abuse and sexual 
activity during her teen years, when her parents did not encourage her to take 
her studies seriously and go on to college.  Later on, she had attempted to cobble 
together a sense of self through her delusional system.  By believing that she was 
Jesus Christ and had a mission to “save” people through her writing, she 
attempted to forge for herself a prosthetic ego or sense of self through a 
delusional system in which she could exist and could have a place in a world of 
meaning.  Indeed, she could imagine not only having a place within a paternal 
lineage—having a place in the Other—but also being in a place of privilege as 
descended from God the Father.  Her writing, similar to the substance abuse and 
sexual experimentation that marked her teen years, was a way of responding to a 
fault or hole.   
In other words, Janice’s delusion as well as her writing project or 
“mission” (and these were clearly intertwined) had the function of a sinthome.  
Recall that for Lacan a sinthome is “something that allows the symbolic, the 
imaginary, and the real, to hold together” (Lacan, 1975-1976/2005, Class of 
February 17, 1976).  In psychosis, the Name-of-the-Father is lacking or not 
operative, which can result in the symbolic, imaginary, and real not being 
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securely knotted or held together.  In neurosis the three orders are knotted 
together by way of the Oedipus complex or imposition of the paternal metaphor.  
Lacan formulates how a sinthome such as a delusional structure, writing project, 
and so on, can come to bind the three orders together in the absence of the 
Name-of-the-Father, thus replacing it in its function.  The sinthome is thus 
something like a fourth ring that comes to organize the other three and keep 
them together.  This can be depicted accordingly:   
Figure V: 
 
 
Lacan refers to this as a Borromean knot, in which he depicts how each subject’s 
psychic reality takes shape according to their particular organization of the 
imaginary, symbolic and real, or the three rings in the knot.   
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In the case of James Joyce, Lacan posits that Joyce’s writing is his sinthome, 
and I believe this is similar to the function Janice’s writing had for her.  Lacan 
suggests that although for Joyce there might have been an absence of the 
imposition of the Name-of-the-Father during his childhood, Joyce’s writing 
became a fourth ring that kept him from ever experiencing a psychotic break, or 
an unraveling of the knot.  Joyce’s writing—perhaps like Janice’s delusion and 
writing mission—served to make up for what was lacking on the level of the 
Name-of-the-Father.  As Lacan put it, “it was by wanting a name for himself 
[through his writing] that Joyce compensated for the paternal lack” (Lacan, 1975-
1976/2005, Class of February 17, 1976).  The name that Joyce created for himself 
through his writing filled in for the absence of the Name-of-the-Father.  This 
highlights the sinthome’s function of “filling-in-for (suppléance) the Name-of-the-
Father” (Lacan, 1974-1975, p. 44).  Joyce’s writing gave him both a name and a 
place, and was a way of creating a paternity.  For instance, in A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, Joyce wrote:  “I go to encounter for the millionth time the 
reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated 
conscience of my race. . . .  Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in 
good stead” (Joyce, 1916/1964, p. 253).  Joyce’s writing was a prosthetic ego.  In 
fact, Lacan suggests that Joyce’s writing became constitutive of, and coextensive 
with, his ego.  Even more than this, another important function Joyce’s writing 
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had for him was that through it he used language to organize jouissance.  This is 
most evident in Finnegan’s Wake.  As I remarked earlier, I believe much of Janice’s 
own writing had a similar function of translating jouissance for her.   
There are certainly similarities between the function Joyce’s writing had 
for him and the function Janice’s writing had for her.  However, whereas Joyce’s 
writing seems to have prevented him from ever having a psychotic break, Janice 
had already experienced a psychotic break.  Her writing was part of the 
delusional system that was her way of attempting to repair the break, and it was 
her way of cobbling together a sense of self and establishing a place for herself in 
the world through her mission.  Both Joyce’s and Janice’s writing functioned as 
prosthetic egos or sinthomes through which both attempted to make a name for 
themselves and organize and translate jouissance.  
 Nevertheless, Janice got stuck at twenty-four pages.  Numbers can have a 
lot of meaning, perhaps more so in psychosis.  Let us recall that Janice had a 
psychotic break when she was twenty-four years old.  We might say that when 
she had just given birth to Tamika, her aunt and uncle died, and she lost her job 
and had to go on welfare, a fundamental hole11 was exposed.  The things that had 
been in any way holding her together fell apart and her sense of self thus seemed 
to unravel.  Being unable to produce more than twenty-four pages of her non-
                                                 
11
 Or perhaps multiple holes.  Psychotic patients in the midst of a break often present as though things 
continue to unravel at multiple locations, due to the emergence of several holes.   
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fiction, autobiographical writing project seems to relate to an inability to 
symbolize a self beyond the dissolution of her already fragile sense of self which 
took place during her break when she was twenty-four years old.   
Janice’s delusional system gave her a name, but not a very suitable one in 
that the name of Jesus Christ is too difficult to live up to.  Janice’s writing, as her 
“mission,” can be considered somewhat better for the reason just noted as well as 
for the fact that her writing is not just imaginary; it also exists on the level of the 
symbolic.  Since it was her “mission,” it gave her a place in the Other.  It was also 
symbolic by virtue of the fact that it involved her attempt to use language and to 
give symbolic expression to feelings, experiences, and thoughts.  Nevertheless, it 
was not sufficient, as I will explain in the next section when I turn to reviewing 
aspects of the course of treatment.   
Furthermore, Janice’s writing had a very important function for her in that 
it was an attempt to translate the jouissance of others.  Her writing, much of it 
autobiographical or in some way stemming from her own experiences or 
situations she encountered with others around her, was a way of symbolizing 
what was happening to her and around her, giving symbolic form to it and thus 
giving herself some distance from it.  Given Janice’s position as object of the 
Other’s jouissance, this was particularly important.   
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As we can see, Janice’s writing and delusional structure more broadly had 
a function.  They served as a way of trying to respond to the original hole left in 
the absence of the Name of the Father, and to give herself a place and a name.  
Nevertheless, these attempts were problematic for a number of reasons—as 
evidenced by the fact that what precipitated the “meltdown” that led Janice to 
seek therapy was her writing professor’s critique of her writing.  Janice derived a 
sense of ego cohesion by believing that she was Jesus and that her mission was to 
save the children by publishing her writing, and yet submitting her writing to an 
Other who might judge the writing made her vulnerable to delusions of 
persecution.  It was clear to me that something had to be done in order to 
attempt to remold those structures, to help Janice find something more livable.  
 
Course of Treatment 
One of the first things that I felt was important in my work with Janice 
was to take her delusions and hallucinations seriously, from the very beginning 
of the treatment, and to consider them inherently meaningful.  For instance, 
when she spoke of her friends “Mary” and “Angel” I simply accepted and 
worked with what she said to me, even though it seemed clear that these figures 
were either hallucinations or mere objects of imaginative reverie.  In general, I 
did not attempt to pierce the delusional structure in any way.  Even though the 
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delusional structure was problematic, it was still keeping her together, albeit in a 
rather tenuous fashion.  As Freud pointed out, the formation of the delusional 
structure is an attempt on the part of the psychotic patient at a solution.  
Accordingly, the delusion is not what is most pathological or ill, as many non-
analytic clinicians seem to think, but is rather an attempt at repairing it.  Indeed, 
as Janice’s delusional structure shifted over the course of the therapy, she 
gradually didn’t speak about Mary or Angel at all, as though they were no longer 
necessary. 
 Instead of piercing or calling the delusional structure into question, I 
slowly attempted to find ways to modify it—to make it into something not only 
more stable or functional, but also more livable for Janice.  For instance, since 
encountering people who might critique her writing felt like an assault (recall her 
hallucination of the woman with blood dripping from a cut on her neck) I felt I 
had to move her away from trying to publish her writing and yet still preserve 
something of the project itself.  I felt that was important because her writing was 
already serving as a kind of second skin for her, a continuation of her very sense 
of self and a suppletion (suppléance) of her ego identity, or sinthome, as I 
explained in Chapter 5.  As her writing was interlaced with the delusional 
structure that was holding her together, albeit precariously, it was like a 
protective layer that encapsulated her, perhaps something along the lines of a 
 296
bubble.  When she had her “meltdown” after she encountered the criticism of her 
writing professor, she experienced an invasion, like having her skin stung by a 
bee or like having a bubble that had been encasing her self, melt away.   
 Within the treatment I took a position that involved supporting much of 
Janice’s writing.  I did so knowing that much of her writing was an attempt by 
her—an attempted solution found by her—to symbolize and translate jouissance.  
Her writing was thus her attempt to form some separation from the Other’s 
jouissance.  It was also what she often turned to after she would drink alcohol in 
response to hearing the voices commanding her to hurt or kill her daughter 
(alcohol and writing being media through which she tried to shut out the voices 
and instead give voice to her own desire to save the children).  Accordingly, her 
writing had very important functions for her; however, this was not without 
problems, as I outlined previously.   
 In light of all of those issues, I maneuvered so as to encourage Janice to 
begin seeing her writing project as something that could be private, rather than 
something she absolutely had to publish in order to carry out her “mission.”  For 
instance, since critique by a judging Other felt to her like an “assault,” I was 
careful to emphasize that the writing was fundamentally hers—that she created it 
and that no one could take it away from her.  Whenever she spoke of her writing 
I was careful to emphasize that—for instance, by repeatedly using and 
 297
emphasizing the wording “your writing” when I spoke to her about it.  In fact, I 
never actually saw any of her writing, and instead encouraged her to tell me 
about it, if she wished to do so.  She never offered to bring in her writing, and I 
chose not to ask her to do so.  I did that so as to avoid the possibility that I might 
become positioned as a persecuting Other who might be perceived as judging 
Janice’s writing, like her writing professor.   
When Janice escalated and became enraged as she spoke of her writing 
professor just “not getting it” and not understanding “where [she] was coming 
from,” I tried to reduce her sense of being persecuted by showing a bit of 
empathy for how she felt, and at times by gently suggesting that feeling 
misunderstood was also a common human experience.  For instance, I asked her 
whether she could imagine that any of the other students in the writing class had 
ever felt somewhat misunderstood after someone else read their writing.  She 
was able to consider these sorts of ideas as I gradually and softly introduced 
them after enough of a rapport had been built between us, and her levels of 
paranoia and aggression in turn gradually began to be reduced.  These types of 
interventions were also designed to begin to insert her more effectively into a 
social structure in which she could imagine occupying a position other than 
being “the only one,” an exception or some sort of sole victim of a persecutory 
Other who was “out to get” her.  We might say that these sorts of interventions 
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also facilitated the building of imaginary identifications wherein she might begin 
to see herself as more like her peers at her women’s college, perhaps as “just one 
of the girls.”12   
 I attempted to dislodge Janice from her perceived position as victim of 
constant persecution by intervening in ways that aimed at defusing some of her 
paranoia.  For instance, early in the treatment Janice described repeatedly laying 
awake at night for hours upon hours in distress hearing what she described as a 
banging or knocking sound, which she believed was someone trying to break 
into her apartment and “come to get” her.  After a careful assessment of the 
situation, it seemed more likely that she was hearing something else, like a tree 
branch being rustled by the wind and repeatedly tapping against her window, 
and that she was instead mistaking it through the lens of her paranoid fantasy 
about someone being out to get her.  Suggesting that there might be other 
possible explanations for what she was hearing—suggesting that it might be a 
tree branch tapping her window or the side of her building was one such 
comment I made to her—slowly helped to defuse some of her paranoia.  
Similarly, there was a time later in the treatment when Janice became enraged 
that several people in her life had been calling her repeatedly.  She began 
attributing malevolent intentions to them and seeing them as persecuting her 
                                                 
12
 She had already been attempting, on her own, to form imaginary identifications and supports during her 
teenage years, when she was trying to be like “one of the girls,” as I described previously. 
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with their repeated calls.  I pointed out to Janice that she had suddenly cut off 
contact with several relatives and friends and that they might simply have been 
calling out of concern for her well being, not knowing what to make of her 
suddenly breaking off contact with them.  These interventions were designed to 
call into question the paranoid meanings she was attributing to several events in 
her life and to shake up her fixed belief that others were always persecutors.  
This gradually led to rendering aspects of her paranoid beliefs more contingent 
and generally far less fixed.  
Throughout the course of therapy I also attempted to shift Janice’s 
conviction that her writing mission entailed her having to “save” all of African-
American children.  I accomplished this partly by encouraging her to discuss 
issues that might have been driving that project, such as her own wish that 
someone could have “saved” her as a child, and then by opening up the 
possibility that she might reorient her writing “mission” so that she could use it 
instead to “save” her own daughter.  That is, we talked about how Janice had 
lamented (quite angrily) that her mother “never cared” about her, how her 
parents never expressed a desire for her to pursue her studies and go on to 
college after high school, and so on.  We also worked with the idea that she 
might have wished that if she herself had had parents who had “cared,” she 
wouldn’t have felt so abandoned and then, later, compelled to try to “make 
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[her]self”—for instance, during her teen years through experimentation with 
wild sex, drugs, renaming herself, and so on.  We worked with the notion that 
Janice now had a chance to be a mother who could “care” for her own daughter, 
Tamika, as she wished her own mother could have cared for her.   
Part of this work of transforming Janice’s delusion entailed working to 
modify her position as the object of the Other‘s jouissance.  As I described earlier 
in this chapter, Janice’s auditory hallucinations were enjoining her to hurt or kill 
her daughter.  She experienced this as a demand of a maleficent Other for her to 
sacrifice her daughter.  I intervened to create a division between thought and 
action by emphasizing to Janice that having thoughts about hurting her daughter 
would not result in her being hospitalized or incarcerated, but that taking action 
on those thoughts would.  This helped to dispel Janice’s fear that telling me 
about the voices might result in her being put in a hospital or jail.  Such 
interventions created an important distinction between thought and action—a 
distinction that had not been particularly clear to her—and also established a 
firm limit and supported the law.13  Janice seemed calmed by such interventions.  
Emphasizing to Janice that the thoughts and the voices were important things to 
be talked about in the therapy also helped to open up a space for her to talk 
                                                 
13
 Interventions that support the law, with all of the meanings inherent in doing so, are often very important 
to make with psychotic patients.   
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about them, to give them symbolic expression, with the aim that doing so would 
make their enactment less likely.14   
Another aspect of working to separate Janice from a position as object of 
the jouissance of the Other involved reorganizing particular signifiers that were 
laden with meaning from her childhood and connected to her more recent 
struggles.  This was done with the aim of draining off some of the toxic 
jouissance and creating a different space for her, a space outside of the jouissance 
of the Other.  For instance, when Janice described her recent experiences of 
feeling persecuted and mocked, I said, “Your hurt is something to be taken 
seriously; it stings and it’s nothing to laugh at.”  This was to help her consider 
the possibility that, in contrast to having felt mocked and “laughed at” by her 
parents during the childhood scene of picking flowers and being stung by a bee, 
she could instead experience things differently now, and that perhaps others 
might not be malevolent.  Similarly, when Janice spoke of times when she would 
hear the voices and leave the house so as to ensure that she would not hurt 
Tamika, I commented, “You drink and write to keep yourself at a distance from 
your daughter; you love her and take care to not hurt her.”  And then, “Let’s 
work on helping you to keep yourself at a distance from the voices.”  These 
                                                 
14
 A significant amount of safety planning, risk assessment, and contracting for safety were also key 
features of handling these issues within the therapy.   
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interventions were grounded in and reorganized the persecuting signifiers, to 
create a space for Janice to occupy a different position.   
This move of helping Janice find a place outside the jouissance of the 
Other went hand in hand with fundamentally modifying her delusional 
structure and mission.  First, we discussed how Janice might think of her writing, 
particularly the stories for children, as something she could pass on to Tamika, to 
help teach her values and to help her learn to deal with the struggles she might 
encounter—that might accompany growing up in their rather impoverished and 
unsafe neighborhood, and so on.  By finding meaning in that particular way of 
using her project, and in seeing an opportunity to not repeat her own upbringing 
in her rearing of her own child, she could become more able to find meaning in 
taking on those goals as new uses of her project—a new way of being in the 
world and having a more ordinary, though still very meaningful, purpose.  This 
transformation of her delusional structure involved a shift from “all”—seeing it 
as her mission to save all of the children—to “not all”—not all of the children, 
necessarily, but perhaps just her own child.  This was also a shift from the 
delusion and her mission being the sole focus of her existence to there being 
room for other things, and it not taking over and becoming all that there was for 
her—another form of shift to a “not all.”  In this manner there was a 
decompletion of the delusion and a shift within the fantasy such that she could 
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take a different position within it.  This also resulted in a transformation on the 
level of jouissance, which I will explore further in the following section.   
 
Treatment Results 
Indeed, as Janice began to see “caring” for her daughter as an important 
project, significant changes started taking place.  Whereas Janice had been 
avoiding and essentially abandoning Tamika—for instance, when she came 
home from school she would lock herself in her bedroom and read or write, 
while leaving Tamika to watch TV and be responsible for her own meals (Janice 
had claimed that when Tamika became hungry, she assumed she would just 
make herself a peanut butter sandwich—this resulted, unfortunately, in four-
year-old Tamika becoming undernourished)—now she took pride in being more 
responsible, spending more time with Tamika, preparing three square meals for 
her, and even signing them up to take an art class together.   
As the therapy progressed and Janice became more willing to “care” for 
Tamika, as the nature of her delusion and mission had fundamentally shifted, the 
auditory hallucinations also receded and she was no longer plagued by thoughts 
of hurting or killing her daughter, as they were encapsulated in the command 
hallucinations.  Rather than viewing Tamika as an extension of herself, perhaps 
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by conflating Tamika with herself as a child, a child who had wished for death15 
and who felt like a victim of a maternal ravage, Tamika became more of a 
separate being to her, and someone she could care for, as she herself had not 
been cared for by her mother.   
Another important change that came about by the end of the therapy was 
that Janice’s alcohol use subsided significantly and her drug use stopped 
completely.  In light of Eric Laurent’s assertion that a “drug incarnates a function 
connected either to desire or to delusion, according to the subject’s structure” 
(Laurent, 1996, p. 132), we can understand that the modification of Janice’s 
delusional structure led to a corresponding modification of the nature and 
function of her substance use.  The delusion and the substance use were 
intertwined, as I explained earlier in this chapter.  Janice had been using alcohol 
and writing as media through which she attempted to translate and regulate 
jouissance—to defend against the drive, and her feeling unable to reign in the 
drive, as it was manifested most particularly through the command 
hallucinations to kill her daughter.  By the end of treatment, Janice’s auditory 
hallucinations had ceased.  Accordingly, when her position as the object of the 
Other’s jouissance shifted, and she no longer felt constantly invaded and 
persecuted, so too did her alcohol use shift.  She drank in moderation 
                                                 
15
 Her own death, Janice told me, but we might also speculate about death wishes towards her parents.   
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recreationally and no longer in excess as an attempt to defend against the drive 
and retreat into delusion, the latter having been rendered no longer necessary 
given the modification on the level of the drive.  The addiction shifted because its 
cause was modified.   
Janice’s shift from being a “savior” to all African-American children to 
instead becoming someone who could find meaning in the project of “caring” for 
her own daughter offered her a new way of organizing her identity and life 
project, or way of finding a meaningful place for herself in the world.  From a 
delusional structure in which she imagined herself to be Jesus Christ and a 
“savior” to a less dangerous and more ordinary project of being a woman who 
could “care” for her daughter—that seemed to be the trajectory of the therapeutic 
work.   
Interestingly, this marked a transformation of her position in relation to 
the Other’s demand and was a shift from a full-blown delusion to something 
more similar to a neurotic fantasy.  Janice did not “become neurotic,” which 
would not have been possible given the permanence of Lacan’s structural 
diagnoses.  However, there was a shift from delusion, which is itself the 
psychotic’s attempt to reestablish a relation to the world, to something closer to a 
stabilized psychosis which was somewhat imitative of aspects of neurosis and 
the neurotic’s (fantasmatic rather than delusional) way of relating to the world.  I 
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believe untriggered or stabilized psychosis can be thought of as a way in which 
the psychotic gets through life by way of an imaginary identification with or 
“imitation” of neurosis.  
Janice’s decision to discontinue the treatment coincided with her decision, 
which she proudly discussed with me, to invest more of her time and money in 
her daughter—she and her daughter enrolled in an art class together, she 
enrolled Tamika in a dance class, and Janice herself enrolled in a parenting class.  
She made this decision around the time when I was preparing to leave the clinic, 
which she was aware of.  I do not know how much of a factor the latter was in 
her decision to discontinue treatment.  Although I gently encouraged her to 
consider continuing her therapy with another clinician after I left, she reiterated 
her interest in instead investing more of her time and energy into her daughter.  I 
chose not to push the issue any further.  My sense was that although Janice had 
achieved an adequate level of stability, ongoing work would have helped her to 
achieve a greater and perhaps more enduring level of stability and to manage the 
stressors of life.  The treatment of psychotics is often a very lengthy, ongoing 
process.  Regardless, Janice chose to focus on her daughter, which could have 
been a very constructive new project for her.   
Janice came to occupy a more ordinary place, and simultaneously one that 
was not only less painful but also fundamentally more her own.  That was the 
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last step in her process of “making” herself, accomplished within the therapeutic 
work. 
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Chapter 9 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The Project as a Whole 
 
My hope in undertaking this project was to accomplish two tasks:  1) to 
contribute to the advancement of Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S., and 2) 
to contribute to the improvement of the clinical treatment of addictions.   
I reviewed in my first chapter the fact that there is a disappointing paucity 
of Lacanian clinical scholarship in the U.S.  The primary consequence of this is 
that most American clinicians are not particularly aware of the clinical utility of 
Lacanian theory.  In the U.S., Lacan’s work is more likely to be read within 
literature or film studies programs than psychology departments or 
psychoanalytic institutes.  In fact, in most clinical training programs Lacan is not 
even on the radar.  I consider this to be a very unfortunate state of affairs, in that 
I believe Lacan’s work is not only innovative, compelling, and intellectually 
stimulating, it is also extremely useful.   
Through this project, I set out to explore how a clinical approach guided 
by Lacanian theory might be useful with regard to one specific clinical problem:  
the treatment of addictions.  The field was ripe for exploration, since the 
predominant treatment modalities currently being used to treat addictions—
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primarily CBT and 12-Step programs—seem not to be terribly effective.  That is 
evidenced by the shockingly high relapse rates for addictions:  over 75% (Armor, 
Polich, & Stambul, 1978; Hunt, Barnett, & Branch, 1971; Svanum & McAdoo, 
1989).  Since addictions involve drive-related circuits of repetition and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis aims to facilitate for subjects transformations on the level of the 
drive, an exploration of the potential utility of a Lacanian approach to the 
treatment of addictions seemed promising. 
I approached this project with a simple hypothesis—that each subject 
experiences his or her addiction uniquely.  What logically followed from that 
idea was that the treatment of addictions should also be tailored to each 
individual subject and the particularity of his or her addiction.  I sought to 
explore that through a Lacanian lens, theoretically and clinically, by examining 
differences in how addictions show themselves and function depending on the 
subject’s structural diagnosis—neurosis, perversion, psychosis—as well as how 
each individual subject’s experience of the drive comes to be shaped by 
particular events and circumstances in his or her development.   
In an effort to bridge the gap between theory and practice, I paired 
theoretical exegesis with the presentation of detailed clinical case studies to 
explore how it might be possible, by utilizing a Lacanian approach, to impact the 
drive roots of an addiction.  This project is the first of its kind, in that a Lacanian 
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psychoanalytic approach to the clinical treatment of addictions has not yet been 
written.   
  
Findings 
 I believe this project demonstrates that addictions do indeed show 
themselves very differently depending on the subject’s structural diagnosis and 
the particular ways in which the subject’s experience of the drive is shaped by 
how he or she is Oedipalized, undergoes castration, and enters language.  I 
described how the subject’s experience of the drive follows from how the subject 
positions him or herself with respect to the Other’s demand.  I hope I have also 
demonstrated, through the case studies, the treatment efficacy of a Lacanian 
approach that takes into account these differences.   
For instance, I believe both my theoretical exegesis and the case studies 
demonstrate that a neurotic addict is very different from a psychotic addict.   
In neurosis, the result of the subject undergoing castration is that some 
enjoyment is retroactively determined to have been lost.  The subject then 
engages in drive-related attempts to recover some hypothetically lost jouissance.  
Also, the neurotic subject mistakes the Other’s demand for the Other’s desire and 
lives out the drive according to the position he or she takes with regard to the 
Other’s demand—for instance, by fulfilling it, refusing to satisfy it, or being 
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generally fixated on it such that there is little room for one’s own space of desire.  
After all, desire is the Other’s desire.   
 In the cases of Buck and Phil—two obsessional neurotic addicts—I 
highlighted that their addictions related to how they underwent castration, or 
experienced a kind of loss of jouissance, and to their stances with respect to their 
perception of the Other’s demand.   
Buck seemed to lament the loss of a kind of “golden age.”  He described 
the loss of a time when the family enjoyed all of the spoils of wealth, privilege, 
and social class—when they were mixed with the upper crust of the British 
elite—and memories of a lost enjoyment associated with his early relationship 
with his mother.  Buck’s “oral” addictions functioned as manifestations of his 
drive to recover some jouissance associated with his mother, as I described.  
Those included what he described as attempts to find satisfaction by putting 
myriad objects into his mouth, from soda to paperclips.  He engaged in repeated 
attempts to find some object that might fully satisfy him and fill his lack, and the 
failure to achieve that saturation of lack frustrated and angered him.  The 
metonymic displacement of those objects was attributable to the fact that no 
object can eradicate lack, though addicts sometimes seem to believe that there 
could be an object that might allow them to overcome castration.   
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Buck’s “anal” drive patterns related to his position in relation to the 
Other’s demand.  That is, he imagined that the Other (his father) was demanding 
his academic success—that Buck make good use of his education, work hard, and 
earn good grades.  Buck experienced a great deal of jouissance in pushing his 
father to become angry and yell at him.  He staunchly refused to satisfy his 
father’s demand and withheld what his father was demanding, by sabotaging his 
education and risking flunking out of school.  In so doing, Buck also maintained 
desire as impossible, and in this way too his addictions were intertwined in his 
obsessional neurotic structure.  I described how the treatment, though I believe it 
ended prematurely, involved beginning to bring into focus the drive roots of his 
addiction by attending to manifestations of the unconscious (such as slips of the 
tongue) and punctuating signifiers connected with the circuits of his drives. 
Just as many of Buck’s addictions related to what he imagined to be some 
lost jouissance associated with his early relationship with his mother, so too did 
Phil’s addiction—to marijuana—relate to his relationship with his own mother.  
That is, he imagined a kind of primal fusion with his mother through his 
smoking which took on a lethal value in that his interpretation of his mOther’s 
demand was something like “fuse with me, suffocate, and die.”   
Throughout the presentation of Phil’s case in Chapter 4, “The Color of 
Emptiness: Re-enacting the Paternal Metaphor,” I emphasized technical 
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interventions that were designed to impact the real by way of the symbolic.  I 
described how Lacanian techniques such as scansion and attending to and 
working with what he refers to as the signifier’s “literating structure” can have 
an impact on and transform the drive roots of a symptom such as an addiction.  
By the end of treatment, Phil’s drug use changed, which I described as a 
transformation from “mamajuana”—experiences of smoking that felt limitless, 
anxiety-inducing, and suffocating, and seemed to operate beyond the pleasure 
principle—to ordinary marijuana—experiences of pleasure in occasional 
smoking that had a beginning and an end and did not cause anxiety or suffering.  
Phil himself affirmed that he experienced substantial changes—by the end of 
treatment he experienced far less mental and physical suffering overall and felt 
he was able to “breathe again.”    
After exploring neurosis and addiction through the cases of Buck and 
Phil, I presented the case of Gary, a structurally perverse subject, in Chapter 5.  
Gary had a history of drug and alcohol addiction which then shifted to a kind of 
addiction to shoplifting.  Fitting within the dynamics of perversion, Gary’s 
shoplifting and other criminal activities functioned as attempts to enact 
castration and bring the Other into existence, and to metaphorically (and 
sometimes literally) get himself beaten.  The therapeutic work targeted 
difficulties on the level of his perverse structure itself.  That work included 
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helping him to dialectize his identification with the master signifier “Thief”—to 
mobilize it, loosen its fixity, and make room for other aspects of his identity or 
sense of self to emerge or to be created by him.  That shift away from his thief 
identity was accompanied by a sharp decrease in his behaviors that involved 
being a criminal and a thief and also marked a shift within the structure of his 
addictions.   
I then considered how, from a Lacanian perspective, addiction functions 
very differently in psychosis.  I presented my own formulations of the drive in 
psychosis and the relation between addiction and the drive in psychosis.  As far 
as I am aware, this has not been done before.   
Whereas in neurosis the instating of the paternal function or Name-of-the-
Father results in a loss of jouissance and an organization of the drives—oriented 
and organized according to the mechanism of repression and the process of 
entering language—in psychosis the paternal function fails to be instated, which 
has consequences with regard to the psychotic’s experience of the drives.  That is, 
since psychotics do not undergo castration—some loss or delimiting of 
jouissance—they experience an unregulated drive, do not have sufficient 
distance from or defense against the drive, and are more prone to experiencing 
an overwhelming or invasion of the drive.  I also hypothesized that the relation 
between the drive and the demand of the Other could be theorized with regard 
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to psychosis.  I argued that hallucinations can usefully be thought of as 
manifestations of the Other’s demand in a different register.  Moreover, 
psychotics have little ability to separate from being positioned as the object for 
the Other’s jouissance.  Having presented my theoretical formulations of those 
ideas I then discussed my thoughts about how psychotics sometimes retreat into 
a delusional world and/or turn to drugs, alcohol, and other forms of addictions 
in an attempt to engage in a kind of self-regulation or defense against the drive. 
I illustrated this point in Chapter 7, “A (W)hole Feeling:  Filling in and 
Creating Holes to Modify the Drive,” through the presentation of a case study 
about Nadia, a psychotic young woman whose drive-related behaviors included 
cutting, bulimia, and drinking and writing.  Not having undergone castration, 
Nadia developed a psychotic structure which resulted in her being prone to 
experiencing unregulated drives and invasions of jouissance against which she 
had no defense.  Her addictions were attempts at forming defenses against such 
experiences of the drive.  I argued that she attempted to delimit or make cuts in 
jouissance through her bulimia and cutting herself.  Those were ways in which 
she attempted to make cuts or holes in jouissance.  At other times she confronted 
holes of different sorts (such as a question for which she could find no answer), 
which felt overwhelming, anxiety-inducing, and all-encompassing.  She turned 
to drinking and writing as attempts to plug up those holes, to guard herself or 
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form a protection against the real and against unregulated drives which went 
hand-in-hand with her difficulty separating from her position as the object for 
the Other’s jouissance.   
In reflecting on treatment results, I described the efficacy of interventions 
that were designed to help Nadia find means, other than her addictions, by 
which she might establish forms of protection or defense against the drive.  I 
described how her drinking reduced—she had only a few drinks here and there 
when she was out with friends—and also was completely different in kind:  she 
no longer drank and wrote as ways of trying to regulate a jouissance invasion or 
fill or defend against a hole she faced.  Moreover, by the end of treatment 
Nadia’s moods and demeanor brightened, and her writing was more creative 
and no longer distressed and perseverative.  She had a much freer use of 
language overall, and her cutting and bulimia stopped completely.  My 
contention is that these improvements suggest that a transformation was 
accomplished on the level of the drive.  Treatment interventions were designed 
to fill in holes and establish defenses for Nadia against her experience of the 
drive such that by the end of treatment she was much less prone to feeling 
sucked in, overtaken, and invaded.  She had more of a barrier against the real.   
In Chapter 8, “Working Within and Reorganizing a Delusional Structure:  
The Case of the Woman who Believed she was Jesus Christ,” I presented the case 
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of Janice, a psychotic addict whose alcohol addiction and writing were 
intertwined in her delusional structure.  I argued that her patterns of drinking 
and writing were her attempts to modulate, translate, and defend against 
jouissance.  Janice’s experience of the drive also involved her feeling invaded by 
command auditory hallucinations which told her to hurt or kill her daughter.  I 
formulated those command hallucinations as forms of the Other’s demand in 
psychosis.  As she felt little ability to regulate and defend against her experience 
of the drive, and as she felt so invaded by the voices and fixed in her position as 
victim of persecution, she turned to drinking and writing as attempts to defend 
against the drive and stop herself from acting in accord with the commands that 
she commit violent acts.   
I believe the trajectory of the therapeutic work took Janice from a full-
blown delusional structure in which she believed she was Jesus Christ and had a 
“mission” to save all of the African-American children to something that was 
instead much closer to a neurotic fantasy, though she did not “become” a 
neurotic.  That is, she developed an ordinary life project of caring for her 
daughter as she herself had not been cared for by her parents.  I hypothesized 
that the treatment successes followed from the work of shifting the structure of 
her delusion and mission, helping her to separate from a position of the object of 
the Other’s jouissance, and helping her to form ways of defending against the 
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drive other than through her drinking and writing.  By the end of treatment she 
began taking care of her daughter, her auditory hallucinations ceased, she let go 
of her delusion, her drug use stopped completely, and she drank only 
recreationally—more moderately and no longer in response to feeling invaded 
by command hallucinations against which she felt she had little protection.  
Janice’s addiction shifted as a result of working on the level of her psychotic 
structure itself.   
In all of the cases, I treated the addictions “indirectly.”  That is, I did not 
target the addictions “directly”—for instance, by trying to make the patients 
simply stop a behavior by way of behavior plans or by accepting that they were 
somehow powerless against their addiction. 1  Instead, I viewed each patient’s 
addiction as a sort of symptom within a larger structure.  I considered the 
addictions to be problems of the drive which manifested in very different ways 
depending on the subject’s diagnostic structure and the particularity of his or her 
history and events of development.  By working on a much more structural level 
and aiming to modify the cause of the addictions, a good deal of success resulted 
from impacting the drive roots of the addictions and thus transforming them.   
 
 
                                                 
1
 A veritable cornerstone of 12-Step treatment. 
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The Project’s Holes: Limitations of the Study 
Upon reflecting on my project at this stage of its completion, I have a 
mixed sense of being satisfied and also somewhat frustrated.  That is, although I 
was able to articulate many ideas, many things went unsaid.  This is not only a 
practical reality which is attributable to constraints upon writing time and other 
factors; it also speaks to a truth of the human condition—that being a subject of 
language means that something will always remain, something will always resist 
signification.  The symbolic is not whole, not complete.  As Lacan reminds us, it 
is impossible to “say it all.”  In spite of the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis—
to “say everything”—complete expression through language is impossible.  The 
symbolic comes up against the real and there is a fundamental structural 
resistance that renders complete expression through language an impossibility.  
This is perhaps particularly relevant when the task involves speaking of the 
drive, which itself encircles a point of emptiness and is a concept that 
encompasses both the symbolic and the real.   
 Beyond this fundamental truth about the structural limitations inherent in 
language, many things were left out of this project due to deliberate choices that I 
made.  Insofar as protecting the confidentiality of my patients was my top 
priority, many interesting and important details about each case had to be left 
out completely.  Similarly, in writing up the cases many alternate readings of 
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certain moments of the treatment or other details of the therapeutic work 
occurred to me but have not been fully elaborated in this project.  I tried to keep 
the role of the drive in addictions as my central focus, and I shaped my case 
studies in light of that focus.  Nevertheless, illuminating some things results 
simultaneously in a shadow being cast over others.   
Moreover, what I have presented through the case studies is my own 
reading of each case—my own formulation of the case, the course of therapy, and 
what worked or didn’t work.  Other readers or even the patients themselves 
might interpret things very differently.  I share Lacan’s appreciation that Freud’s 
case studies leave the work of the dig in place so that other readings can become 
possible.  That is the case by virtue of the fact that the courses of therapy are 
presented in great detail and with many direct quotes that tell the reader what 
was actually said by the patient and by the analyst.  My hope is that in 
presenting detailed case studies—and not aiming to fully reduce the details to 
any one “conclusive” reading—I have presented a respectful account of the 
treatments that does not aim to act as a “master discourse” in which only one 
reading is possible or is upheld as the only “correct” account.  I believe this is 
consistent with an aspect Lacan’s own presentation style:  “given the way I think 
that I have to approach problems, you always have the possibility of what is said 
being open to revision” (Lacan, 1955-1956/1993, p. 164).   
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Other limitations of this project were inevitably attributable to my own 
limitations as a scholar and as a clinician.  Additionally, in the absence of long-
term follow-up studies, I have no way of knowing whether and to what extent 
the changes the patients may have experienced by the end of treatment proved to 
be enduring.  I can only hope that they did.   
 Some would argue that in focusing on a specifically Lacanian formulation 
of and approach to the treatment of addictions, I have limited my study by 
excluding other perspectives, other brands of clinical and theoretical approaches.  
In response, I would argue that my project is a substantial contribution and its 
value stands on its own.  My project was to present something that has never 
before been done:  a sustained exploration, through theoretical exegesis and the 
presentation of clinical case studies, of a Lacanian approach to the treatment of 
addictions.  I make no claims to be all things to all people.  Nevertheless, my 
hope is that this project will appeal to a broad audience—of Lacanians and non-
Lacanians alike—because it bears on the shared focus of our work:  clinical 
practice, which at its most basic level involves listening to the speech of suffering 
subjects and trying, by listening and speaking with them, to relieve some of their 
suffering.   
 The clinical work that I did with my patients was something I would refer 
to as Lacanian analytic psychotherapy.  The constraints of the clinic where I was 
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working, in addition to the patients’ limitations regarding time and money, were 
such factors that inevitably affect the frame of treatment.  Nevertheless, in many 
of the cases the session frequency was greater than weekly (e.g., I conducted 
twice-weekly sessions with Gary, and I sometimes met with Nadia four or five 
times per week).  I raise this issue of what label to use because I anticipate that 
some readers might wonder to what degree the interventions I discuss in this 
project apply to analytic intensive psychotherapy or psychoanalysis proper.  
There is, of course, significant debate in the field today about what distinguishes 
analytic intensive psychotherapy from psychoanalysis.  This is a major question, 
but not one that relates to the efficacy of the interventions I described throughout 
this project.  I believe that the interventions I discussed could be implemented 
within analysis or analytic psychotherapy, not to mention any range of other 
approaches.  For example, those who practice the recently popular approach of 
“Motivational Enhancement” therapy for addicts might find it quite useful to 
think about the ways in which a patient’s drive satisfaction keeps his or her 
addiction in repetition and goes directly against any motivation of the ego.  I 
believe that many aspects of the theory of addictions as well as the interventions 
I described in this project can be implemented within and improve the efficacy of 
any range of other, non-Lacanian, clinical approaches. 
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Other readers might argue that my project is overly complicated.  To 
many, the practice of Lacanian psychoanalysis is considered inherently 
complicated.  Rather than devoting such intense focus to being attuned to 
complex networks of desire and layers of signifying overdetermination, many 
clinicians would prefer instead to practice according to approaches that can be 
seen as a bit less complicated.  Furthermore, there is no manual for Lacanian 
work—no simple recipe or set of techniques that would supposedly work all of 
the time for everyone:   
Indeed, such a manualized approach would be impossible in Lacanian 
work, in that the psyche to be cured is regarded as a subject-effect caused 
by the interplay of signifiers in the unconscious, a process that dissolves 
its supposed ego-like solidity, and, in a word, de-substantializes it.  
Therefore, the Lacanian [approach to clinical work] requires a complex 
conceptual battery, which may be discouraging for those who expect 
comfortable technical recipes.  (Rabinovich, 2003, p. 208) 
In spite of these potential limitations (of my study or Lacanian work in 
general), Lacanian psychoanalysis may well be the turtle amidst the hares of 
contemporary psychoanalytic approaches.  Indeed, as Lacanian psychoanalysis 
has grown steadily over the past few decades in places like South America and 
parts of Europe, the number of people doing classical psychoanalytic training of 
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other stripes has decreased (Kirsner, 2000).  For those who take to the approach 
as clinicians, and for those who derive significant benefits from it as patients, the 
limitations around it and the effort that it demands seem well worth it. 
 
Implications for Further Research 
Although I explained previously my sense of the inherent value of a 
specifically Lacanian clinical study of addictions, I am aware that there could 
have been ways to put my work into dialogue with other approaches.  As I wrote 
this project, several such points of potential—and potentially important—
dialogue occurred to me but were not included in this project because of my 
effort to maintain its primary focus.  What I will present below is one such 
attempt to put Lacan into dialogue with other addictions treatment approaches, 
by examining one particular treatment issue and differences in how Lacanian 
and other approaches conceptualize treatment decisions about patients’ drug 
use. 
 
Debates about whether or not to require that patients abstain from drug 
use during treatment.   
In Chapter 4, I discussed why I didn’t agree to directly ask Phil to stop 
smoking or even make that a precondition of the treatment.  I would like to take 
 325
this as an opportunity to discuss, on a more general plane, issues to be 
considered in making treatment decisions about patients’ drug use in cases of 
addiction.  That is important not only because of how such decisions impact the 
treatment, but also because, with addicted subjects, beginning the treatment can 
in and of itself be one of the biggest challenges.  
There are certainly analysts who, as a matter of course, insist that patients 
who present with substance abuse issues stop using drugs or alcohol first—often 
with the generic recommendation that they participate in a 12-Step program or 
behaviorally-oriented treatment in order to accomplish that—before the patient 
would be accepted into analysis.  Moreover, a wide variety of clinicians (not just 
analysts) approach things in that manner:  sending the patient to AA meetings or 
the like rather than thinking of the addiction as something that could be worked 
on within the therapeutic process itself.  That practice—referring a patient to 
something like a 12-Step program rather than working on his or her addiction 
within the therapy itself—has somehow become very commonplace, but I think 
it is important to call it into question and examine it more thoroughly.2     
Indeed, many analysts opine that no analytic work can happen until the 
patient is clean—meaning not only that they would not accept the patient into 
                                                 
2
 It is probable that 12-Step models are generally considered to be “the” treatment approach for addictions 
because other approaches have not yet been adequately researched and demonstrated to be effective or 
“empirically validated.”  People probably gravitate towards 12-Step treatments largely because of their 
hype, so to speak, without giving much serious thought to the value of other treatment modalities.   
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analysis until the patient is clean, but also, in many cases, that they think the 
patient would not be able to “do the analytic work” anyway until he or she stops 
using.  As is true of any treatment decision, the question of whether or not to 
require that a patient abstain should be carefully thought out within the context 
of each individual case and not be based on a general rule that automatically gets 
applied to every case.  Decisions about this issue should take into account many 
factors, including but by no means limited to the particularities of what is going 
on with the patient, the effects of the patient’s drug use, how much danger3 the 
patient is putting him- or herself in, and how much damage the patient is doing 
to him- or herself or to others.   
It is also important to consider how much jouissance the patient 
experiences through his or her substance use—that is, how much space remains 
within the patient’s psychic economy to invest in (cathect) the analytic process 
and thus essentially give up some of the jouissance attached to the drug use.  The 
patient transferring at least some of his or her investment from the drug use over 
to the analysis itself4 implies a kind of trade, not a simple renunciation of 
something with no return benefit.  That is, the patient can instead derive a 
                                                 
3
 Depending on the circumstances, acquiring drugs can, in and of itself, be dangerous (crime, tainted 
needles, drugs laced with something else, dealing with people whose judgment and self-control might be 
impaired due to their drug use, etc.). 
4
 There is, of course, always a risk that the patient might become, loosely speaking, “addicted” to the 
analysis itself—that is, reenacting the dynamics of their addiction not with the drug as their object but with 
the analysis as their new object!   
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different kind of satisfaction from the analytic process itself:  a kind of 
satisfaction that can be obtained through the work of decoding the unconscious 
and exploring its various manifestations, through the process of putting things 
into words, and through the transferential relationship with the analyst.  This is 
based on the assumption that the analyst has brought his or her desire to bear—
that is, has conveyed to the patient and brought to bear on the treatment what 
Lacan refers to as “the analyst’s desire.”  That is a desire for, above all else, the 
work of analysis to occur.  Lacan emphasizes that the analyst must continuously 
demonstrate to the patient that he or she is interested in all manifestations of the 
unconscious—every slip of the tongue, dream, bungled action, and so on—and 
fundamentally wants the patient to continue with the analytic work.  Lacan 
underscores how crucial the analyst’s desire is by giving it a central place in the 
treatment:  “It is ultimately the analyst’s desire that operates in psychoanalysis” 
(Lacan, 1964/2006, p. 724).  The bringing to bear of the analyst’s desire is 
therefore crucial not only in cases of addictions but also in any case, regardless of 
the presenting issues, in that the jouissance of the symptom—be it an addiction 
or something else—is not likely to be easily given up, and certainly not 
automatically!   
There certainly could be situations in which the patient’s fixation on the 
drug is extremely strong, such that, if the patient has been unreceptive to the 
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analyst’s initial interventions oriented towards engaging the patient in the work 
of analysis, there might be good reasons for prioritizing, as an initial task, the 
patient’s cessation or reduction of his or her drug use.5  That is, in such situations 
the patient’s engagement in the analytic work might be more easily facilitated if 
some space is first opened up by the patient finding a way, by whatever means, 
to stop or reduce his or her drug use.  That could involve referring the patient to 
someone else to do that work first or simply making that a primary focus of the 
early stages of the analysis.  It is possible that in some cases a patient’s drug use 
fundamentally and obdurately blocks access to something, thus functioning as a 
strong form of  resistance that needs to be modified in order to clear a space 
within which work can occur.  Indeed, drug use can sometimes involve the 
annihilation of speech, thought, and access to feelings.  That is not necessarily 
limited to addictions, however, and patients in general often come in for 
treatment experiencing difficulty accessing their thoughts and feelings, and 
difficulty putting a whole host of things into words.  Resistance is to be expected, 
and it can be worked with.   
Nevertheless, if the approach taken by the clinician is to set an initial goal 
that the patient reduce or terminate his or her drug use, the clinician should 
strongly emphasize to the patient that this is not the end of the work—not the 
                                                 
5
 Note that I am not suggesting that this be assessed according to some vague measure of relative “severity” 
of an addiction, whatever that might mean, but rather according to its level of fixity and intractability—not 
budging in spite of the clinician’s efforts and interventions.   
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end but, more likely than not, the beginning.  That is, the clinician should convey 
and explain to the patient what I argued previously:  that a simple separation 
from the drug does not resolve an addiction and does not necessarily change the 
overall structure of the addiction.  The clinician might then take that as an 
opportunity to express a strong desire—the analyst’s desire—for the patient to 
then engage in the deeper work of analysis, if that is in fact what the clinician 
believes would be helpful and productive for the patient.   
Treatment decisions relating to the patient’s drug use should therefore be 
made thoughtfully and carefully.  Other factors in these decisions take into 
account not only the patient and his or her drug use but also the clinician him- or 
herself.  For example, issues to be considered are:  the clinician’s own level of 
training, the particular brand of training to which he or she was exposed,6 the 
clinician’s level of comfort and experience in working with addicted subjects, his 
or her way of understanding addictions and how to work with them, and the 
clinician’s overall biases and presuppositions.  Many of those can be categorized 
as “countertransference.”  Indeed, Lacan broadly defines countertransference as 
“the sum total of the analyst’s biases, passions, and difficulties, or even of his 
inadequate information, at any given moment in the dialectical process” (Lacan, 
                                                 
6
 Many graduate psychology training programs and even psychoanalytic institutes teach that 12-Step 
approaches are the only ones suitable for the treatment of addictions.   
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1952/2006).  The clinician’s level of self-awareness and ability to self-reflect are 
thus important factors in the decision-making process.   
For example, deciding to refer patients out so that they can work on their 
addiction prior to engaging in therapy or analysis, or even prioritizing that 
within the treatment itself to the exclusion of examining other issues, as though 
the addiction were so strong as to preclude the examination of anything else, 
could, in some situations, reflect the clinician’s own feelings of impotence in the 
face of an addiction.  Addictions can seem fiercely intractable to some, which can 
lead to David and Goliath fantasies.  Regardless, clinicians must also recognize 
their own limits and keep in mind the patient’s best interests.  These are, of 
course, issues that should be considered in any treatment.   
I have been presenting various reasons why a clinician might decide that a 
patient must get clean before he or she is accepted into therapy or analysis—by 
the clinician referring the patient elsewhere or by making sobriety the first goal 
to be worked on within the treatment.  Now I would like to address the other 
side of the argument and present some reasons against stipulating that the 
patient must get clean before entering therapy or analysis.  This is not meant to 
be an exhaustive list.   
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1)  It is sometimes simply unrealistic to expect that a patient would be 
willing—let alone able—to stop using his or her drug of choice prior to engaging 
in substantive treatment.   
a. First, I will address the question of the addicted subject’s “ability” to get 
clean prior to engaging in substantive treatment.  I say substantive, thus 
revealing perhaps a bias of my own, because, based on what I have seen, 12-Step 
programs often seem not to facilitate much rigorous or “deep”7 work.  It seems 
likely that this can leave the patient very vulnerable to relapse—that is, if the 
treatment is successful in the first place.  That is a very big “if,” in that the relapse 
rate for addictions exceeds 75% across treatment modalities studied, which tend 
to be mainly CBT and 12-Step programs (Armor, Polich, & Stambul, 1978; Hunt, 
Barnett, & Branch, 1971; Svanum & McAdoo, 1989).   
b.  As for the question of the patient’s supposed “willingness” to give up 
his or her drug prior to engaging in therapy or analysis, we must keep in mind 
Freud’s point—which Lacan also endorses—that individuals both complain 
about and cling to their symptoms.  Early on, Freud was surprised by the 
“resistance of the neurotics to the removal of their symptoms” (Freud, 1916-
1917/1963, p. 292).  Eventually he was able to formulate that people derive a kind 
                                                 
7
 The term “deep” is problematic, given Lacan’s effort to steer away from Freud’s archaeological 
metaphors of the unconscious, but I use it here colloquially to refer essentially to something substantial, 
rigorous, and thorough—something that gets at the heart of the symptom or addiction and operates on that 
level. 
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of satisfaction from their symptoms—“secondary gain” or “substitute 
satisfaction” (Freud, 1916-1917/1963)—which makes them far less willing or able 
to give up their symptoms!  Lacan also suggests that people are reluctant to give 
up their symptoms because, on some level, they are enjoying their symptoms.  
For Lacan, the symptom “in its nature is jouissance” (Lacan, 1962-1963, Class of 
January 23, 1963).   
2)  Patients do not always see their drug use as problematic.  Requiring 
that the patient reduce or eliminate his or her drug use might therefore sound 
absurd to him or her, perhaps leading such a patient to drop out of treatment 
entirely. 
3)  Analysis is not surgery.  Symptoms—including addictions—cannot be 
simply isolated and removed.  It is generally necessary, during the therapeutic 
process, for the patient to delve into a variety of topics and areas of his or her life 
before things begin to shift or get worked through, including the relinquishing of 
symptoms.   
4)  Asking patients, as a condition of therapy, to stop the problem for 
which they are seeking help—if they are entering treatment to work on their 
addiction precisely because they have not been able to fix it on their own—is 
paradoxical, to say the least.   
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5) Underlying decisions to refer patients to 12-Step or other programs to 
get clean before accepting them into analysis is often an assumption that analysis 
itself cannot help addicted subjects with their addictions8—that is, that analysis is 
not an “appropriate” treatment for addictions.  It should be clear by now that 
this entire dissertation aims to refute that notion! 
6)  Other assumptions underlying a notion that analysis is not for addicted 
subjects are that analysis is a kind of ivory tower of treatments and that addicts 
are mere “junkies,” the bottom of the barrel, and not worthy of a treatment that is 
supposedly for wealthy people who are not suffering all that much.  I believe 
that is a myth.  Lacan, referring to neurotics, even notes that:  “They have a 
difficult life and we try to alleviate their discomfort” (Lacan, 1976, p. 15).   
7)  Hastily removing an addiction that is functioning as a sinthome for a 
psychotic patient can result in the triggering of a break.  
8)  Neither Freud nor Lacan ever suggested, to the best of my knowledge, 
that analysis is an inappropriate treatment for addicted subjects.  Lacan implored 
analysts to not shy away from working with psychotics.  I take Lacan to mean 
that most clinicians will inevitably encounter psychotic patients at some point 
and would need to educate him- or herself about how to treat such patients.  Can 
the same not apply to the issue of working with addicted subjects? 
                                                 
8
 As I explained before, that should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
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9)  A demand for a separation from the drug—whether it comes from the 
patient or the clinician—could function as a resistance to doing the deeper work 
of analysis.   
10) The only demand the analyst should make on the patient, according to 
Lacan, is that he or she speak.   
 
Having an Impact:  The Clinical Utility of a Lacanian Approach 
I hope this project demonstrates the practical value of Lacanian theory—
its clinical utility.  I believe this project proves that approaches guided by 
Lacanian theory are genuinely useful not only with regard to Lacanian analysis 
but also psychotherapy.  The therapeutic ends of Lacanian analysis are even 
suggested by Lacan himself, who, referring to neurotics, notes:  “They have a 
difficult life and we try to alleviate their discomfort” (Lacan, 1976, p. 15, as qtd. 
in Fink, 2007).   
Through what is in many ways a delicate craft of working with the 
subject’s language—touching lightly on the particularity of his or her speech—
deep transformation can be achieved.  The real can be impacted through the 
symbolic, creating a transformation on the level of the drive and profound 
changes in the very moorings of one’s being.  Indeed, Lacanian approaches to 
clinical work have the potential to create profound transformations in the 
subject’s suffering by “touching, however lightly, on man’s relation to the 
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signifier . . . [to] change the course of his history by modifying the moorings of 
his being” (1957/2006, p. 438). 
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